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Abstract
Strategic reasoning is part of our everyday lives: we negotiate prices, bid in auctions, write
contracts, and play games. We choose actions in these scenarios based on our prefer-
ences, and our beliefs about preferences of the other participants. Game theory provides
a rich mathematical framework through which we can reason about the influence of these
preferences. Clever abstractions allow us to predict the outcome of complex agent inter-
actions, however, as the scenarios we model increase in complexity, the abstractions we
use to enable classical game-theoretic analysis lose fidelity. In empirical game-theoretic
analysis, we construct game models using empirical sources of knowledge—such as high-
fidelity simulation. However, utilizing empirical knowledge introduces a host of different
computational and statistical problems.
I investigate five main research problems that focus on efficient selection, estimation,
and analysis of empirical game models. I introduce a flexible modeling approach, where
we may construct multiple game-theoretic models from the same set of observations. I
propose a principled methodology for comparing empirical game models and a family of
algorithms that select a model from a set of candidates.
I develop algorithms for normal-form games that efficiently identify formations—sets
of strategies that are closed under a (correlated) best-response correspondence. This aids
in problems, such as finding Nash equilibria, that are key to analysis but hard to solve. I
investigate policies for sequentially determining profiles to simulate, when constrained by
a budget for simulation. Efficient policies allow modelers to analyze complex scenarios by
evaluating a subset of the profiles. The policies I introduce outperform the existing policies
xiii
in experiments.
I establish a principled methodology for evaluating strategies given an empirical game
model. I employ this methodology in two case studies of market scenarios: first, a case
study in supply chain management from the perspective of a strategy designer; then, a case
study in Internet ad auctions from the perspective of a mechanism designer. As part of the
latter analysis, I develop an ad-auctions scenario that captures several key strategic issues




The Internet has brought about fundamental change to the world economy. The U.S. Census
Bureau estimates that in 2007 the value of e-commerce shipments, sales, and revenues to-
taled $4.33 trillion or approximately 15% of total economic activity.1 Business-to-business
transactions accounted for the lion’s share of e-commerce activity (92.5%). Fueled by vast
amounts of data and the increasing complexity of making business decisions in electronic
markets, some firms now design complex software systems to execute key elements of their
business strategies.
The prominence of Internet advertising has dramatically shifted marketing practices
and serves as another example of the influence the Internet has had on the economy. In
a recent survey,2 the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) reports a total of $23.4 billion
in annual Internet advertising revenue with search advertising accounting for 45%. To put
this in perspective, consider that revenue from Internet advertising exceeded the revenue of
traditional methods of advertising like broadcast ($18.0B) and cable television ($21.4B).
While this figure is staggering, it is the underlying technological paradigm shift that
has caused the greatest excitement in related research communities. Unlike early forms
of Internet advertising where contracts were negotiated in large blocks through the use of
human sales teams, auctions are now the dominant process by which the allocation and
pricing of advertisements is determined. Major search engines return paid advertisements




auction that allocates the ad slots to paying advertisers. In July of 2008, the top search
engines received almost half a billion search queries per day.3 Because of the sheer mag-
nitude, search engines use highly optimized software systems to clear the auctions. These
systems reason over statistical models of user and advertiser behavior while continuously
adapting auction rules to optimize strategic goals. In addition to the software systems used
by the search engines to implement the auctions, sophisticated advertisers employ soft-
ware agents to manage their advertising campaigns. These agents may manage the daily
bids of a few hundred to a few hundred thousand or more keywords. The agents act in
semi-autonomous or fully autonomous fashion. I use the term trading agents to describe
self-interested autonomous software agents that participate in markets.
This thesis addresses the problem of practical design and evaluation of complex sce-
narios involving multiple trading agents. These multiagent scenarios can be described as
games. The goal of this thesis is to develop computational methodologies and techniques
that enable modelers to apply game-theoretic reasoning to scenarios that defy classical
analysis. Game theory provides a principled approach to designing and evaluating trading
agents and the markets in which the agents participate.
1.1 Foundation
Research in understanding agent behavior has classically been considered an economic
discipline. However, as markets and decisions that agents make participating in these
markets increase in complexity, practical algorithmic and computational concerns arise.
For instance, today’s market designers must consider the algorithmic constraints on the
complexity of the software required to facilitate their markets. Modern examples of these
market mechanisms include the ad auctions of Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo; the supply
networks of Wal-Mart that integrate directly with vendor inventory; electronic crossing net-
3See http://searchenginewatch.com/3630718
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works (ECNs) of financial markets; and combinatorial auctions in which bidders can bid
over multiple attributes and items.
From an agent’s perspective, its strategic choices may be algorithmically complex as
well. The environment the agent operates within may contain stochastic elements whose
parameters and distributions must be learned. Therefore, reasoning under uncertainty is
a core component of agent behavior. Firms may delegate business process decisions to
trading agents, therefore understanding and evaluating the algorithmic behavior of trading
agents is a primary concern of these firms and of the designers of the markets in which the
firms interact.
Multiagent systems (MAS) research, a sub-discipline of artificial intelligence, has long
relied on both theoretical and experimental analysis to understand the implications of al-
ternative agent behaviors, or strategies. For situations amenable to analytic modeling,
researchers often appeal to the framework of game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944), primarily due to its generality and normative solutions.
For scenarios that are too complex or lack directly specified game forms (i.e., payoff
or utility functions for a normal-form representation), analytic game theory is not imme-
diately applicable. In such situations, empirical game models (Wellman, 2006), where
observations or simulations of agent play are used to construct estimates of their utility,
can support game-theoretic analysis despite lack of explicit game descriptions. Empirical
game theory allows researchers to model a strategic scenario at a practical level of abstrac-
tion where analysis is computationally feasible and game-theoretic concepts can still be
applied.
1.2 Empirical Game-Theoretic Framework
The concept of empirical games has antecedents in both the MAS and economics literature.
In 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern introduced a framework for model-
3
ing scenarios involving multiple self-interested agents. Their theory of games pioneered
a new economic discipline. Soon after, John Nash (1951) generalized this framework by
extending von Neumann and Morgenstern’s work on two-player zero-sum games. In 1967,
John Harsanyi introduced Bayesian games to model situations where players are uncertain
about the payoffs of other players. Many general models of games now exist that span a
multitude of different modeling scenarios, however it is the non-cooperative games of Nash
and the Bayesian games of Harsanyi that form the basis for the empirical game-theoretic
framework used in this thesis.
Non-Cooperative Games
Nash (1951) investigated non-cooperative games consisting of a basic set of elements: play-
ers, actions, and utilities. Unless otherwise specified, I refer to the strategic or normal
form.
Definition 1 (Strategic Game). A strategic game Γ = 〈N, (Ai), (ui)〉 consists of
• a finite set of players, N , of size n indexed by i;
• a non-empty set of actions Ai for each player;
• a utility function ui : ×j∈NAj → R for each player.
Following the notation of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), I refer to a = (aj)j∈N as an
outcome or joint action and the set A = ×j∈NAj as the joint action space. Each player’s
utility depends on the outcome chosen jointly by the players, not simply on its own action.
In this setting, each player has full knowledge of its and the other players action sets and
utility functions, respectively. This condition is termed complete information. Finally, each
player chooses an action and all players choose their actions simultaneously.
Bayesian Games
In some scenarios, a player may be uncertain about the utility functions, actions, or the
knowledge of other players (incomplete information) or may not know all of the actions
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that have been played (imperfect information). Harsanyi (1967) proposed a framework in
which we transform a game of incomplete information into a game of imperfect information
by including an additional player, commonly called Nature. In Harsanyi’s model, Nature
takes the first action by selecting its state. Each player has a Bayesian prior over the states
and the priors are common knowledge. After Nature selects the state, each player chooses
an action simultaneously. A player may condition the action it chooses upon a signal (also
called a type), which is a function of the selected state of Nature. The utility received by
the players is a function of the joint actions taken by all the players (including Nature).
Definition 2 (Bayesian Game (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994)). A Bayesian game
〈N,Ω, (Ai), (Ti), (τi), (pi), (ui)〉 consists of
• a finite set N of players;
• a set of states of Nature Ω;
and for each player i ∈ N
• a set of actions Ai;
• a set of signals Ti and a signal function τi : Ω→ Ti;
• a probability measure Pi on Ω for which Pi(τ−1i (ti)) > 0 for all ti ∈ Ti;
• a utility function ui : ×j∈NAj × Ω→ R.
A player’s strategy is a mapping si : Ti → Ai where ai = si(ti) and Si is player i’s
strategy space. We refer to s = (sj)j∈N as a joint strategy or profile and S = ×j∈NSj as the





ui(s(ω), ω) dPi(ω), (1.1)
where s(ω) = (sj(τj(ω)))j∈N . Harsanyi (1967) describes a Bayesian game in strategic
form by using strategies in the place of actions with the corresponding expected utility, i.e.,
Γ = 〈N, (Si), (Ui)〉. Unless otherwise stated, I use this formulation throughout this thesis
to describe strategic scenarios.
Each profile s is associated with the set of neighboring profiles that can be reached
through a unilateral deviation by a player.
Definition 3 (Unilateral Deviation Set). The unilateral deviation set for player i and profile
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s ∈ S is
Di(s) = {(ŝi, s−i) : ŝi ∈ Si},





Note that s ∈ D(s), and that ŝ ∈ D(s) implies s ∈ D(ŝ). The notation sDŝ is used to





Let ∆(·) represent the probability simplex over a set. A mixed strategy σi is a prob-
ability distribution over strategies in Si, with σi(si) denoting the probability player i will
play strategy si. The mixed strategy space for player i is given by ∆i = ∆(Si). Similarly,
∆S = ×i∈N∆i is the mixed profile space.
Empirical Games
Like Bayesian games, empirical games model scenarios in which players may be uncertain
about the utility of playing a profile. What distinguishes the Bayesian formulation from
the empirical is that in an empirical game the utility functions are unknown. In the place
of utility functions, we have a simulator that generates (stochastic) observations of utility
from play.
In complex multiagent environments, strategies are often best described procedurally,
in effect, as computer programs that take type information as input and return the selected
action or sequence of actions as their output. For this reason, we often can do no better
than treat these strategies as black boxes, analyzing them in terms of input-output but not
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internal structure. Thus a simulator is a (stochastic) function that maps joint strategies
to outcomes, in the form of payoff vectors. Typically, a simulator will itself be realized
as a program that generates type information and implements the interaction among the
participating agents and the environment.
Definition 4 (Simulator). A simulator is a tuple S = 〈N,Ω, P, (Si), (Πi)〉 consisting of
• a finite set of players N of size n indexed by i;
• a set of states Ω;
• a probability measure P on Ω;
and for each player i ∈ N
• a set Si of strategies;
• a function Πi : ×j∈NSj×Ω→ R corresponding to the payoff player i receives when
a particular profile is simulated.
Although the full strategy space allowed by the game simulator may be large, empirical
game models usually restrict the strategy space to a small number of heuristically defined
strategies (Walsh et al., 2002). Even within this restricted space, modeling accuracy is
limited by statistical sampling, given the inherent stochastic behavior of typical simula-
tion environments. Given a limited computational budget, modelers must choose carefully
which strategy profiles to simulate and how many samples of those profiles to take.
One benefit of a simulation-based framework is that representations of a multiagent sys-
tem can be made with varying degrees of fidelity to the underlying scenario. For instance,
a stock market scenario may involve thousands of participants, each of whom are selecting
from a potentially infinite number of trading strategies. A simulation of the scenario may
be reduced to a manageable number of representative participants, each selecting from a
handful of promising strategies. Depending on the computational budget, an analyst may
increase or decrease the population size or available trading strategies in the simulator.
An individual run of the simulator, or simulation, produces an observation θ = (s, π),
where s is the strategy profile simulated and π = (π1, . . . , πn) is the realization of the
payoffs received by the players. Let Θ = {θk} be the observation set. A simulator S im-
plicitly defines a strategic game over the set of players N and profile space S, but without
an explicit utility function as would normally be specified in a game description. Instead,
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the observation set generated by the simulator provides the basis for an estimated game
model, which is what I call the empirical game. I define empirical games below, but first I
introduce a property called gain preserving.
Definition 5 (Gain Preserving). Let A and B be index sets and f = (fj)j∈B be a vector-
valued function such that fj : R|A| → R. The function f is gain preserving if there
exists a κ > 0 such that for every ε ≥ 0 and x, y ∈ R|A|, maxi∈A yi − xi ≤ ε ⇒
maxj∈B fj(y)− fj(x) ≤ κε.
For a gain-preserving function f , I call κ the gain-preserving constant.
Definition 6 (Empirical Game). An empirical game is a tuple E = 〈Γ,S, φ, µ〉 consisting
of
• a strategic game Γ = 〈NΓ, SΓ, uΓ〉;
• a simulator S = 〈NS,Ω, P, SS,ΠS〉;
• a mapping φ : SS → SΓ such that ∀sS, ŝS ∈ SS, sDŝ ⇒ φ(s)Dφ(ŝ);
• a gain-preserving mapping µ = (µj)j∈NS where µj : R|N
Γ| → R.
In the empirical game 〈Γ,S, φ, µ〉, the strategic game Γ is termed the embedded game
and µi associates the utilities in Γ to player i’s payoff in S. Conceptually, the functions
φ and µ allow us to move between the simulation space and the embedded game, while
preserving game-theoretic interpretations of the scenario—such as the deviation relation.
For every i ∈ NS, I define player i’s empirical utility model : ũEi (sS) = µi(uΓ( φ(sS) ) )
for every sS ∈ SS. Note that as defined here, the embedded game need not employ the
same player and profile space as the simulator. Because our evidence is statistical, we may
choose a different Γ to model an empirical game depending on our set of observations.
Determining which Γ is best is the one of the core research questions addressed in this
thesis.
Consider the example two-player, four-action simulator whose mean payoffs are given
in Table 1.1. The simulation strategy set for each player is {a, b} × {A,B}. The total
number of simulation profiles is 16. However, this example can be decomposed into two
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(a,A) (b,A) (a,B) (b,B)
(a,A) (6,6) (8,3) (6,6) (8,3)
(b,A) (3,8) (4,4) (3,8) (4,4)
(a,B) (6,6) (8,3) (6,6) (8,3)
(b,B) (3,8) (4,4) (3,8) (4,4)
Table 1.1: Mean payoffs for a two-player, four-action simulator.
games that are additive in utility: the game over the first factor and the game over the
second factor. Moreover, we find that the players’ choices for the second factor are irrele-
vant (in mean utility). Therefore we can model the scenario using only the game over the
first factor: Γ = 〈{row, col}, {a, b}2, uΓ〉. Let srow = (s1row, s2row) be the strategy played
by the row player and scol = (s1col, s
2
col) be the strategy played by the column player. The
function φ is given by φ(srow, scol) = (s1row, s
1
col). The function µ = (µi)i∈{row,col}, where
µi(ui, u−i) = ui and i ∈ {row, col}. The utility function of the embedded game is given in
Table 1.2. Instead of having 16 profiles as in the simulation space, the embedded game has
4. This compact representation reduces the risk of overfitting the utilities in the embedded




Table 1.2: An embedded utility function, uΓ, for the simulated payoffs in Table 1.1.
Strategic Stability
One goal of game-theoretic analysis is to identify profiles that are strategically stable, that
is, profiles where players have no incentive to unilaterally deviate. Stable profiles are a
fundamental component of many of the analysis techniques developed in this thesis, how-
ever, approximately stable profiles are also of great value. I use a concept called regret
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to measure the stability of a profile. Before describing regret and the Nash equilibrium
solution concept, I outline a supporting game-theoretic concept called the best response.
The best-response correspondence is used in the regret calculation of a profile as well as
calculating the regret of a set of profiles. I temporarily suppress the superscript Γ notation
for ease of exposition.
Best-response correspondence
For a given player i, the best-response correspondence, Bi, maps a given opponent pro-
file σ−i to the set of strategies that yield the maximum payoff, holding the other players’
strategies constant. I define best-response correspondences for a set of profiles, as well as
overall best-response correspondences, B, that give the joint best-responses with respect to
a profile or a set of profiles.
Definition 7 (Best Response). The player i best-response to opponent profile σ−i ∈ ∆(S−i)
is
Bi(σ−i) = arg max
σ̂i ∈ ∆i
ui(σ̂i , σ−i),
and for ∆−i ⊆ ∆(S−i) is Bi(∆−i) = ×σ−i∈∆Bi(σ−i). The overall best-response for profile
σ ∈ ∆(S) is B(σ) = ×i∈NBi(σ−i) and for ∆ ⊆ ∆(S) is B(∆) = ×σ∈∆B(σ).
The symbols Bi(σ−i), Bi(∆−i), B(σ−i), and B(∆) denote to the pure-strategy vari-
ants of the best-responses—allowing for a slight abuse of notation:
Bi(σ−i) = Bi(σ−i) ∩ Si






I introduce notation for the pure-strategy best-response to a set of profiles X = ×i∈NXi
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B†i (X−i) = Bi (∆(X−i))
B(X) = ×i∈NBi(X−i)
B†(X) = ×i∈NB†i (X−i)
The B(·) and B†(·) notation corresponds to differing independence assumptions on player
i’s system of beliefs (Bernheim, 1984). Under B(·), player imay not hold subjective beliefs
of opponent correlation (opponents mix independently over their respective strategy set).
Under B†(·), player i may hold subjective beliefs of opponent correlation.
Regret
The regret measures described in this section measure the stability of strategies and profiles,
respectively.
Definition 8 (Strategy regret). A player’s regret, δi(σi|σ−i), for playing strategy σi ∈ ∆i
against opponent profile σ−i ∈ ∆(S−i) is max
si∈Si
ui(si, σ−i)− ui(σi, σ−i).
Note that this can equivalently be formulated as ui(σ̂i, σ−i) − ui(σi, σ−i) for any
σ̂i ∈ Bi(σ−i). Given an efficient method for calculating a best-response, the latter for-
mulation can speed up regret computations, especially if player i’s strategy set is large or
infinite.
Definition 9 (Maximum regret). For strategy σi ∈ ∆i, the maximum regret, δ~i (σi), is
maxs∈S ui(s)− ui(σi, s−i).
Savage (1954) uses a minimax decision criterion to select a strategy to minimize the
maximum regret of the player. The maximum regret is related to the concept of approxi-
mate strategic dominance (Cheng and Wellman, 2007).
Definition 10 (δ-Dominance). A strategy sdi ∈ Si is δ-dominated iff there exists a σi ∈
∆(Si \ {sdi }) such that δ ≥ ui(sdi , s−i)− ui(σi, s−i),∀s−i ∈ S−i.
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If the inequality is strict, we say that the strategy is strictly δ-dominated. If a strategy is
not (strictly) δ-dominated, it is (strictly) δ-dominant. A strategy that has a maximum regret
of δ is a δ-dominant strategy.
Finally, I use the regret of the constituent strategies to define the regret of a profile.
Definition 11 (Profile regret). The regret of profile σ ∈ ∆, is the maximum gain from
deviation from σ by any player. Formally, ε(σ) = maxi∈N δi(σi|σ−i).
We can relate the regret of a profile in the embedded game to the regret of the profiles
in the simulator—based on the empirical utility model. Let E = 〈Γ,S, φ, µ〉, where κ is
the gain-preserving constant for µ. Let G = 〈NS, SS, ũE〉 be the strategic game formed
from the simulation profile space and the empirical utility model. For every σS ∈ ∆S, let
φ(σS) = σΓ, where for each profile sΓ ∈ SΓ, the probability that the profile is played is
given by σΓ(sΓ) =
∑
sS∈SS
φ(sS)I{sΓ=φ(sS)} and I is the indicator function. Let ε(·|γ) be
the regret function with respect to game γ.























= κ · ε(φ(sS)|Γ).
Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibrium
The equilibrium concept proposed by Nash (1951) for non-cooperative games remains the
foremost solution concept in game theory. Nash proved that such an equilibrium always
exists for finite games.
Definition 12 (Nash equilibrium). A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a profile σ ∈ ∆Γ such that
σ ∈ B(σ), therefore ε(σ) = 0.
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Nash defined this equilibrium over the set of actions in a non-cooperative game.
Harsanyi (1967) extended the Nash equilibrium to Bayesian games by constructing a strate-
gic game where the actions are the strategies of the Bayesian game and the utilities of the
strategic game are given by the expected utilities of the strategy profiles, i.e, 〈N, (Si), (Ui)〉.
Harsanyi’s solution concept is known as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, however I simply refer
to it as a Nash equilibrium when discussing empirical games.
Corollary 1.2.2. If σΓ ∈ ∆SΓ is a Nash equilibrium in Γ and, for some σS ∈ ∆SS ,
φ(σS) = σΓ, then σS is a Nash equilibrium in 〈NS, SS, ũE〉.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 1.2.1.
Approximate equilibria may be of interest in general, and are especially salient when
analyzing pure profiles for games that may not exhibit pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We
say that profile σ is an ε-Nash equilibrium, when the profile regret of σ is ε.
Constrained strategic equilibrium
Armantier et al. (2008) defined the concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) as
an approximation of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) induced by constraints on the strat-
egy space. Let S∗ ⊆ S be the BNEs of the game 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉. Let Sk ⊆ S be the
constrained strategy set at index k and Sk∗ be the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the con-
strained game 〈N, (Ski ), (ui)〉. An element of Sk∗ is a CSE. Assume ∀k > 0, Sk ⊂ Sk+1.
Theorem 1.2.3 (Corollary 2.2 of Armantier et al. (2008)). If S is compact, u is continuous
and there exists CSE sk∗ ∀k > 0, then there exists a BNE in S, and any sequence of CSEs
{sk∗}∞k=1 has a subsequence that converges towards a BNE.
Strategy sets in empirical games will generally not conform to Armantier et al.’s com-
pactness requirement; nevertheless, their result provides theoretical support for our expec-
tation that equilibria in empirical games will improve in approximation to equilibria of the
true game as more strategies are evaluated.
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1.3 Market Games and the Trading Agent Competition
Since 2000, the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) series of tournaments has spurred re-
searchers to develop improved automated bidding techniques for an array of challenging
market domains.4 The original TAC game presented a travel-shopping scenario; subse-
quent games have addressed problems in supply chain management, market design, and
ad auctions. By continually introducing new games, the TAC series engages the commu-
nity in an expanded set of strategic issues bearing on trading agent design and analysis. A
key feature of these games is that—like most realistic market environments—they are suf-
ficiently complicated (severely imperfect and incomplete information revealed over time
throughout dynamic activity) to defy analytic solution. Thus, empirical methods appear
indispensable to progress. The TAC/SCM and TAC/AA games provide an experimental
testbed for many of the techniques described in this thesis, while TAC/Travel makes less
frequent appearances. Short descriptions of each game follow. In addition, each game has
a detailed specification available.
TAC/Travel
TAC/Travel (Wellman et al., 2007) is an eight-player travel-shopping scenario where each
player acts as a travel agent, with the goal of assembling travel packages. Each agent acts
on behalf of eight clients, who express their preferences for various aspects of the trip. The
objective of the travel agent is to maximize the total satisfaction of its clients (the sum of
the client utilities) minus expenditures. An annual competition for the game was run every
year from 2000–2006. Over 70 entries have competed over the entire history of the yearly
competitions, with many teams submitting entries over the course of multiple competitions.
There are over 30 scholarly publications, including one book, that analyze the entries and
the game itself.
4See http://tradingagents.org, and http://www.sics.se/tac.
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TAC/SCM
TAC/SCM (Arunachalam and Sadeh, 2005) is a six-player supply chain management sce-
nario where players act as manufacturers, who must compete with each other for both
supplies and customers, and manage inventories and production facilities. The objective
of each manufacturer is to maximize its accumulated profits over the course of a simulated
year. An annual competition for the game has run every year since 2003. Participants have
created over 150 entries and over 50 corresponding scholarly publications.
TAC/Market Design
TAC/Market Design (Niu et al., 2008) is a variable-player double auction market scenario
where agents act as market specialists. Players in the game create respective marketplaces
that facilitate transactions between potential buyers and sellers currently associated with
the marketplace. Players compete over three objectives: profit share from fees, market
share, and transaction efficiency. The corresponding competition has run every year since
2007. Participants have created over 30 entries and at least 10 corresponding publications.
TAC/AA
TAC/AA (Chapter 9) is an eight-player sponsored search advertising scenario where agents
act as advertisers. Players manage their respective ad campaign by selecting bids and ads to
be displayed for each day. The objective of each advertiser is to maximize its accumulated
sales profits net advertising expense over the course of a simulated 2-month campaign.
Participants created 15 entries for the July 2009 inaugural competition.
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1.4 Thesis Overview
In this thesis, I investigate a general methodology for analyzing complex strategic sce-
narios with empirical game-theoretic models. In doing so, I consolidate a collection of
publications in which I, together with my coauthors, focus on five key research questions.
Question 1. Can we reduce the variance in our estimates of the parameters of an empirical
game model?
Chapter 2 covers Monte Carlo methods for efficiently estimating parameters of the util-
ity function of the embedded game. These methods focus on reducing the variance of
unbiased estimators of the mean utility. Many of the standard variance reduction tech-
niques originating from the simulation and control literature are applicable to multiagent
simulation. I review these methods as well as the advantage-sum technique that has been
used to analyze the performance of computer poker agents. The advantage-sum technique
bears a strong resemblance to the method of control variates. New to this thesis, I intro-
duce a family of control variate methods that extend the approach used by Wellman et al.
(2007) and Jordan et al. (2007) to reduce the variance of the payoff estimates from the
TAC/Travel and TAC/SCM simulators, respectively.
Question 2. Given an empirical model of the game, how should strategies be evaluated?
Chapter 3 explores and extends a regret-based approach to evaluating strategies in an
empirical game model (Jordan et al., 2007). The NE-regret evaluation measure induces a ra-
tional ranking over each player’s strategies. This ranking can be used to align the incentives
of the entrants in research competitions with the goals of the competition designers.
Question 3. Given an empirical model of the game, can we efficiently find (minimal) sets
of strategies that are closed under rational behavior?
Strategy sets closed under rational behavior are sets that are closed under a best-
response correspondence. Chapter 4 introduces algorithms to find closed and approxi-
mately closed strategy sets by extending the approach of Benisch et al. (2006). Strategy
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sets closed under rational behavior are useful for determining restricted games—games
whose strategy sets are restricted with respect to the base game—that capture relevant
strategic information about profiles and strategies, such as regret, in the base game. The
proposed algorithms are an improvement over the related iterated weaker-than-weak dom-
inance strategy pruning algorithms of Cheng and Wellman (2007) on the tested market
games.
Question 4. Given a set of heuristic strategies and a computational budget for simulating
agent play, how should modelers optimally select profiles to be simulated?
Chapter 6 introduces the profile selection problem and categorizes the existing ap-
proaches by the payoff observation model they assume. Under each payoff model, I
experimentally evaluate the known approaches from prior literature along with new algo-
rithms and variants, on a range of game instances and game classes. In each case, I find
that the new algorithms outperform the existing algorithms.
Chapter 7 applies the methods of Chapter 4 to the strategy exploration problem de-
fined by Schvartzman and Wellman (2009a). I introduce a new method that attempts to
form approximately-closed strategy sets in a minimal number of steps. This new method
outperforms the existing policies in the experiments.
Question 5. Given observations of agent play, how should empirical models of the under-
lying scenario be evaluated?
In Chapter 8, I introduce a flexible approach where we may construct multiple game-
theoretic models from the same set of observations. This approach gives a principled
methodology for selecting an empirical model for a given scenario and set of observations.
I propose a family of heuristic search algorithms that select an empirical game model from
a set of candidates.
Chapters 2–4 and 6–8 form the basis for the empirical game-theoretic analysis frame-
work. Chapters 5 and 9 employ this framework in two case studies: supply chain man-
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agement and Internet ad auctions. The case study in supply chain management focuses
on the design and evaluation of SCM strategies, in particular the design process used for
DeepMaize. Additionally, I compare the progress of agents as a whole over subsequent
tournament years.
The case study in Internet ad auctions focuses on the design and evaluation of ad auc-
tion mechanisms. As part of this thesis, I introduce a representative simulator that extends
existing models in the literature. This simulator was used in the TAC/AA 2009 tournament.
Fifteen teams participated in the tournament. Using the participants’ strategies, I optimize




In this chapter I describe methods to efficiently estimate parameters of the utility function,
uΓ, of the embedded game Γ. The utility function may have many different parameters—
for instance, a parameter specifying the mean utility for each player in each profile. The
parameters must be estimated from observations of agent play. To this end, I review the
existing body of literature on Monte Carlo methods for parameter estimation and describe
how they can be employed when modeling empirical games.
In order to facilitate game-theoretic reasoning, we need an estimate for the mean pay-
off, ui(s), for each player in each profile. In general, if Γ is written in normal form and
each player has at most P strategies to choose from, we need O(nP n) such estimates. The
realized payoffs from simulation are a function of strategic choices made by the players
and stochasticity in the environment. With enough samples, the random effects of the en-
vironment are simply averaged away. However, simulating the market games described
in this thesis is costly and observations are dear. Therefore, efficient parameter estimation
methods are of great importance.
L’Ecuyer (1994) and Ross (2001) describe several important variance reduction tech-
niques from the simulation research literature. Section 2.1 reviews four of these methods
and highlights important aspects as they relate to multiagent simulation. Three of the four
methods manipulate the stochastic inputs to the simulator and therefore require a simula-
tion framework conducive to the respective type of manipulation. The fourth, the method
of control variates, exploits the correlation between the stochastic inputs and the payoffs.
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This method can be applied whenever the stochastic inputs are observable and requires no
special consideration on the part of the simulation framework designer.
2.1 Variance Reduction in Monte Carlo Methods
Metropolis (1987) reflects on the early days of digital computing circa 1945 and a new
computation technique from that era: the Monte Carlo method. The method originated
out of a need to estimate parameters of complex physical systems (Metropolis and Ulam,
1949). At that time, this meant calculations related to the development of the hydrogen
bomb on the newly introduced ENIAC. Since their inception, applications of Monte Carlo
methods have expanded to include many challenging problems in various engineering and
scientific disciplines.
Hammersley and Handscomb (1964) describe Monte Carlo methods as a branch of
mathematics concerned with experiments on random numbers. They are particularly ef-
fective when estimating parameters of uncertain systems that are too complex or otherwise
expensive to be ascertained analytically. At their core, Monte Carlo methods use repeated
simulation to construct estimates of the parameters in question.
L’Ecuyer (1994) provides an extensive review of Monte Carlo methods that forms the
basis of this section. However, because we are modeling games, there are added complica-
tions. For example, with the exception of the common random variables method, L’Ecuyer
considers parameter estimation of a single “system” of interest. This corresponds to a sin-
gle player’s mean payoff estimate in a single profile. Instead, we are interested in a family
of payoff estimates, one for each player in each profile. Moreover, the relationship between
the payoff estimates for deviating profiles plays a central role in our analysis. I proceed by
introducing the framework as described by L’Ecuyer, making exception where necessary
to incorporate multiagent considerations.
We are interested in some statistical parameter π. Through simulation, we compute the
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realization of Z, an estimator of π. For instance, Z may be the sample average of several
simulation runs. Thus, Z is the result of the entire simulation process, which may involve
multiple runs through a simulator. The estimator is defined over probability space (Ω,B, P )
and is a measurable function of ω ∈ Ω, where Ω is the set of states of Nature, B is a σ-
algebra (typically a Borel algebra), and P is a probability measure. Therefore Z = h(ω)
for some h. Nelson (1985) describes the function h by three transformations such that
h(ω) = T3(T2(T1(ω))). The (multivariate) random variable X , where X = T1(ω), is con-
sidered the input to the simulator. The output, Y , of the simulator is a transformation of the
input given by Y = T2(X). The final transformation, Z = T3(Y ), gives the performance
statistics for the simulation.
In this section I consider a simple motivating example. We have a single player with
a single strategy. During the course of simulation a single random variable X is gener-
ated. The variable X is normally distributed. The payoff, Π, to the player is a measurable
function of X given by Π = g(X). Figure 2.1 shows g(x) for the example. Our pa-
rameter of interest, π, is the expectation of Π. In this example, g(x) is a step function
that pays off 100 if X is greater than the threshold of two. Therefore, we can calculate
π = 100 · (1 − Φ−1(2)) ≈ 2.275, where Φ−1(·) is the inverse standard normal cumulative
distribution function. Using L’Ecuyer’s notation, we devise an experiment where we cre-
ate m samples of the input, therefore X = (x1, . . . , xm). For each of the sample inputs,
we calculate the simulation output, in aggregate given by Y = (g(x1), . . . , g(xm)). The




Notice that E[Z] = π, therefore Z is an unbiased estimator for π. I call this the vanilla
Monte Carlo method and use the symbol Π̄ to represent this specific definition of Z. I use
alternate forms of the statistic Z in subsequent methods.
Figure 2.2 shows a trace of a 1,000-sample vanilla Monte Carlo estimation of π. The
dark line shows Π̄ and the gray lines show 95% confidence intervals for π. The confidence
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Figure 2.1: Single player, single action simulator
payoff is 100 has a low probability of occurrence.









Figure 2.2: A 1,000 sample trace of the simple example.
Efficient Monte Carlo estimation considers the tradeoff between the computational cost
of simulation and the level of precision for parameter estimates. In the approach of Nel-
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son (1985), transformations T1, T2, and T3 determine the mean square error (MSE) of the




[h(ω)− π]2dP (ω). (2.1)
When Z is an unbiased estimator of π, the mean square is equivalent to the variance of Z.
Efficiency in Monte Carlo estimation is inversely proportional to the product of the mean
square error and the expected cost of computing Z. Therefore, if we have two performance
statistics, both with the same expected cost, we would prefer the one with smaller mean
square error.
Wilson (1984) uses the term variance reduction to describe this process. He lists two
broad categories for variance reduction techniques (VRTs): correlation methods and im-
portance methods. Correlation methods exploit correlations in the random variables to
reduce variance. Such methods include antithetic variables, common random variables,
and control variates. Importance methods transform the input in order to focus sampling
on pivotal regions of the sample space. Such methods include the method of importance
sampling (described in this section) and additional methods like stratification (L’Ecuyer,
1994). Nelson (1985) takes a more elemental view of variance reduction, in which VRTs
are formed by modifying the three basic transformations. In the remainder of this section,
I review methods of antithetic variables, importance sampling, common random variables,
and control variates, as they relate to parameter estimation in empirical games.
Antithetic Variables
Suppose we have two unbiased estimators, Z and Z ′, of π. We can combine these esti-













Suppose Z and Z ′ are generated independently with equal variance. The covariance
term would vanish and we would be left with Var[Ẑ] = Var[Z]/2. In our simple example,
this is analogous to the variance achieved through a vanilla Monte Carlo approach using
2m samples of the input, instead of m. What if, however, we could find Z and Z ′ with
equal variance, but negative covariance? We would achieve a variance reduction.
Suppose in our simple example, ω ≡ {χk ∼ U [0, 1] | 1 ≤ k ≤ m} and X(ω) =
(Φ−1(χ1), . . . ,Φ
−1(χm)). Consider the input vectorX(1−ω) where 1−ω ≡ {1−χk | χk ∈
ω}. Here, 1 − ω is the antithetic sequence. In the simple example, X(ω) = −X(1 − ω).
If, for some k, xk(ω) > 2, then xk(1 − ω) < 2. Therefore, Y (ω) and Y (1 − ω) have the
same variance, but are negatively correlated. Similarly, Z(ω) and Z(1− ω), which are the
averages of Y (ω) and Y (1− ω), respectively, have negative covariance.
Let Ẑ(ω) = 1
2
(Z(ω) +Z(1−ω)). The relationship between the variance of Z and Ẑ is
Var[Ẑ] < Var[Z]/2. In other words, for the same number of sample points, we have an es-
timator with smaller variance than the original. Figure 2.3 shows a trace of a 1,000-sample
Monte Carlo estimation of π using antithetic variables. Because each step of the simulation
uses two simulation observations, I report indices only up to 500.









Figure 2.3: A 1,000-sample trace of the simple example using antithetic variables.
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The effect of the antithetic variables is only slight in this example, because the negative
correlation is weak (anti-correlated observations occur with low probability). Chapter 9
provides an example of antithetic variable analysis, through the use of capacity assignments
in the TAC/AA tournament, where the negative correlation is significant.
Importance Sampling
The method of importance sampling is particularly useful when rare events have a signif-
icant impact on parameter estimation, as is the case in our simple example. Importance
sampling reduces variance by transforming the simulation input and focusing simulation
on regions that are “important”. The input is transformed from the original probability
measure, P , to a new measure, Q. However, we adjust the resultant output, h(ω) under
the Q-measure, such that the expectation of the output is equal to the expectation of h(ω)
under the P -measure. This is done through the use of the Radon-Nikodym derivative,








[h(ω) (dP/dQ) (ω)] dQ(ω)
= EQ[h(ω)L(P,Q, ω)]




In our simple example, we can select Q such that X is still normally distributed, but
centered around 2 instead of 0. Under this Q-measure, we are equally likely to observe a
high or low value from u(·). However, we have to adjust the observation by the likelihood
it would be observed under the P -measure. This likelihood ratio is the density of the stan-
dard normal divided by the density of a unit normal with mean two both evaluated at x.
Figure 2.4(a) shows a trace of a 1,000-sample Monte Carlo estimation of π using only im-
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portance sampling. Because of the rare event nature of the simple example, the efficiency
of this method is a vast improvement over the vanilla method and the antithetic variable
method. However, we can combine methods to further improve efficiency. Figure 2.4(b)
shows a trace of a 1,000-sample Monte Carlo estimation of π using importance sampling
and antithetic variables, which is an improvement over importance sampling alone.









(a) Without antithetic variables









(b) With antithetic variables
Figure 2.4: A 1,000-sample trace of the simple example using importance sampling.
Common Random Variables
Thus far, I have considered methods that efficiently calculate parameter estimates for a sin-
gle ui(s). Now I consider the more general case where we are interested in estimating the
differences in mean payoffs. Computing differences in payoffs is fundamental to regret
calculations.
Suppose π1 and π2 are two unknown mean payoffs for two different strategies, esti-
mated by Z1 and Z2, respectively. Let Zδ = Z1 − Z2 and suppose E[Zδ] = π1 − π2. The
variance of Zδ is
Var[Zδ] = Var[Z1] + Var[Z2]− 2Cov[Z1, Z2].
Like with antithetic variables, the covariance term vanishes if Z1 and Z2 are generated in-
dependently. However, if we can induce a positive covariance, then we can decrease the
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variance of Zδ. L’Ecuyer (1994) describes a method in which the same random numbers
are used in each simulation experiment. Similar to the antithetic variables method, we use
Z1(ω) and Z2(ω), with the same ω, to compute Zδ. Care must be taken so that the same
random numbers are used in the exact same “spot” in both scenarios.
In general, this design process is called synchronization in the simulation literature.
Achieving synchronization is not a trivial task in the market games listed in Chapter 1.
Sodomka et al. (2007) and Collins and Ketter (2009) make notable progress in achieving
synchronization in TAC/SCM by modifying the standard simulator.1 The authors’ primary
motivation for designing the synchronized systems is to improve statistical significance
in paired t-tests, however we can also exploit their synchronization efforts for empirical
game-theoretic analysis.
The Method of Control Variates
In complex market simulations such as TAC/SCM and TAC/AA, observable environmental
variables may exist that correlate well the payoffs agents receive. The method of control
variates exploits correlations between random variables whose expectations are known,
called control variates or control variables, and a statistical estimator of interest. Unlike
methods described above, control variates do not require manipulation of simulation inputs.
This allows us to perform after-the-fact reductions in variance, a particularly convenient
property when we do not control the path of simulation.
Lavenberg and Welch (1981) and Lavenberg et al. (1982) provide excellent general
references for the method of control variates. I review their approach as it applies to mul-
tiagent simulations, using similar notation for convenience. I start with a single-player,
single-strategy setting, and then incorporate multiple players and strategies into the final
model.
1Each market factor is generated by a repeatable pseudo-random sequence. For example, the supply mar-
ket factors are generated by a mean reverting random walk. Sodomka et al. (2007) modify the server by
exposing seed parameters for each sequence.
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As above, let π (the expected payoff) be our desired statistical parameter and Π a sam-
ple payoff. Hence, Π is an unbiased estimator of π from one simulation run. Let C =
(C1, . . . , CQ)
T be a vector of Q control variables, such that Cq is generated from the same
simulation run as Π, has a known expectation, and is correlated with Π. Let µC = E[C]
and µq = E[µq] for q ∈ {1, . . . , Q}. For any constant vector α, ΠC(α) = Π−αT (C − µC)
is an unbiased estimator of π. Let α∗ minimize the variance of that estimator, in particular,
α∗ = Σ−1C σπ,C ,
where ΣC is the covariance matrix of C and σπ,C = (Cov[Π, C1], . . . ,Cov[Π, CQ])T . At















In practice σΠ,C and ΣC are often not known, forcing us to estimate α∗. Assume we
have K independent samples from simulation. To estimate α∗, Lavenberg et al. propose a
regression of the form
π = µ+ αT (C − µC) + e.
Let α̂ be the estimate for α∗ obtained by the regression. If (Π, C1, . . . , CQ) is multivari-









L’Ecuyer (1994) observes that, when the multinormality assumption is violated, the es-
timator is generally biased and may have larger variance than Π for small values of K.
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However, asymptotically there is no loss in estimating α∗. Additionally, Lavenberg and
Welch (1981) and Lavenberg et al. (1982) report that, in experiments, the ratio is relatively
accurate, even when the normality assumption is violated. Therefore we have a quantifiable
heuristic for selecting the number of control variables relative to the number of samples.
Lavenberg et al. developed the method of control variates in a simulation domain in
which there is a single parameter of interest. In multiagent scenarios, we have a set of
parameters of interest. A single run of the simulator may reveal information relevant only
to a subset of these parameters, namely, the parameters corresponding to the profile being
simulated. Depending on the observations available to us, we try various methods, taking
the view that any reduction in variance is welcome. I consider the following variations on
the method of control variates:
• Luck-only: the effect of the control variables on mean payoff is the same for all
strategies, regardless of the opponent profile;
• Strategy level: the effect of the control variables on mean payoff is the same for a
given strategy, regardless of the opponent profile;
• Profile level: the effect of the control variables on mean payoff is possibly dependent
on the given strategy and the opponent profile.
Choosing the best method involves reasoning about the relationship between the obser-
vation data set and empirical game model. In order to apply the strategy and profile-level
methods, we need to have a reasonable number of observations for each strategy and pro-
file, respectively. When the set of strategies under consideration is small, this assumption
may make sense. However, as is the case with the empirical games modeled in this thesis,
it is unrealistic to assume that we can sample every possible profile a significant number of
times. I review each model in turn.
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Profile-level methods
In the profile-level method, we can straightforwardly follow Lavenberg et al.’s approach
and calculate control variates independently for each player in each profile. Therefore, we
create a statistic
Πs,Ci (α) = Π
s
i − αT (C − µC) (2.2)
for every i ∈ N and s ∈ S. The control variables C can be unique to each player and




T (C − µC) + e.
The number of regressions we perform is exponential in the number of players and strate-
gies, thus requiring an exponentially large data set to regress on.
Strategy-level methods
In the strategy-level method, the control variables C and coefficients α are the same for
every strategy. Therefore, the distribution over opponent profiles in the training set is very
influential. One way to reduce the influence of the opponent profiles is to introduce a factor










µs−iI{s−i} +αT (C − µC) + e,
where I{x} is an indicator variable that is one if x occurs in the profile and 0 otherwise.
In the first regression, the variance is explained solely by the control variates. This lat-
ter regression works well if the payoffs from simulation are additively decomposable into
strategic factors and luck factors. The number of regressions we perform is linear in the
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number of strategies—an improvement over the profile-level method.
Luck-only methods
In the luck-only method, the control variables C and coefficients α are the same for every
profile. To estimate α∗, we solve a regression of one of the following forms:
πi = µi +α
T (C − µC) + e,
πi = µi +
∑
µsiI{si} +αT (C − µC) + e,
πi = µi +
∑
µs−iI{s−i} +αT (C − µC) + e,
πi = µi +
∑
µsI{s} +αT (C − µC) + e.
The various forms of regression correspond to our assumptions on how payoffs are (ap-
proximately) additively decomposable. In the first regression, the variance is explained
solely by the control variates, whereas in the latter forms the variance is explained by
a combination of the control variates and strategy, opponent profile, and profile factors,
respectively.
Exploiting ex-interim form
The method of control variates presented in the previous subsection used the ex-ante for-
mulation of the Bayesian game under consideration. We can use a player’s type as a control
variate, however the variance reduction achieved using this variable depends on how linear
the relationship between a player’s type and payoffs is. More typically, we use control
variates that summarize type information. If, for instance, the type space is small, then
we can apply the method of control variates separately for each type and then estimate the
payoffs using the weighted average of these estimates, weighting by the probability of the
type. This allows us to model nonlinear relationships between types and payoffs.
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Advantage-sum method
The advantage-sum technique introduced by Zinkevich et al. (2006) is similar in design
to the method of control variates. This technique explicitly models a sequence of events.
Here, I outline the Zinkevich et al. (2006) model and review some of the existing literature
that extends.
The set of all possible events is given by E and a history is some h ∈ E∗. We have
the relation O ⊆ H ⊆ E∗, where H is the set of reachable histories and O is the set of
terminal histories. A utility function u : O → R. A distribution σ : H \ O → ∆(E) over
the next event in the sequence. It is important to note that, as stated, σ describes all of the
randomness in the system, that is, the strategy of every player (including Nature). There is
a set K ⊆ H \ O, such that there is a known distribution k : K → ∆(E). Let K be the set
of all k-distributions, and Σ be the set of all σ-distributions. The distributions k ∈ K and
σ ∈ Σ agree if for all h ∈ K, σ(h) = k(j). Let Σk be the set of all σ that agree with k.
The output from simulation, Π, is a random variable where Π = u(h) and h ∈ O
under σ. As above, we seek an unbiased estimator of Eσ[Π] with minimal variance. Let
V : H → R be a value function. Given a belief ρ ∈ Σ, let V ρ(h) = Eρ[Π|h]. For some





where h.e is the sequence with e appended to h, and k(e|h) is the conditional probabil-
ity that e is the next event in the sequence given h under k. Define the advantage-sum
ûV,k : O → R to be:
ûV,k(h) = u(h) +
∑
t s.t. h(t)∈K
[QV,k(h(t))− V (h(t+ 1))].
Let Π̂V,k = ûV,k(h) and h ∈ O. Zinkevich et al. prove two main theorems.
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Theorem 2.1.1 (Zinkevich et al. (2006)). For any V : H → R and k ∈ K, Π̂V,k is an
unbiased estimator for Eσ[Π] for any σ ∈ Σk.
Theorem 2.1.2 (Zinkevich et al. (2006)). For any k ∈ K and any σ ∈ Σk, Π̂V σ ,k is a
minimum variance unbiased estimator for Eσ[Π].
The first theorem establishes that Π̂V,k, for any V , is an unbiased estimator. Therefore
we restrict our attention to value functions defined by belief ρ. The second theorem estab-
lishes that if we use a value function defined by belief ρ that is correct (ρ = σ), then Π̂V σ ,k
is a minimum variance estimator.
Let σ, σ′ ∈ Σk such that if σ(h) > 0 then σ′(h) > 0 for every h ∈ O. It follows that
Eσ′ [Π] = Eσ′ [u(h)]
= Eσ[u(h) σ(h)σ′(h) ].
This means that we can use the payoff estimate given by a simulation trace under σ to es-
timate the payoff under σ′ for any distribution σ′ meeting the criterion. In order words, we
can estimate the payoff under σ′ using only the data generated under σ. This is the basis
for the results given by Bowling et al. (2008).
2.2 Experiments
Each of the market scenarios in the Trading Agent Competition have some stochastic com-
ponent defined as part of their respective simulation. Uncertainty in the simulated environ-
ments reflects actual uncertainty agents face in these domains. In the TAC/SCM scenario,
the major source of uncertainly originates from the stochastic processes that drive customer
demand and component supply. In this section, I apply the method of control variates to
reduce the variance in the estimates of the mean payoffs in TAC/SCM simulations.
Wellman et al. (2005a) proposed a set of control variables to derive a payoff measure
called demand-adjusted profit (DAP). Each DAP represents an unbiased estimate of the
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mean payoff to a given player in a given profile. This adjustment considers the average
level of demand (measured in total number of PCs requested) for each of the PC market
segments: low, mid, and high. I collected the demand and score data from games played in
the semifinal and final rounds of the TAC/SCM 2005–2009 tournaments. Table 2.1 reports













Table 2.2: Number of observations for TAC/SCM tournament data.
Using the luck-only method, I compute DAP coefficients for each tournament year. I
regress against the semifinals data and measure the variance reduction on the finals data.
Because the profiles are fixed in each semifinal heat, controlling for a given strategy in
the semifinals is equivalent to controlling for a given profile. For each tournament year,
I measure the variance reduction with and without controlling for each player’s strategy.
Table 2.3 shows the results of the analysis without controlling for the strategies. The center
column of the table (DAP coefficient) presents the result of a linear regression of mean
agent score on demand in the respective segments. We obtain the DAP for agent i in game
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where Qseg(x) denotes the actual demand for the specified segment in game x, and Q̄seg
the mean demand as presented in Table 2.1. With the exception of the 2009 tournament
data, the difference in variance reduction with and without controlling for strategies is sta-
tistically insignificant, therefore I do not list the coefficients controlled for strategies in the
table. In the 2009 dataset, the variance reduction obtained without controlling for strategies
exceeded the corresponding method controlling for strategies by approximately 10%.
Server DAP Coeff. Low High. Variance
Version Segment (δseg) (2.5%) (97.5%) Reduction
20
05
Low 74.2 36.2 112.3
37.9%Mid 85.7 61.1 110.3
High 78.1 40.6 115.6
20
06
Low 61.7 42.4 81.1
45.8%Mid 75.9 62.7 89.1
High 99.2 84.5 113.9
20
07
Low 90.4 52.1 128.7
42.6%Mid 90.5 52.2 128.6
High 116.6 73.3 160.0
20
08
Low 119.1 -4.1 242.2
41.4%Mid 101.2 -23.9 226.2
High 125.3 6.0 244.7
20
09
Low 64.7 -1.3 130.7
37.4%Mid 85.5 41.8 129.3
High 35.8 -27.0 98.5
Table 2.3: TAC/SCM tournament variance reduction using DAP, including 95% confidence
intervals around the DAP coefficients.
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2.3 Discussion
In this chapter, I review variance reduction techniques and describe how these approaches
can be extended to a multiagent setting. I propose three classes of control variate methods
for reducing variance in multiagent simulations: luck-only, strategy level, and profile level.
Using the luck-only method, I demonstrate a variance reduction of at least 35% over five
years of TAC/SCM tournaments. In Chapter 9, I apply these methods to reduce the variance
of the payoffs in TAC/AA.
A majority of the techniques estimate parameters for empirical games in strategic form,
which is the game form used throughout this thesis. Methods for estimating parameters in
extensive form exist as well, with noteworthy contributions originating from the computer
poker research community (Zinkevich et al., 2006; Bowling et al., 2008). The number
of information states in a poker game is large, however it is dwarfed by a scenario like
TAC/SCM. Thus, developing methods that can partially exploit the extensive form while




Given a set of possible strategies, what is the best strategy for a given player? How much
better is one strategy compared to another? In a single-agent setting with some measure
of agent utility, we can answer these questions in a straightforward manner by evaluating
the utility of each strategy. The best strategies are the strategies with maximal utility. The
degree to which one strategy is better than another is the difference in utility the agent re-
ceives between the two strategies. In a multiagent setting, evaluating a set of strategies is
not as straightforward and has generated an abundance of evaluation techniques within the
research community.
Solving a game in a multiagent setting is analogous to finding the optimal strategy in a
single-agent setting. In game theory, the principal solution concept is the Nash equilibrium
and the analog of a best strategy is the set that supports a Nash equilibrium. However,
what about two strategies that do not support an equilibrium? Can one be better than the
other? In this chapter, I propose a principled strategy-evaluation measure and contrast this
with other existing methodologies. The proposed evaluation measure is termed NE regret
and corresponds to the strategy-regret of a player when the opponent profile, called a back-
ground context, in the strategy-regret calculation is a Nash Equilibrium. Using NE regret
as a comparison criterion induces a rationally consistent ranking over strategies, termed an
NE-response ranking.
Section 3.1 introduces NE-regret, while the discussion of NE-response ranking is de-
ferred until Section 3.3. Preceding the description of NE-response rankings, I illustrate a
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visualization technique for compactly displaying the stability of profiles in pure strategy
space. Deviation graphs and the contoured extension given in Section 3.2 were observed
by Wellman et al. (2005a) and Jordan et al. (2007) to be a useful tool for summarizing a
strategy space. I illustrate the usefulness of the evaluation measure and ranking technique
through an analysis of the Annual Computer Poker Competition in Section 3.4. The result-
ing NE-response ranking differs from the rankings given by the two methods used in the
competition.
3.1 Equilibrium-Based Strategy Regret
In a single-agent setting, we can compare strategies by the difference in their respective
utilities. In a multiagent setting the corresponding utilities depend on the opponent profile.
If the differences in utilities are invariant over all opponent profiles, then we can construct
a measure similar to the one used in the single-agent setting. However, this condition will
not be met in general.
Strategy regret (Definition 8) provides a method by which we can evaluate each strategy
in a set of candidate strategies. This measure is dependent on the choice of opponent pro-
file, forcing us to characterize what is reasonable for an opponent profile. The evaluation
measure I propose in this chapter restricts the set of allowable opponent profiles to those
supporting Nash equilibria. There may be multiple equilibria, in which case there may be
multiple regret values for a given strategy.
Definition 13 (NE Regret). The NE regret of strategy si ∈ Si for player i is δi(si|σNE−i )
where σNE is a Nash equilibrium of game Γ.
In a symmetric game with symmetric Nash equilibrium σNE , all strategies in support
of σNE have an NE regret of zero. The use of equilibrium profiles as a basis for opponent
profiles is founded on two lines of reasoning. First, Jordan et al. (2007) make the assump-
tion that, all else being equal, stable profiles are more likely to be played in practice. The
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assumption is echoed in this work and is empirically supported by Erev and Roth (1998).
Second, stable background contexts are intuitively appealing because they are equilibrium
points for rational agent play. Using NE regret as a strategy selection criterion can differ
significantly from other criteria such as minimax-regret.
Aside from measuring stability, strategy regret can reveal additional useful information
about a strategy. For instance, defining a feature-based or parameterized strategy is typical
for complex scenarios, such as TAC/SCM, where the agent is making many different com-
plex decisions. If a strategy is decomposable into a set of behavioral features, this measure
can ascribe a value or utility to each of its constituents. From a designer’s perspective,
this is particularly useful in heuristically constructing novel strategies from the evaluated
features of similar strategies.
3.2 Contour Deviation Graphs
A contour deviation graph is a visualization technique that describes the quality of strate-
gies through the relative stability of the profiles they support. I illustrate this technique
through an analysis of the simple game given in Table 3.1. The game has two players and




A (4,4) (5,1) (3,5)
B (1,5) (2,2) (1,3)
C (5,3) (3,1) (5,5)
Table 3.1: Two-player, three-action game example game.
However, simply identifying the equilibria of a game does not give us the whole pic-
ture. For instance, consider Figure 3.1. The left half of the figure shows the connectedness
of the profile space, where a node in the graph is a profile and an edge represents a possible
39


















Figure 3.1: Deviation space (left) and deviation gain (right) of the two-player, three-action
game in Table 3.1, with an emphasis on the AB profile.
The right half of the figure has more information overlaid on the edges. The edge
weights represent the regret of the player playing its strategy in the source profile when
given the option of switching to the corresponding strategy in the destination profile. For
instance, consider the profile AB. When analyzing AB, only the deviating profiles AA,
BB, BC, and AC affect the stability of AB. The profiles not in AB’s deviation set have
been colored gray as well as the deviations edges not used in its computation. From this
we can see that the deviation from AB giving the largest gain is AC.
Looking at the deviation gain graph as a whole, we can also make observations about
individual strategies. The strategy C seems particularly strong in this setting. It supports
the pure strategy Nash equilibrium and, additionally, is an improving deviation in five out
of six possible deviations (edges in the graph where a player changes its strategy to C).
Similarly, A is improving in four out of six possible deviations. Finally, we can see that B
is a particularly poor choice in that there are no improving deviations using B.
Figure 3.2 gives an alternative view of the deviation space using contour levels to in-
dicate the stability of a profile. Edges in the graph represent the best deviation from the
profile. The magnitude of the gain from deviation is represented by the contour level. In
the contour graphs, modelers make qualitative judgements of strategy robustness by con-
sidering the relative contour levels in which the strategies appear as well as the frequency








Figure 3.2: Contoured deviation graph of the three action game in Table 3.1.
librium, CC, is the most stable profile with a gain from deviation of zero. It is placed in
the innermost contour. Proceeding outward, each contour level contains progressively less
stable profiles, increasing in one unit of regret for each contour level. Thus,AA has a regret
of one and AB has a regret of four. Using this visual representation, strategy B is quickly
identified as a poor strategic choice, given that the profiles it supports occupy the outermost
contour levels. Conversely, C is identified as a strategically stable choice.
3.3 NE-Response Ranking
The NE-regret measure of Section 3.1 assigns a level of regret to each strategy and thus
induces a ranking over strategies. The notion of comparing or ranking strategies is not
novel. For instance, in the annual TAC tournament1, participants are ranked according to
their relative scores in a multi-stage tournament. The TAC tournament generates results
1A TAC tournament is typical of many competitive tournament settings and is similar in structure to the
NCAA Basketball Championship structure. There is an initial seeding round (round-robin style tournament)
in which teams determine their initial bracket. Each subsequent round eliminates half of the tournament
participants.
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from one particular path of combinations, and success in the tournament is rightly regarded
as evidence for agent quality.
Consider the design of a multi-stage tournament used to compare strategies from the
game in Table 3.1. The scenario is a two-player, symmetric game with three strategies.
During a round in a tournament, two strategies are compared. The winner is the player that
has a higher score in the profile. For instance, when the strategies A and C are compared,
we see that C is preferred to A. This is because, in the profile AC, the agent playing C
receives a payoff of 5 and the agent playing A receives a payoff of 3. A tournament is
formed by comparing two strategies, determining a winner, and then comparing the sur-
viving strategy to the third remaining strategy. Given the payoffs from Table 3.1, there are
















Figure 3.3: Possible multi-stage tournament outcomes for the game in Table 3.1.
First, notice that, in all cases, C wins the tournament. This supports the qualitative as-
sessment of strategies in Section 3.2. However, note that the tournament does not produce
a complete ranking, since the first losing strategy is never compared to the third strategy.
Moreover, strategies will have no opportunity for self-play, thus omitting valid strategic
aspects of the scenario in the comparison. Finally, in a multi-stage tournament the outcome
of the tournament is dependent on the ordering. Consider a similar design for a rock-paper-
scissors tournament. In Figure 3.3 each of A, B, C strategies would be replaced by rock,
paper, and scissors, respectively. Given the three initial tournament configurations, each
strategy wins the tournament exactly once.
Alternatively, we could construct a round-robin tournament that includes self-play and






Table 3.2: Average score for each strategy in a round-robin tournament of the game in
Table 3.1.
given by the round-robin tournament is C  A  B, which is consistent with the qual-
itative ranking given in Section 3.2. However, round-robin tournaments fail to provide a
reasonable ranking in cases like prisoner’s dilemma, where the ranking would consider a
dominated strategy as preferable to the dominant strategy.
We would like the ranking to be consistent with the preferences of rational players in
the game. The proposed NE-response ranking is grounded in these preferences. Before
defining the NE-response ranking, I discuss a set of properties a ranking over strategies
should have that are similar in spirit to the Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) concept of
rationalizable strategies.
Definition 14 (Rationalizable Strategies (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984)). Let Γ =
〈N,S, u〉, R(0) = S, and R(i) = B(R(i−1)). The rationalizable strategies are given by
R = R(∞).
The first property is termed rational support. This property states that there is some
mixed opponent profile for which the ranking respects a rational player’s preference rela-
tion with respect to that opponent profile.
Definition 15 (Rational support). For a game Γ and player i with strategy set Si, a binary
relation i on Si has rational support if
• i is a total preorder on Si
• ∃σ−i ∈ ∆ (S−i) such that for every pair of strategies si, ŝi ∈ Si,
si i ŝi =⇒ ui(si, σ−i) ≥ ui(ŝi, σ−i).
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I propose a family of ranking methods, called σ-response rankings. These methods use
a mixed profile σ as a background context. For each strategy si, we compute the payoff
player i receives by playing si when the other players play σ−i.
Definition 16 (σ-response ranking). For a game Γ, player i, and mixed profile σ−i ∈
∆ (S−i), a σ−i-response ranking denoted by σ−i is a ranking over player i’s strategies
that is rationally supported by σ−i. A σ-response ranking is a joint ranking σ= (σ−1
, . . . ,σ−n) where each component is a response ranking for a respective player.
Note that σ−i-response rankings are defined with respect to a specific player i in Γ,
however if Γ is symmetric, then the ranking is the same for each player.
Any σ-response ranking has rational support given by σ, however not all σ are justifi-
able as background contexts under rational behavior. From Bernheim (1984) and Pearce
(1984), we can prune strategies that are not rationalizable and reduce the set of justifiable
background contexts to those that are mixtures over rationalizable strategies. Let ratio-
nalizable rankings be rankings that have rationalizable support. A joint ranking  is a
rationalizable ranking if there is a rationalizable mixed profile σ such that i is supported
by σ−i for each player i.
We could identify the set of rationalizable rankings and disregard those that are not
rationalizable. However, this raises the existential question: are there any joint ratio-
nalizable rankings that are not justified by rational behavior? Consider the matching
pennies game given in Table 3.3. Each player’s full strategy set is rationalizable. Therefore,
({H R T}, {h C t}) is a jointly rationalizable ranking supported by the rationalizable
profile Th. In this case, the row player is playing a strategy it considers inferior according
to its stated ranking. Moreover, there is no profile that supports this joint ranking without
mixing over inferior strategies for the column player. Therefore ({H R T}, {h C t}) is
not consistent with rational strategic behavior.
Now that we know some rationalizable rankings are not justified, the question remains







Table 3.3: Matching pennies game.
behavior. To justify a joint ranking with rational behavior, I propose a property called
rational consistency that is defined subsequently. Plainly speaking, rational consistency
requires a profile that supports a joint ranking mix over strategies that are consistent with
the individual players’ rankings.
Definition 17 (Rational consistency). For a game Γ and joint ranking= (1, . . . ,n),
satisfies rational consistency if there exists some profile σ ∈ ∆Γ such that for every player
i ∈ N ,
• i is rationally supported by σ−i;
• ∀si ∈ Si if σi(si) > 0 then si is maximal under i.
If σ supports a rationally consistent , the two conditions imply that σ is a Nash equi-
librium. Therefore the set of rationally consistent joint rankings is given by the set of
σ-response rankings, where σ is a Nash equilibrium. I term an element of this set an
NE-response ranking.
Definition 18 (NE-response ranking). For a game Γ, an NE-response ranking is a σ-
response ranking where σ is a Nash equilibrium in Γ.
Consider, again, the game presented in Table 3.1. There is a degenerate mixed-strategy
equilibrium where each player plays C with probability 1. If we allow a single player devi-
ation to each of A, B, and C, we can calculate our σ-response ranking. Table 3.4 illustrates
deviation gain for each strategy from the Nash equilibrium background context as well as
two other background contexts where players playA andB with probability 1, respectively.
Using A as a background context, the resultant ranking is C  A  B, whereas B gives
the ranking A  C  B. The background context of B does not seem to capture what we
observed by visually analyzing the deviations. When using the Nash equilibrium context
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(C), we do see a ranking C  A  B that is consistent with our prior qualitative observa-
tions. Notice that both background contexts A and C induce the same rationally-consistent
ranking, even though A is not a Nash equilibrium. In this case, the profile of 100% A is an
approximate Nash equilibrium with a regret of 1.
Background Context A B C
100% A 0 -3 1
100% B 3 0 1
100% C -2 -4 0
Table 3.4: Pure-strategy deviation gain for three background contexts. 100% C is the Nash
equilibrium background context and is in bold font.
3.4 Computer Poker Competition
The Computer Poker Competition2 is an annual competition that evaluates research in au-
tonomous computer poker agents. The competition has existed since 2006 with over 40
entrants competing. The 2009 tournament3 consisted of two 2-player (heads-up) competi-
tions and one 3-player competition. The 2-player competitions include a no-limit and limit
variant of Texas Hold’em poker. In total, 13 bots participated in the limit competition and
5 in the no-limit. As part of the tournament, an empirical payoff matrix is created that
contains mean payoff estimates for each profile. For the limit competition, each bot played
75 matches of 3000 hands, while in the no-limit competition each bot played 60 matches
of 3000 hands.
Figure 3.4 shows the contour deviation graph for the 2009 no-limit competition bots.
Each step subsequent level indicates a unit increase in regret. From the graph, we observe
that Tartanian3 and Tartanian3RM are not strategically stable strategies. They only support
























Figure 3.4: The 2009 no-limit competition bots.
HyperboreanNL-Eqm, and HyperboreanNL-BR all support profiles that are in the inner-
most level. The profile consisting of only HyperboreanNL-Eqm is a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium.
Figure 3.5 shows the deviation graph for the 2009 limit competition bots. The color of
the circle implies its stability, with black being the least stable and white being the most
stable. The darker, distal profiles all contain GS5Dynamic or tommybot as selected strate-
gies. In the upper right of the figure, we see stable profiles that contain Rockhopper. The
white, proximal profile contains all GGValuta, which is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
For each competition, bots are ranked according to two methods: bankroll and run-off.
Bots in the bankroll competition are evaluated by their aggregate number of chips won over
all hands. Because each bot plays each other bot an equal number of times, this is equiv-
alent to ranking by a bot’s mean score against an opponent playing a uniform distribution
over all bots. In other words, a uniform-response ranking.
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Figure 3.5: The 2009 limit competition bots.
The run-off method4 recursively eliminates bots from consideration. A bot’s rank is
determined by how many rounds it survives. Starting with a set S of all bots, compute the
uniform-response ranking with respect to S. Eliminate the worst-ranked bot and recurse.
The run-off method bears a strong resemblance to the iterated-regret-minimization solution
concept introduced by Halpern and Pass (2009). The tournament designers describe the
run-off method as an “equilibrium competition”, with the idea that first place bot should be
able to beat the second placed bot in a heads up match and that, in general, the ith-place bot
should have a higher bankroll than j th-place bot when considering only matches between
the top j bots for i < j.
Table 3.5 highlights the differences in rankings between the various methods for the
2009 no-limit bots. Not surprisingly, the bankroll ranking differs from the run-off and
NE-response rankings (shown in bold). Both the run-off and NE-response method reverse
the order of the top two bots, but NE-response also reverses the ranking of the bottom
two bots. If we assume that players are rational in selecting which bot to play, bankroll
ranking does not yield reasonable results. For instance, HyperboreanNL-Eqm is the sole
4See http://www.cs.ualberta.ca/˜pokert/2009/rules.php
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survivor of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and therefore should be in
the highest ranked. The large difference in bankroll between HyperboreanNL-Eqm and
HyperboreanNL-BR results from HyperboreanNL-BR’s ability to exploit the weaker bots,
which rational opponents would not use.
Bot Bankroll Run-off NE-Response Ranking
HyperboreanNL-BR 1 2 2
HyperboreanNL-Eqm 2 1 1
BluffBot4 3 3 3
Tartanian3RM 4 4 5
Tartanian3 5 5 4
Table 3.5: Comparison of ranking methods for 2009 no-limit bots.
Table 3.6 displays the corresponding differences in rankings between the various meth-
ods for the 2009 limit bots. Here again, the bankroll ranking differs substantively from
the other rankings. In particular, HyperboreanLimit-BR is ranked second in the bankroll
ranking and fifth in the others, largely due again to its ability to exploit weaker bots.
Bot Bankroll Run-off NE-Response Ranking
MANZANA 1 3 2
HyperboreanLimit-BR 2 5 5
GGValuta 3 1 1
HyperboreanLimit-Eqm 4 2 3
Rockhopper 5 4 4
Sartre 6 7 7
Slumbot 7 6 6
GS5 8 8 8
AoBot 9 9 9
LIDIA 10 11 11
dcurbhu 11 12 12
GS5Dynamic 12 10 10
tommybot 13 13 13
Table 3.6: Comparison of ranking methods for 2009 limit bots.
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3.5 Discussion
The NE-regret and NE-response rankings I discuss in this chapter provide a principled
methodology to evaluate strategies. Through a case study of the Annual Computer Poker
Competition, I observe differences in ranking between the regret-based method and the ex-
isting techniques, while highlighting inconsistencies in the latter from a rational-behavior
perspective.
Using competitions to motivate research in complex environments is an increasingly
common research technique within the artificial intelligence and robotics communities
(Gini, 2009). In a multiagent setting, care must be taken by the designers to align the
incentives of the entrants with the research goals of the competition. The Trading Agent
Competition, which promotes research into the problems faced by designers of trading
agents and the markets in which they participate, is an excellent example. Each year a tour-
nament is run to determine the best set of agents for a specific market scenario. The hope
is that entrants are creating competent agents that tell us something about how to behave
optimally in these various markets. However, from a entrant’s perspective, there is a strong
incentive to design an agent to win the tournament. An agent that wins the tournament
may act pathologically, with respect to the underlying research goals, in order to do so.
For instance, an agent may be willing to lose a large amount of money as long the agent
makes more money than its opponents. While this behavior is reasonable with respect to
the entrant’s goals, it is not reasonable with respect to the goals of an agent in the actual
market scenario. Using a multi-stage or round-robin tournament, like the bankroll rankings
of the Computer Poker Competition, does not always correctly align incentives of the en-
trants. In general, this is because an equilibrium strategy in the competition may not be an
equilibrium strategy in the stage game, the game on which research is focused. However,
the NE-response ranking method of this chapter does correctly align the incentives of the
competition entrants and the research goals.
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Chapter 4
Rational Closure in Empirical Games
Many computational problems in game theory, such as finding Nash equilibria, are hard
to solve. This limitation forces analysts to limit attention to restricted subsets of the en-
tire strategy space. In this chapter, I develop algorithms to identify relevant subsets of the
strategy space under given size constraints. First, I modify an existing family of algorithms
for two-player games to compute rationally-closed strategy sets for n-player games. I then
extend these algorithms to apply in cases where the utility function is partially specified,
or there is a bound on the size of the restricted profile space. Finally, I evaluate these al-
gorithms on various game classes and compare their performance to that of other known
algorithms.
4.1 Restricted Games
Researchers in multiagent systems often appeal to the framework of game theory. It has
well understood solution concepts and a general formalism that allows analysts to model
a wide variety of scenarios. However, many game-theoretic analysis procedures—such as
solving a game—are computationally complex. All else being equal, smaller games are
easier to analyze. This is exemplified in computational game-theoretic literature, where
the complexity of some of the most basic operations are PPAD-complete or NP-complete.
Therefore, methods that reduce the size of a game can have a large impact on the feasi-
bility of analysis. For example, decreasing the effective number of players by hierarchical
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reduction (Wellman et al., 2005b) or clustering (Ficici et al., 2008) can reduce the num-
ber of profiles exponentially. We can also reduce the size of a game by pruning strategies
from some player’s strategy set. If strategies that are not relevant to the analysis can be
identified, then they can be safely pruned. Determining if a strategy is irrelevant can be
computationally complex, depending on the type of analysis undertaken.
Definition 19 (Restricted Game). Let ΓS↓X be a restricted game with respect to the base
game Γ, where each player i in ΓS↓X is restricted to playing strategies in Xi ⊆ Si.
Our goal is to find a restricted game that is minimal in size, yet conveys approximately
the same relevant information as the base game. Obviously, what information is relevant
depends on the exact type of strategic analysis, however one common vein in empirical
game-theoretic analysis is computing the regret of profiles. The regret computation is a
core component of the analysis of Chapter 3. In this context, we desire a restricted game
such that the regret of any profile with respect to the restricted game is approximately
the same as the regret of that profile with respect to the base game. Of course, when we
prune strategies, we lose the ability to calculate the regret of profiles not within the re-
stricted game. However, pruning irrelevant strategies can dramatically reduce the size of
the game. As analysts, we can determine an acceptable tradeoff between this loss and the
set of methods made feasible to us by the reduction.
From a player’s perspective, the regret of playing a particular strategy in a profile de-
pends on the other available strategies in the game. For a given profile, only the strategies
that are improving deviations give the player positive regret and thus are relevant to the
regret calculation. Suppose we can identify a joint strategy set such that, for each player
and each available profile in the restricted space, the player’s improving deviations are
contained in the restricted set of strategies for that player. Strategies outside that set are
irrelevant from the point of the regret analysis. The restricted game formed from the joint
strategy sets is closed, in the sense that a rational player would not choose to play strategies
outside those of the restricted game, given knowledge that the other players choose strate-
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gies within their restricted strategy sets. Therefore, we can prune these irrelevant strategies
and reduce the size of the game.
4.2 Pruning Strategies Through Strategy Elimination
In this section, I review some of the available algorithms used to prune strategy sets. Iter-
ated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) is an obvious first choice. IESDS
removes dominated strategies from the players’ strategy sets. Dominated strategies are
non-rationalizable (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984). In two-player games, only rationaliz-
able strategies remain after IESDS, but this is not necessarily the case for more than two
players.
Another possibility is to compute all of the Nash equilibria of the game and keep
only the strategies constituting those equilibria. This approach has some obvious down-
sides. Foremost, if identifying equilibria is the goal, then computing the equilibria as a
preprocessing step does not reduce the complexity of the analysis as a whole. Moreover,
computing equilibria is hard. For instance, computing a single NE is hard (PPAD-complete,
see Chen and Deng (2006) for two-player games; Daskalakis and Papadimitriou (2005) for
three-player games; and Daskalakis et al. (2005) for four or more players), let alone all NE.
Conitzer and Sandholm (2005) introduce a general eliminability criterion for two-
player games. The authors compute whether a strategy is eliminable by solving a mixed
integer program, which implicitly considers the rationalizable and NE solution concepts
discussed so far. However, whereas iterated elimination using this criterion may not rule
out equilibrium strategies in the base game, it may introduce NE in the restricted game that
are not equilibria in the base game. This is undesirable; we would like to know that profiles
identified as NE in the restricted game persist as NE in the base game. Persistence of this
type leads to the idea of rational closure.
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4.3 Rational Closure
In the previous section, I informally discussed properties of rationally closed sets. A re-
stricted strategy set, X , is rationally closed if the set is closed under a given best-response
correspondence. In this section, I review two formal definitions of rational closure in-
troduced by Basu and Weibull (1991) and Harsanyi and Selten (1988), respectively. The
difference between these two concepts is subtle and lies in the use of two different best-
response correspondences, B(X) and B†(X), respectively. Strategies in B†(X) are best-
responses to correlated opponent mixtures, whereas strategies in B(X) are best-responses
to independent mixtures.
Definition 20 (Closed under rational behavior (Basu and Weibull, 1991)). A set of profiles
X ⊆ S is
• closed under rational behavior (CURB) if B(X) ⊆ X .
• a minimal CURB set if no proper subset of X is CURB.
Definition 21 (Formation (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988)). A set of profiles X ⊆ S is
• a formation if B†(X) ⊆ X .
• a primitive formation if no proper subset of X is a formation.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) use the term primitive formation as the analog of a minimal
CURB set in the CURB framework. I use the term minimal formation interchangeably with
primitive formation as well as min-CURB for minimal CURB set.
Each formation contains at least one Nash equilibrium in the base game. Moreover,
the regret of a profile in a formation, with respect to the restricted game defined by the
formation, is equal to the regret of the profile with respect to the base game.
Theorem 4.3.1. If X is a formation and σ ∈ ∆X , then ε(σ|Γ) = ε(σ|ΓS↓X).
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Rational closure is central to many set-valued solution concepts. A set-valued solution
concept assigns to each game Γ a collection of product sets of strategies. Each element
X ∈ ϕ(Γ) is defined as X = ×i∈NΓX−i where Xi ⊆ Si. Set-based solution concepts using
some notion of rational closure include persistent retracts (Kalai and Samet, 1984), min-
imal prep sets (Voorneveld, 2004, 2005), minimal CURB sets (Basu and Weibull, 1991),
and primitive formations (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).
Identifying minimal CURB sets is complex, even in the two-player case. Benisch et al.
(2006) introduce a set of algorithms for finding these sets in two-player games. In the fol-
lowing section, I describe an extension of their algorithm for n-player games that identifies
the primitive formation sets. These algorithms are closely related to the generalized-saddle-
point algorithms of Brandt et al. (2009). Because B(X) ⊆ B†(X), primitive formations
weakly contain minimal CURB sets.
4.4 Algorithms for Finding Primitive Formations
Benisch et al. (2006) give algorithms for finding all minimal CURB sets, a sample minimal
CURB set, and the smallest minimal CURB set. The three algorithms all rely on a sub-
routine that computes Bi(X) for some X ⊆ S. The authors determine these strategies by
solving a feasibility problem: checking whether each strategy is a best-response to some
opponent mixture. When players mix over strategies independently, the feasibility problem
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is nonlinear for more than two players. Therefore, the authors restrict their attention to
two-player games.
I provide an extension of the Benisch et al. algorithms that is instead based on the
computation of B†i (X). Allowing correlated opponent play restores the linearity of the
feasibility problem, however we forgo minimal CURB sets with primitive formations re-
maining in their stead. The Correlated-All-Rationalizable (CAR) algorithm gives the
extension of the Benisch et al. All-Rationalizable algorithm to n-player games with cor-
related opponent play.
Algorithm 1 CAR(Si, X−i, ui)
S∗i ← ∅
for si ∈ Si do
if solution to the following linear feasibility problem exists
find px such that∑
x∈X−i
px = 1





pxui(ŝi, x) (∀ŝi ∈ Si \ {si})
then
S∗i ← S∗i ∪ {si}
return S∗i
The Minimum-Containing-Formation (MCF) algorithm is the extension of the two-
player Min-Containing-CURB algorithm (Benisch et al., 2006). Like the two-player
algorithm, MCF uses seed strategies to generate a minimum (primitive) formation contain-
ing the seed strategy. In many cases, the minimum formation is also the minimum CURB
set containing the seed strategies.
The algorithms for finding all minimal formations, a sample minimal formation, and
the smallest minimal formation are constructed by substituting the MCF algorithm for the
Min-Containing-CURB algorithm in the respective procedure (Benisch et al., 2006). Note
that seed strategies must be provided for n − 1 of the players in the non-symmetric cases
and one player in the symmetric case.
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Algorithm 2 MCF(s2, . . . , sn, 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉)





for 1 ≤ j ≤ n do
Ŝj ← CAR(Sj,×k∈N\{j}S∗k , uj)
if Ŝj \ S∗j = ∅ then
S∗j ← Ŝj
converged← false
return 〈S∗1 , . . . , S∗n, u〉
4.5 Partially-Specified Games
The utility u(s) is defined for every profile s in a game Γ. In empirical games, utility esti-
mates are constructed from Θ, however there may exist a set M ⊆ S such that none of the
observations in Θ correspond to any s ∈M . In this section, I explore methods of assigning
utility estimates to those missing profiles M and the consequences of these methods on the
primitive formation algorithms of Section 4.4. I consider the domain of u(·) to be S \M
and, if M 6= ∅, I call u(·) a partially-specified utility function (PSU).
The CAR algorithm uses the payoffs given by the utility function u(·) to determine
which strategies are best responses to mixtures over X−i. The algorithm assumes that we
have an estimate for the utility of each profile s ∈ Si ×X−i, however this may not be the
case. First, consider the use of a default utility ũ for s ∈M .
If s ∈M , we use ũ, in place of ui(s), when solving the feasibility problem in the CAR
algorithm. This may give an unduly pessimistic view of the relative utilities associated with
a strategy si ∈ Si, when determining if si is a best response. This can occur in two ways
for a given opponent profile x−i ∈ X−i:
• (si, x−i) ∈M and the actual utility u(si, x−i) > ũ,
• for some ŝi ∈ Si \ {si}, (ŝi, x−i) ∈M and the actual utility u(ŝi, x−i) < ũ.
Given either of those scenarios, we could exclude si from S∗i given our current partially
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specified utility function u(·), only to learn later that si is rationalizable for some mixture
over X−i once we have estimates for the associated utilities. Therefore, once again, we
could have a profile that is an equilibrium in the restricted game, but not in the base.
We would like to eliminate as many strategies as our observations allow, but not at the
expense of removing strategies in the support of a minimal formation. One effect of er-
roneous strategy elimination is the loss of ability to make general claims about NE using
only the subset of the profile space returned by the formation-finding algorithms. Notice
that we can straightforwardly check whether X ⊆ S is a formation, if D(X) ∩M = ∅.
However, restricting formation analysis to subspaces with estimated utilities is too strong a
requirement.
Instead of using a default utility, if we make optimistic assumptions on the utilities of
missing profiles, we can still guarantee the sets returned by any of the formation finding
algorithms are actually formations, albeit not necessarily primitive formations. As in the
consideration of default utility values, I focus on the relative utilities of a strategy si ∈ Si.
Let [u−i , u
+
i ] be known bounds on the utility of player i. In the algorithm, the utilities for
player i of the missing profiles are assigned to either u−i or u
+
i , according to the following
two rules:
• if (si, x−i) ∈M , then u+i is used;
• for ŝi ∈ Si \ {si}, if (ŝi, x−i) ∈M , then u−i is used.
Let MCF-PSU be the extension of the MCF algorithm using the previous rules for missing
profiles.
Theorem 4.5.1. IfX is the set returned by MCF andXPSU is the set returned by MCF-PSU
for the same parameters, then X ⊆ XPSU.
Proof. I use induction on the size of the missing profile set. For the base case, letM = {s}.
Assume XPSU ⊂ X . Therefore, for some player i, there is a strategy s∗i ∈ Xi that is not in
XPSUi . Because s
∗
i ∈ Xi, there is some iteration in MCF such that the LFP is satisfied for
s∗i in the CAR algorithm. Let p∗ be the probability vector that solves the LFP. Three cases
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can occur: (i) s is a profile in the left-hand-size (LHS) of the utility-based constraints, (ii)
s is a profile in the right-hand-size (RHS), (iii) s is neither a profile in the LHS nor the
RHS. In case (i), ui(s) ≤ u+i implies that the LHS constraints are weakly greater under
CAR-PSU, and p∗ satisfies the new LFP. In case (ii), ui(s) ≥ u−i implies that the RHS
constraints are weakly less under CAR-PSU, and p∗ satisfies the new LFP. In case (iii) the
CAR-PSU utilities are unchanged, so p∗ trivially satisfies the LFP. Therefore, the PSU-
based LPF is satisfied for s∗i under CAR-PSU and s∗i ∈ XPSUi Hence, by contradiction, we
have X ⊆ XPSU.
For the inductive step, assume X ⊆ XPSU where Mk is the missing profile set and
|Mk| = |k|. I use the same reasoning to conclude that under Mk + {s}, X ⊆ XPSU — the
LHS (RHS) constraints weakly increase (decrease) when under Mk + {s}. Therefore, by
induction, X ⊆ XPSU under any countable M .
Theorem 4.5.2. Let X be the set of minimal formations returned by the find-all-minimal-
formations algorithm and X PSU be the equivalent for the PSU extension. The following two
conditions hold:
(i) ∀X ∈ X∃XPSU ∈ X PSU such that X ⊆ XPSU,
(ii) ∀XPSU ∈ X PSU∃X ∈ X such that X ⊆ XPSU.
Proof. To prove (i), observe that for X ∈ X , the MCF algorithm returns X when each
player i chooses a seed strategy from Xi. This follows from the fact that minimal forma-
tions do not overlap (Benisch et al., 2006, Cor. 2). Therefore, directly from Theorem 4.5.1,
there exists some XPSU such that X ⊆ XPSU.
To prove (ii), let XPSU ∈ X PSU. Let X ′ be the minimum containing formation returned
by MCF when each player i chooses a seed strategy from XPSUi . From Theorem 4.5.1,
X ′ ⊆ X PSU. The set X ′ is a formation, therefore there exists some X ′′ ⊆ X ′ that is a
minimal formation. Hence, X ′′ ∈ X and X ′′ ⊆ XPSU.
Under these rules, si can never be eliminated with the optimistic partially-specified
utility function, when it would not have been with the fully-specified utility function. In
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addition, si cannot support the elimination of another strategy with the optimistic partially-
specified utility function, when it would not have been supporting with the fully-specified
utility function. Therefore, the each minimal formations is weakly contained within some
formations found using the optimistic algorithm.
4.6 Finding Approximate Formations
Cheng and Wellman (2007) introduce a weakened version of the standard dominance con-
dition, which they called δ-dominance. Applying this condition iteratively yields the set
of strategies that survive iterative elimination of weaker-than-weakly dominated strategies
(IE[wtw]DS). For equilibria found in the restricted game, the authors provide regret bounds
on those profiles in the base game.
I define a similar condition for formations. Let ÙUi be the function that specifies the
best-response utility of player i for each σ−i ∈ S−i when player i’s strategy set is limited
to Xi. Thus, ÙUi(σ−i;Xi) = max{ui(si, σ−i)|si ∈ Xi}. I extend the definition of regret to
sets of strategies in the following way.
Definition 22 (Regret of a Strategy Set). Let ∅ ⊂ Xi ⊆ Si. The regret of player i for having




I also define regret of a joint strategy set.
Definition 23 (Regret of a Joint Strategy Set). Let ∅ ⊂ X ⊆ S. The regret over all players
for having restricted joint strategy set X is ε(X) = maxi∈N δi(Xi|X−i).
Using the set-wise extensions of regret, I define ε-formation.
Definition 24 (ε-Formation). A set of profiles X ⊆ S is an ε-formation if ε(X) ≤ ε. The
set X is said to be an ε-primitive formation if no proper subset of X is an ε-formation.
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[ÙUi(σ−i;Xi)− ui(σ) + ÙUi(σ−i;Si)− ÙUi(σ−i;Xi)]
≤ ε(σ|ΓS↓X) + γ.
Aside from evaluating the regret of a set of joint strategies, we may be interested in
finding a set of joint strategies with minimal regret (ε) under some budget k on the size of
the profile space. Such a situation can occur when analysts are designing novel strategies
from a set of existing strategies. New strategies are evaluated against a set of promising
existing strategies using NE regret. To compute NE regret, we need estimates for the util-
ity of all the profiles in the joint strategy space as well as the unilateral deviations to the
new strategy. We may be limited in the number of observations we can make for these
new profiles, due to limited computational resources. This implicitly bounds the size of the
joint-strategy space we consider. I formulate the optimization problem as follows:
min ε(X)
s.t. |X| ≤ k.
(4.1)
Developing search strategies to find the optimal X is a fruitful area for future research.
In order to solve the optimization problem, we need to efficiently compute ε(·), which in
turn depends on the calculation of δ(·). We calculate δi(Xi|X−i) by determining the sup-
porting strategies in Si \ Xi. A strategy ŝi ∈ Si \ Xi supports δ if the maximum gain in
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σx−i ≥ 0 (∀x−i ∈ X−i)
ui(ŝi, σ−i)− τ ≥ ui(si, σ−i).
(4.2)
Notice that the last set of constraints in the linear program of (4.2) is slightly different
than the set of constraints in the linear feasibility program of Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1,
we consider every si ∈ Si rather than just in Xi. The reason for the distinction is subtle.
For a strategy to be included in a primitive formation it must be a best response to some
mixture over X−i, not simply an improving deviation, as in (4.2). The constraint in (4.1)
causes us to loosen our criterion for accepting additional strategies in the ε-formation.
Let COMPUTE-TAU return the solution to the linear program of (4.2). The pseudo-
code for calculating δi(Xi|X−i) is given in Algorithm 3. For each ŝi ∈ Si\Xi, we determine
the maximum τ and set δ to the maximum of those values. If τ ≤ 0, then ŝi is covered by
Xi. If τ > 0, then ŝi supports δi(Xi|X−i).
Algorithm 3 COMPUTE-DELTA(Xi, Si, X−i, ui(·))
δ ← 0
for ŝi ∈ Si \Xi do
τ ← COMPUTE-TAU(ŝi, X−i, ui(·)))
δ ← max(δ, τ)
return δ
Given an efficient algorithm for determining ε(·), we need an efficient search algorithm
for identifying the optimal restricted game. Before discussing search algorithms, consider
some general observations regarding ε(·): ε is not monotonic in the subset relation, ε is not
transitive, ε is not submodular or supermodular, and greedy selection of X is not optimal.
The two-player, three-action symmetric games of Table 4.1 highlights a few of these
observations. Allowing for the abuse in notation, the regret in game (a) of choosing from
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the strategy set {A} is 0, since all-A is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, ε({A,B,C}) is
0, since all of the strategies are available. However, ε({A,B}) = 1 and ε({A,C}) = 1.
Notice that ε({A}) < ε({A,B}) > ε({A,B,C}), which violates monotonicity and tran-
sitivity. Additionally, ε({A}) + ε({A,B,C}) < ε({A,B}) + ε({A,C}), which violates
supermodularity. For game (b), ε({A}) = 1 and all other restricted games have a re-




A 2 0 0
B 0 0 1
C 0 1 0
(b)
A B C
A -1 0 0
B 0 0 0
C 0 0 0
Table 4.1: Row player payoffs for games with non-modular ε(·)
The first three observations provide no effective bounds for branch-and-bound search.
The fourth observation rules out a greedy search algorithm as optimal, however it may be a
reasonable heuristic search method. Below I outline a simple algorithm to search over the
join-semilattice of restricted games.
Algorithm 4 FIND-FORMATION(Γ, k, M )
best← null
queue← Empty priority queue with maximum size M ordered by ε(·)
ENQUEUE-INITIAL-GAMES(queue,Γ, k)
while queue is not empty do
game← top(queue)




Algorithm 4 uses two basic subroutines and a priority queue with a maximum size of
M to determine the optimal restricted game for the given bound k. The two enqueue sub-
routines, ENQUEUE-INITIAL-GAMES and ENQUEUE-CHILD-GAMES, each present
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restricted games to the priority queue. The ENQUEUE-INITIAL-GAMES subroutine gen-
erates all restricted games where each player has a single strategy to choose from. The
ENQUEUE-CHILD-GAMES subroutine generates all of the restricted games where some
player has an additional strategy to choose from. For each generated restricted game in the
enqueue subroutines, the regret of the game is calculated by the COMPUTE-EPSILON
subroutine. The priority queue orders each restricted game by this calculated value.
Observe that the number of restricted games is exponential in the size of the players’
strategy sets, therefore a finite (small) value for M is required for even small values of k
and small games. Notice the special case of M = 1, which corresponds to simple greedy
search. In the experiments of Section 4.7, I vary M and observe the effects on the regret of
the selected restricted game.
4.7 Experiments
I consider two sets of experiments in evaluating the ε-formation finding algorithms. Note
that both sets of experiments involve two-player games, and recall that formations and
CURB sets are identical in this case. The first set considers a market game of interest,
the TAC travel-shopping game (Wellman et al., 2007), and compares the restricted games
given by iterated weaker-than-weak dominance (Cheng and Wellman, 2007) to those given
by Algorithm 4. The second set, run on randomly generated games, investigates under what
circumstances primitive-formation algorithms and ε-formation algorithms differ.
TAC Travel
Much like the TAC/SCM and TAC/AA games described in Chapter 1, the Trading Agent
Competition Travel-Shopping game (TAC/Travel) is a simulation-based game representing
a complex market scenario. The simulation is designed as an eight-player symmetric game.
The payoffs are derived from Monte Carlo simulation (Wellman et al., 2007). Cheng and
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Wellman (2007) consider a space of 27 candidate strategies using a two-player hierarchical
reduction of the original eight-player scenario, forming a symmetric game with 378 dis-
tinct profiles. Using iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, the 27 candidate
strategies are reduced to a set of 18 candidate strategies.
The authors investigate two greedy elimination algorithms by measuring the error of
each algorithm after each iteration of the algorithm. The error is calculated as the largest
regret with respect to the base game over all equilibria in the restricted game selected at
the end of each iteration. Thus, ε is an upper bound on the error metric used by Cheng
and Wellman. The two algorithms use δ-dominance, an approximate notion of dominance
(see Definition 9), as a strategy elimination criterion. Both algorithms iteratively eliminate
strategies until an error budget is reached. The error bound calculated by the algorithms is
weakly monotonically increasing in the number of strategies eliminated; however, Cheng
and Wellman provide a method for tighter bounds calculation that may reduce the error
estimate but is no longer monotonic.
The results reported by the authors show that the greedy algorithms can form restricted
games with 9-15 strategies that have an error bound of approximately 30, 6–8 strategies
with an error bound of 10, 4–5 strategies with an error bound of 5, and 2–3 strategies
with an error bound of 45. The actual error over these restricted games varies from 0 to
approximately 20 in the case of the restricted games with 2–3 strategies.
When I apply the ε-formation algorithm to this dataset, some interesting features
emerge. First, the smallest ε, single-strategy restricted game has a regret of 26.4, smaller
than the bounds returned by the greedy algorithms of Cheng and Wellman for 2–3 strategy
restricted games—the actual regret of the two-strategy restricted game is approximately 20.
Second, there is a primitive formation that consists of two strategies. Therefore, we have a
very aggressive pruning strategy that can prune all but two strategies and retain zero regret
for the restricted game. In general, such an aggressive pruning will not result in a primitive
formation, thus I analyze approximate formations in the experiments of Section 4.7.
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Randomly generated games
The randomly generated games used this section are classified into two distinct types gen-
erated by GAMUT (Nudelman et al., 2005): random and covariant. The random class of
games has payoffs that are uniformly and independently distributed in the range [-100,100].
The covariant class of games has payoffs that are distributed normally(0,1) with covariance
r between players in a profile. For experiments in this section, I used a setting of r = −1
2
for
covariant games. I generated 100 instances of each class with two players and ten strategies
per player. I compute the regret for each pure-strategy profile in each instance. Figure 4.1
shows the empirical distribution of regret values over profiles in each game class.
























Figure 4.1: Empirical distribution function of regret values over profiles for random and
covariant games.
The algorithms of Section 4.6 seek to find a restricted game whose regret is as small
as possible for a given constraint k on the size of the game. Benisch et al. (2006) found
experimentally that random games tend to have small smallest CURB sets (pure strategy
equilibria), whereas covariant games tend to have large smallest CURB sets (nearly all
strategies). While reviewing their findings, I make another observation. For those random
games which do not have a pure-strategy NE, the smallest CURB sets tend to be large. This
implies that we are unlikely to find minimal CURB sets for intermediate values of k unless
there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 4.2: Empirical distribution of minimum-regret values for random and covariant
games.
Figure 4.2 shows the empirical distribution of minimum-regret values for pure-strategy
profiles in the generated instances. GAMUT generated games with PSNE around 58%
of the time for random games and 14% of the time for covariant games. Therefore with
the same frequency, we can find minimal CURB sets where each player is selecting a
single strategy. Thus, returning a restricted game consisting of the minimum-regret pure-
strategy profile is optimal in nearly 58% and 14% of these games, respectively. Computing
the minimum-regret profile is linear in the number of profiles and thus is accomplished
efficiently.
The question remains as to what should be done in the remaining 42% and 86% of re-
spective cases when we are bounded by an intermediate value for k. From Benisch et al.’s
results, we can conclude that it is unlikely that a minimum CURB set, an ε-formation with
ε = 0, is found when k is much smaller than the size of the base game. However, using the
algorithms of Section 4.6 we can find ε-formations where ε > 0 for any k.
The number of restricted games is exponential and we have no known bounds relating
the regret of different restricted games. However, the M parameter in Algorithm 4 allows
us to explore some of the restricted games off of the greedy path if M > 1. Therefore, we
remove instances from the two classes where a PSNE exists. On the remaining games, I
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run Algorithm 4 with two settings for M and various settings for k. For each game, we run
the algorithm for each k where k ∈ {i2|1 ≤ i ≤ 10}. Because the size of the base game
is 100, the algorithm should return a game with ε = 0 when k = 100, even in the greedy
case. I use two settings for M ; a setting of M = 1 corresponds to greedy search, whereas
M = 1000 allows some non-greedy exploration. Maintaining a maximum queue size of
1000 allows a complete search of roughly the first two levels, or k ≤ 9 in the generated
instances.






































Figure 4.3: Worst-regret ratio for random and covariant games.
Figure 4.3 shows the results of running Algorithm 4 on the two classes of games, where
the worst-case regret ratio is fraction of regret of the restricted game found by the algorithm
when compared to the regret of the minimum-regret profile. Both the greedy (M = 1) and
M = 1000 found restricted games with less regret than the minimum regret profile. In fact,
when considering the random and covariant game classes, we can find a restricted game




Rational closure is a useful concept for selecting restricted games that capture relevant
strategic information about the base game. In particular, primitive formations allow mod-
elers to be confident that the regret of any profile calculated in the restricted game is the
same as when calculated in the base game. I adapt the algorithms of Benisch et al. (2006)
for calculating minimal CURB sets in two-player games to finding primitive formations
in n-player games. In addition, I derive techniques for identifying primitive formations
when utility functions are only partially specified, as is often the case in empirical game-
theoretic analysis when the strategy space is large and sampling is costly. Finally, when
primitive formations do not exist for a given restricted game size, I introduce ε-formations
and an algorithm for finding them when faced with a constraint on the maximum size of
the restricted game that is returned.
I show the ε-formation finding algorithm outperforms the iterated weaker-than-weak
dominance strategy pruning algorithms on the TAC/Travel market game. In cases where the
primitive formations of the base game are large, the ε-formation finding algorithm is able
to decrease the regret of selected restricted games when evaluated over various classes of




Managing a Supply Chain
with Trading Agents
Supply chain management (SCM) is concerned with the processes that govern the flow
of materials and information in a network of business relationships (supply chain). As
a field of study, SCM emerged from the study of inventory management systems in the
mid-twentieth century and has produced numerous scholarly publications over multiple
decades (Giunipero et al., 2008). The field has evolved from controlling the material flow
from within an organization to managing materials and information across organizations.
During this evolution, computer programs became critical to solving many of the problems
posed in SCM from optimization to forecasting. This chapter is concerned with the design
and analysis of the computer programs (trading agents) that implement the strategic behav-
ior of the firms in a supply chain—such as procuring supplies and selling manufactured
goods.
In the beginning, SCM’s rapid adoption of computers drove the need for a new method
of communication. In the late 1960s, a machine-readable form of electronic commu-
nication emerged. The term electronic data interchange (EDI) grew to encapsulate the
transmission of this structured data (Bergeron and Raymond, 1992). EDIs allow business
entities to transfer information within an organization or between organizations without
a human intermediary. Thus, firms could now populate large databases of information
automatically.
The vast stores of information provided new opportunities for resource management
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and strategic analysis, however exploiting these new found opportunities presented a dif-
ficult problem. Without a standardized (modular) system for managing this information,
integrating new components into existing legacy systems can be excessively costly. Starting
in the 1990s, enterprise resource planning systems (ERPs) arose to fill this need. Through
standardization, ERPs allow organizations to integrate information systems—such as man-
ufacturing, inventory, and accounting—that would otherwise be prohibitively complex.
Supply chain management leapt forward with the adoption of EDI and ERPs. These
systems enable efficient execution of business plans by providing greater access to infor-
mation. As SCM continues to evolve, we find that, increasingly, critical decisions are
delegated to computer programs. Mixed-initiative systems—where both human and au-
tomated reasoning are employed—are being developed and studied in both industry and
research communities. This chapter explores the design, development, and evaluation of
systems that are fully automated. In this way, we view them as autonomous trading agents,
functioning as the planner for the entire organization or node in a supply chain. At this
level, the actions of the agents are inherently strategic.
Section 5.1 describes the scenario that I use for testing various strategies of agents. Be-
cause the TAC/SCM scenario is simulation based, we can employ the tools and techniques
from previous chapters to analyze the strategic behavior of the agents. In Section 5.2, I re-
view the general architecture of SCM agents that Ketter et al. (2008) found after surveying
participants from various years in the competition. The analysis of Section 5.3 investigates
progress of the field of agents in the TAC/SCM tournament. Section 5.4 describes the gen-
eral structure of University of Michigan’s agent, DeepMaize, and the design paradigm used
to select DeepMaize for the tournaments.
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5.1 TAC/SCM Scenario
This chapter investigates the strategic issues that arise from managing supply chains with
trading agents. I pose the investigation as a case study of the Supply Chain Manage-
ment game (TAC/SCM) introduced by Arunachalam and Sadeh (2005) and Eriksson et al.
(2006). The TAC/SCM tournament—a supply chain management competition between
agent designers—has been played annually since its inclusion in the Trading Agent Com-
petition in 2003.
TAC/SCM is a dynamic supply chain environment where trading partners form short-
term relationships. This is in contrast to the static, long-term relationships currently found
in practice. This flexibility allows agents to explore trading and management strategies that
are potentially more efficient. While obviously not of the highest fidelity, TAC/SCM cap-
tures many of the interesting strategic and non-strategic aspects of managing a supply chain,
while making simplifications to keep a modest barrier to entry for potential research teams.
Collins et al. (2004) provide a complete specification of the game. Further description and
discussion is provided in many of the papers cited herein. Although most details of the
game rules are inessential to the analysis here, I establish some context by providing a
capsule description.
In TAC/SCM, six agents representing PC (personal computer) manufacturer agents
compete to maximize their profits over a simulated year. There are 220 scenario days,
and agents have approximately 14 seconds to make decisions each day. Agents partic-
ipate simultaneously in markets for supplies (components) and finished PCs. There are
16 different types of PCs (divided into three market segments), defined by the compatible
combinations of 10 different component types. Components fall into one of four categories:
CPU, motherboard, memory, and hard disk. There are four types of CPUs and two types
of each of the remaining components; one component from each category is required to
produce a PC.
Agents negotiate deals with suppliers and customers through an RFQ (request-for-
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quote) mechanism. The suppliers and customers execute policies defined by the game
specification and implemented in the server. The suppliers have limited production capac-
ity that varies during the game according to a random walk. They make offers and set
prices based on their ratio of available capacity. The customer generates requests for PCs
each day. The number of requests is driven by a stochastic demand process for each market
segment.
Agents face substantial uncertainty in both markets. The underlying supplier capacities,
customer demand parameters, and local state of other manufacturer agents are not directly
observable, so agents must estimate these from other sources of information. There is
also strategic uncertainty, since agents do not know the exact strategies employed by their
competitors.
Each manufacturer is endowed with an identical factory that has limited production ca-
pacity, measured in cycles. Each PC type requires a different number of cycles to produce.
Agents pay storage costs for all components and PCs held in inventory each day, and are
charged (or paid) interest on bank balances. At the end of the game agents are evaluated
based on total profit, and any remaining inventory is worthless.
5.2 Supply Chain Management Agents
TAC/SCM is a complex scenario and developing an agent is a correspondingly difficult
task. On a given day in the TAC/SCM senario, an agent faces three types of decisions: pro-
curement, sales, and scheduling. Procurement decisions consist of generating RFQs and
accepting or rejecting offers from suppliers. Agents make sales decisions by determining
the offer prices of RFQs received from customers. Finally, scheduling decisions include
selecting which PCs to produce from available components, and planning delivery of the
finished PCs to fulfill customer orders. These decisions take place under substantial uncer-
tainty in the state of the markets. Predicting the state (both hidden and observable) is an
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important part of an agent’s strategy.
Participating TAC/SCM teams have proposed various general architectures for agents.
Ketter et al. (2008) distill the results of an informational survey regarding these architec-
tures. Figure 5.1 gives a hierarchical interpretation of their findings. Top-level features
include decision coordination mechanisms, choice of general optimization algorithms, and
modeling choices for dealing with uncertainty. Under the umbrella category for decision
coordination, agents specify procedures for dealing with inventory, procurement, sales, etc.








































Figure 5.1: Features of agent architectures in TAC/SCM (Ketter et al., 2008).
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that a majority of novel agent designs (archi-
tectures) in TAC occur in the first few years of the respective scenario. This is not to
imply that subsequent years are inconsequential to research; rather, in the first few years
we historically find incipient high-level designs—for instance, value-based decomposition
(Kiekintveld et al., 2006) in TAC/SCM—and subsequent competitions’ agents improve
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upon these designs with improvements to low-level components such as demand and supply
prediction algorithms. Some low-level components of agent behavior that are common to
most agents have inspired side competitions or challenges. In particular, the TAC/SCM Pre-
diction Challenge (Pardoe and Stone, 2008) isolates the demand and supply price prediction
problem agents face in TAC/SCM.
5.3 Measuring Progress
The main goal of this section is to determine whether agents are progressing—that is,
whether subsequent years’ agents are “better” than prior years. Agent progress supports
the value of research competitions in tackling difficult problems like supply chain manage-
ment; however, the multiagent nature of the scenario complicates progress metrics because
agent competence is measured with respect the set of opponent agents’ strategies that may
change over time. I employ the strategy evaluation measures of Chapter 3 to show that, in
fact, TAC/SCM agents have become better over time.
I center analysis around a TAC/SCM empirical game model. First, I introduce an em-
pirical game model used to represent TAC/SCM and describe the process used to generate
data for the model. The TAC/SCM scenario is implicitly defined by a server, which I use
as the underlying simulator for the model. The strategy space is the set of agents submitted
to the agent repository,1 as well as candidates constructed for DeepMaize analysis. Ta-
ble 5.1 lists the participating agents used in this analysis as well as their affiliations and
descriptions, if available.
Following the description of the empirical game, I show the results of an isolated
empirical game-theoretic analysis of the strategies for the 2005 and 2006 tournaments,
respectively. In addition, I analyze the 2005 and 2006 strategies jointly. Evidence from
the analysis supports the claim that agents are improving in competence over subsequent
1Designed and implemented by Joakim Eriksson (Swedish Institute of Computer Science) and Kevin
O’Malley (University of Michigan), and available at http://www.sics.se/tac/showagents.php.
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Agent Affiliation Description
Botticelli Brown U Benisch et al. (2004)
CMieux Carnegie Mellon University Benisch et al. (2009)
CrocodileAgent University of Zagreb Podobnik et al. (2006)
DeepMaize U Michigan Kiekintveld et al. (2006)
GoBlueOval Ford Motor Co. and U Michigan
Maxon Xonar Inc.
Mertacor Aristotle U Thessaloniki Kontogounis et al. (2006)
MinneTAC U Minnesota Collins et al. (2007)
PhantAgent Politechnica U Bucharest Stan et al. (2006)
SouthamptonSCM U Southampton He et al. (2006)
TacTex U Texas Pardoe and Stone (2007)
Table 5.1: TAC/SCM participants with affiliation.
tournament years.
Defining an empirical game model
The TAC/SCM server defines a simulation space with six players. The players’ roles in
the simulator are equivalent, thus forming a symmetric profile space. Given a symmetric






For example, in this analysis we may consider S = 6 agent strategies. With N = 6, this in-
duces a total of 462 profiles that would need to be estimated for a full-granularity analysis.
We can significantly decrease this number by restricting attention to cases where strategies
are assigned to pairs of agents rather than individuals. Specifically, the resulting 3-player
game, denoted SCM↓3, comprises only 56 profiles over the same 6-strategy set. The payoff
to a strategy in an SCM↓3 profile is defined as the average payoff to the two agents playing
this strategy in the original 6-player game.
In several contexts, it has been shown experimentally and theoretically that this form of
hierarchical game reduction produces results approximating well the original unrestricted
game, with great computational savings (Reeves, 2005; Wellman et al., 2005b). Although
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I have not validated this specifically in TAC/SCM, intuitively I would expect this game to
share the necessary property of payoffs smoothly varying with the number of other agents
playing a given strategy.
Generating the observation set
I have collected results from well over 35,000 sample games combined in the TAC-05 and
TAC-06 environments. We performed most of the simulations using a computing cluster
operated by the University of Michigan. The cluster facility provides scalable and homo-
geneous processing, supporting parallel simulation with a fair allocation of computational
power to each agent.
Each game simulation reserves seven CPUs for a period of one hour; one for each agent
and one for the TAC/SCM server. We group games into sets of 3–5 to reduce the overhead
cost of configuring the simulation on the assigned cluster nodes. Game results (in the form
of server log files) are sent back to central repository. A central server tracks the results
and submits new simulations to the cluster as each job is completed.
The simulated strategies potentially differ from the actual tournament agents in one im-
portant respect. Tournament agents can maintain state from one game instance to another,
and so can adapt their strategy for later games based on experience in earlier games. Sev-
eral agents take advantage of this opportunity, including the top-scoring agent from both
2005 and 2006 tournaments, TacTex (Pardoe and Stone, 2006). The simulation analysis is
based on sampling from a pool of fixed strategies, so this necessarily restricts the agents to
versions that adapt only within a game instance.
During a game simulation, much can go wrong, for example network outages or de-
lays, or interference with one or more processors. We therefore attempt to filter our data
set by removing game instances tainted in this way. We considered various procedures for
identifying tainted games, ultimately settling on a very simple rule. A game is scratched if,
for any agent, there are six or more days (out of 220) in which the server did not receive a
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message from that agent (as indicated by the game log).
Given the expense of generating samples by simulation (over 7 processor-hours per
game), we seek to glean the most information we can from each data point. Toward that
end, I employ the reduce variance techniques of Section 2.2. In the case of TAC/SCM, the
most significant stochastic factor bearing on payoffs is the level of customer demand for
PCs during the game.
SCM 2005
The TAC-05 analysis employs a dataset of 2,110 validated game instances, covering a
minimum of 28 samples each of 56 distinct profiles of six TAC-05 agents: TacTex (Tx),
Mertacor (Mr), DeepMaize (Dm), MinneTAC (Mt), PhantAgent (Ph), and GoBlueOval
(Gb).2 As shown in Table 5.2, the first four of these made it to the final round of the
TAC/SCM-05 tournament (the other two finalists are not currently available in the reposi-
tory), PhantAgent was a semifinalist, and GoBlueOval was a quarter-finalist.
Agent Finals Semifinals Quarter-Finals Seeding
TacTex (Tx) 4.74 3.57 [1] 17.78 [A] 14.89
SouthamptonSCM 1.60 4.62 [2] 3.50 [B] 10.05
Mertacor (Mr) 0.55 2.66 [2] 4.58 [B] 9.30
DeepMaize (Dm) –0.22 3.68 [1] 17.49 [D] 10.23
MinneTAC (Mt) –0.31 2.27 [1] 11.91 [A] 9.86
Maxon –1.98 3.80 [2] 5.23 [C] 8.76
PhantAgent (Ph) n/a –6.64 [1] 7.03 [A] 9.87
GoBlueOval (Gb) n/a n/a –2.60 [B] 12.60
Table 5.2: TAC/SCM-05 finalists, plus PhantAgent and GoBlueOval, with average scores
($M) from seeding through final rounds (semifinal and quarter-final groups in brackets).
Interaction among the strategies is one factor explaining differences in scores—and
even relative rankings—between rounds of the tournament. Game-theoretic analysis serves
2The versions of these agents in the repository do not maintain state from game to game, so may differ
from the actual tournament agents as noted above.
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to assess the robustness of tournament rankings to strategic interactions. Another factor that
explains differences between rounds is modifications to agents made between rounds (de-
velopers are allowed to modify agents between tournament rounds, but not within a round).
In one case, both a semifinal and final round version of a single agent has been released, but
we typically do not have access to all versions of the agent and are thus unable to investigate
these variations in our empirical analysis.
The contour deviation graph of Figure 5.2 summarizes our stability analysis of the pure
strategy profiles of the game. Each node represents a profile (three strategies). The outgo-
ing edge from a node indicates the best deviation from that profile—that is, the transition
providing the greatest gain in payoff for one agent switching strategies. For example, the
profile with all DeepMaize (DmDmDm, in Level 4 around 10 o’clock) points to profile
DmDmMr, which means that switching from DeepMaize to Mertacor in this context of-
fers the greatest increase in payoff. That the arrow signifying the edge is solid rather than





































Level 1: 0.0 - 0.6 M
Level 2: 0.7 - 2.2 M
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Figure 5.2: Deviation analysis for pure profiles of 2005 SCM↓3.
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The magnitude of the potential benefit from deviating is represented by the node’s
placement in the diagram. The profiles in the innermost ellipse (Level 1) represent the
most stable (closest to equilibrium), with 0.04M ≤ ε ≤ 0.6M . Concentric rings define
levels with increasing values of ε. Level 4 (outermost ring) profiles are quite unstable, as
a single agent (in the 3-player game) can benefit by at least 4.4M by deviating from its
designated strategy. Note that the best deviation links usually, but not necessarily, connect
profiles to more stable alternatives.
Since all profiles in Figure 5.2 have outgoing edges, we can conclude that the empirical
game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). Indeed, there exists a directed cycle
among three relatively stable profiles, and all paths lead to this cycle.
There are, however, mixed strategy equilibria, and we have identified one symmetric
Nash equilibrium, as well as several approximate equilibria. We found these mixtures us-
ing replicator dynamics (RD), and present them in Table 5.3. Specifically, we ran RD seven
times; once with all strategies present, and once for each subset of five out of six. In all
cases, the initial population is distributed uniformly. The profile generated by RD with all
agents present is a symmetric Nash equilibrium. GoBlueOval is not played in this equi-
librium, and indeed omitting that agent leaves the RD result unchanged. Two other RD
results are approximate (ε < 1.0M ) equilibria; not surprisingly, these respectively omit the
agents (DeepMaize and MinneTAC) with lowest positive probability in the known exact
equilibrium.
The analysis reveals several striking observations. First, all agents perform quite poorly
with many copies of themselves. Three out of the four most unstable profiles (MnMnMn,
TxTxGb, TxTxTx, and MrMrMr, respectively) comprise a single strategy. This fact can be
explained by the multiple copies all competing for the same “niche”, or exploiting oppor-
tunities typically left available by other agents (but not themselves, of course). In addition,
some of the problem may be simply that the agents are hardwired to procure components




































DeepMaize .055 — .015 .035 .219 .326 .055
TacTex .112 .137 — .100 .210 .156 .112
MinneTAC .057 .079 .106 — 0 .109 .057
PhantAgent .400 .418 .533 .482 — .271 .400
Mertacor .376 .366 .346 .384 .559 — .376
GoBlueOval 0 0 0 0 .012 .138 —
ε 0 0.49M 1.46M 0.42M 1.28M 3.50M 0
Table 5.3: Profiles resulting from replicator dynamics. Each column presents probabilities
for a mixed profile, with associated ε in SCM↓3 specified in the bottom row. The first col-
umn presents the result from RD including all agent strategies (initial proportions uniform).
Subsequent columns respectively omit one strategy from the RD process.
copy exists. Similarly, multiple copies may make the same predictions and estimates of
prices and other market conditions; thus, they may be making bidding and other decisions
in an interfering manner.
Second, PhantAgent performs much better in the game-theoretic sense than might be
expected from the TAC/SCM-05 tournament outcome.3 PhantAgent is least sensitive to
playing with copies of itself, and appears with substantial probability in all the profiles pro-
duced by RD in Table 5.3. In fact, it is most probable in all but two cases: the one where it
was excluded, and the one with highest ε value.
Third, Mertacor appears especially strong in a wide variety of contexts. Like Phant-
Agent, Mertacor is present with large probability in all the symmetric stable profiles
identified. Most remarkable is that of the 35 profiles without Mertacor, 30 of them have a
best deviation where some strategy changes to Mertacor. Of the 21 profiles with Mertacor,
the best deviation changes from Mertacor in only three. In addition, Mertacor is also a best
3We are unaware of specific problems that may have afflicted the agent in the semifinal round, but this is
a possibility.
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response to players playing uniformly at random.
The equilibrium analysis complements the regret analysis shown in Table 5.4. Due
to the large set of support, the NE regret measure does little to distinguish the strategies,
however we do get additional insight from the max-regret values. The max regret—the
maximum over all possible opponent profiles—of each strategy is fairly large. All agents
have situations where they perform poorly, supporting the conclusion that, of these strate-
gies, there are no approximately dominate strategies.







Table 5.4: TAC/SCM 2005 tournament strategy comparison using stability metrics ($M).
I note that the first observation above raises some questions about this analysis ap-
proach. Presumably TAC entrants design their agents with tournament play in mind, and
so may not be concerned about the performance of their agents with copies of themselves
in the environment. The restricted-game analysis is especially sensitive to this question,
since all profiles have at least two copies of any strategy present. On the other hand, one
might argue that performance in self-play is important, and the tournament unduly neglects
this aspect of strategy. Furthermore, because the game logs provide a detailed account of
observable agent behavior, mimicking this behavior is relatively simple along some dimen-
sions of an agent’s strategy, such as early-game procurement. Therefore it is reasonable to
assume that an agent could face behaviorally similar competition agents and should design
with self-play performance in mind.
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SCM 2006
Agent Finals Semifinals Quarter-Finals Seeding
TacTex (Tx) 5.85 7.55 [2] 7.48 [B] 13.73
PhantAgent (Ph) 4.14 5.71 [2] 17.37 [C] 12.56
DeepMaize (Ds,Df) 3.58 6.46 [1] 9.61 [A] 16.60
Maxon 1.75 4.08 [1] 17.74[D] 10.63
Botticelli 0.48 1.94 [1] 0.83 [A] 4.21
MinneTAC (Mt) –2.70 2.06 [2] 13.45 [C] 9.59
Table 5.5: TAC/SCM-06 finalists, with average scores ($M) from seeding through final
rounds (semifinal and quarter-final groups in brackets).
The agents that competed in the 2006 TAC/SCM finals are listed in Table 5.5. Versions
of five of these agents were released to the agent repository: TacTex (Tx), PhantAgent
(Ph), DeepMaize (Ds and Df), Maxon, and MinneTAC (Mt). Two versions of DeepMaize
were released, corresponding to versions that played in the final round and semifinal round
(significant changes were made to the agent between rounds, particularly to procurement
behavior). The MinneTAC agent is the version that played in the semifinal round. This
agent was also changed for the final round, but the final round version has not been re-
leased. Both semifinal and final round versions of Maxon were released. We analyze five
of the seven agents available, including both versions of DeepMaize but excluding both
Maxon agents.4 The full symmetric game for the five agents we include in our analysis
comprises 35 profiles. We have over 1,100 validated game instances, with a minimum of
15 samples for each profile (typically 30 or more).
Profile stability results for the 2006 agent set are shown in Figure 5.3. This game con-
tains a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (DsPhTx) and an approximate equilibrium (DsDsTx)
that has a small, statistically insignificant, benefit of 0.09M for deviating to the PSNE. We
also applied replicator dynamics to this game to search for symmetric mixed equilibria,
4Maxon was the last agent to be released, and we do not have enough simulation data for these agents to
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Figure 5.3: Deviation analysis for pure profiles of 2006 SCM↓3.
starting from mixtures generated uniformly at random. In all cases, RD converged to a
mixture of TacTex, PhantAgent, and DeepMaize SF. Figure 5.4 shows the field for repli-
cator dynamics over the simplex of these three strategies. The fixed point corresponds to




Figure 5.4: Replicator dynamics field for the top three agent strategies from the 2006
SCM↓3. The Nash equilibrium (0.254, 0.188, 0.558) is shown as a black dot.
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Table 5.6 presents several statistics about the deviations in 2006 SCM↓3. Percent posi-
tive deviations is the fraction of possible deviations to the agent that result in a net benefit.
Best Deviation is the number of instances where deviating to the agent was the most benefi-
cial deviation. Mean Deviation and std. error reflect the average benefit ($M) for deviating
to this agent, which may be negative. Deviations to TacTex, PhantAgent, and DeepMaize
SF are beneficial in at least 60% of the cases. The mean value for deviating is highest for
TacTex and DeepMaize SF, and TacTex is the best deviation most frequently. The three
agents comprising the PSNE are nearly indistinguishable in this analysis.
% Positive Best Mean Std.
Agent Deviations Deviation Deviation Error
TacTex 61.67 18 1.45 5.91
DeepMaize SF 63.33 5 1.43 4.68
PhantAgent 60.00 8 0.89 4.77
DeepMaize F 53.33 3 0.88 4.62
MinneTAC 11.67 0 –4.67 6.41
Table 5.6: Deviation statistics for agent strategies of 2006 SCM↓3.
Table 5.7 presents regret statistics for the agents in 2006 SCM↓3. NE regret is calculated
with respect to the equilibrium given in Figure 5.4.
Agent NE Regret Max Regret
TacTex 0 10.36
DeepMaize SF 0 12.11
PhantAgent 0 11.42
DeepMaize F 0.89 10.04
MinneTAC 4.06 23.79
Table 5.7: TAC/SCM 2006 tournament strategy comparison using stability metrics ($M).
Perhaps the most striking result is that the semifinals version of DeepMaize clearly out-
performs the finals version in this game-theoretic environment. This is another instance
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where an agent that did not participate in the finals shows strong performance in our game-
theoretic analysis. Given these results, the selection of the weaker version of DeepMaize
to play in the final round would have been prevented. In the combined analysis, I dis-
covered further evidence that given only the 2005 agent strategies and the two versions of
DeepMaize, the semifinals version is a more robust choice. This suggests that the type
of analysis I present here should have applications to strategy selection as well as post-
tournament analysis. Finally, notice the general increase in max regret across agents. I
observe that agents in the 2006 game show similar difficulties playing against copies of
themselves to the 2005 agents; all of the profiles with six identical agents are among the
least stable profiles again. Self-play seems to be a major contributer to the increase in max
regret. This effect may also partially explain why the profile with the top three agents play-
ing is a PSNE. None of the agents has enough of an advantage over the others to overcome
the penalty from playing against more copies of itself, so none of the deviations to these
three is beneficial.
Combined 2005 & 2006 Analysis
The previous analysis focused on analyzing sets of agents from a single year of competition.
One of the exciting opportunities afforded this empirical analysis methodology is to con-
sider combinations of agents not observed during tournament play, including agents from
different years. To facilitate general comparisons between agents, we use the NE-response
ranking of Section 3.3.
For this analysis, I employ data from approximately 10,000 simulations focused on the
profiles containing eleven agents from 2005 and 2006 (listed in Table 5.9). The experiments
using the top 2005 agent sets as background context were simulated using both the 2005
and 2006 server rules. The simulations using the top 2006 agents as background context
were run using only the 2006 server rules, which have two modifications from the 2005
rules. Under 2006 rules, the identity of opposing agents is revealed at the start of the game,
86
and the reputation mechanism for suppliers was slightly modified. Agents from 2005 are
compatible with the 2006 server, but may be at a slight disadvantage because they were not
designed for the new rule set.
I begin by testing the hypothesis that the strongest agents from 2006 should show sub-
stantial improvements over the strongest agents from 2005. The first step is to select a
symmetric Nash equilibrium for the 2005 agent set {DeepMaize, Mertacor, PhantAgent,
TacTex}, which corresponds to the support of the mixed strategy equilibrium of the full
2005 game minus MinneTAC.5 Using this 2005 equilibrium as the background context, we
test possible deviations to three of the top 2006 agents. The results are given in Table 5.8,
along with the background context. Each of the 2006 agents is a beneficial deviation from
the 2005 equilibrium using both the 2005 and 2006 server rules, offering strong support
for the hypothesis of improvements from 2005 to 2006. In the subgame that includes the
background agents and DeepMaize SF, DeepMaize SF is the sole survivor of iterated elim-
ination of dominated strategies, providing even stronger evidence for improvement in this
agent.
Background Context Deviation Gain (ε)
05 Agent Mixture Server Rules
DeepMaize 0.083 06 Agent 2005 2006
Mertacor 0.431 PhantAgent 5.33M 6.57M
PhantAgent 0.314 TacTex 5.07M 4.73M
TacTex 0.172 DeepMaize SF 4.22M 4.56M
Table 5.8: Deviation gain comparison of top 2006 agents in the context of a symmetric
mixed Nash equilibrium of top 2005 agents for the 2005 and 2006 server rules.
In Table 5.9 I present a ranking of eleven agents from 2005 and 2006 in the context
of the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium given in Figure 5.4.6 This equilibrium is robust
to the addition of the 2005 agents into the strategy pool. All agents are ranked based on
their NE regret with respect to the equilibrium context. This ranking is interesting par-
5This omission does not change the context substantially, and requires much less data.
6This is the only symmetric equilibrium we have found after extensive search, but we cannot guarantee
that it is unique.
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ticularly because it spans agents that have never faced one another directly in tournament
competition. Table 5.9 also gives the tournament results, where applicable.
NE Tournament Scores
Agent Regret Finals 05 Finals 06
TacTex 06 0 n/a 5.85
PhantAgent 06 0 n/a 4.15
DeepMaize 06 SF 0 n/a n/a
Mertacor 05 0.57 0.55 n/a
DeepMaize 06 F 0.95 n/a 3.58
Maxon 06 S7 1.03 n/a n/a
MinneTAC 057 1.23 –0.31 n/a
PhantAgent 05 1.51 n/a n/a
DeepMaize 05 3.18 –0.22 n/a
MinneTAC 06 3.48 n/a –2.70
TacTex 05 5.96 4.74 n/a
Table 5.9: Ranking of eleven TAC/SCM agents based on deviations from an equilibrium
context, along with tournament results (in $M).
This ranking supports the case for substantially improved agent performance in the
2006 competition. Deviating to a 2005 agent from the 2006 equilibrium typically incurs
a large loss. The exception is Mertacor 05, which shows a relatively small loss—smaller
than two of the 2006 agents, including DeepMaize F which placed third overall. This agent
continues to show strong performance in the game-theoretic analysis. I also note that this
ranking generally corresponds to the ranking based on tournament results. The exception
is TacTex-05, which ranks lower than one might expect based on tournament performance.
5.4 Designing DeepMaize
The goal in this section is to establish a principled development methodology for Deep-
Maize, the University of Michigan’s TAC/SCM agent. The methodology focuses on an
7These strategies had a lower minimum number of samples, 13 & 18, respectively, than the remaining
nine strategies.
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iterative approach of introducing novel strategy features; then, evaluating and tuning them
through empirical game-theoretic analysis. This approach is empirically validated by a
first-place finish in the 2008 and 2009 TAC/SCM tournaments as well as improved NE-
regret and max-regret values.
Developing an agent strategy for a TAC scenario can be a complex task—for exam-
ple, the candidate strategy chosen for DeepMaize 2008 has 11,647 lines of code in 192
classes, not including a multitude of associated libraries. The development team has in-
cluded over 10 contributing developers and researchers over its seven-year existence. The
agent architecture for DeepMaize is defined by a set of modules and corresponding param-
eters (Kiekintveld et al., 2006). A concerted effort is made by the developers to expose






























Figure 5.5: DeepMaize decision process
Figure 5.5 depicts the relationship between the modules. The architecture of Deep-
Maize has two main categories: prediction modules and decision modules. DeepMaize
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predicts various pieces of market information based on observations of supply (component)
and demand (PC) prices and quantities. Manufacturers see component offers (prices) from
suppliers for their own RFQs. Figure 5.6 shows an example of a supplier price curve. Each
day DeepMaize must infer changes in whole curve, while only receiving price information
for at most five points on the curve. For the PC market, DeepMaize predicts the probability
that an offer will be accepted given a specific bid (sometimes called the probability of win-
given-bid), based on past acceptance notification from customers. Kiekintveld et al. (2009)
describe in detail the market prediction algorithms implemented by DeepMaize.
Figure 5.6: Example supplier price curve
Using various market state and price forecasts, DeepMaize creates estimates of the
marginal value of resources through its long-term production scheduler. These values coor-
dinate decisions across all low-level decision modules: supply, factory, and demand. These
low-level modules make use of the market state predictions, however this value-based de-
composition allows each module to optimize independently.
In what follows, I describe the regret-based development approach used by the Deep-
Maize team to select the agent (strategy) used in the given year’s tournament from a set of
candidate strategies. The process is iterative and centers around the construction of novel
strategies that refute the current equilibrium; in other words, strategies that are positive
deviations from an equilibrium in the restricted game. Unlike Section 5.3, which considers
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strategies at an atomic level, in this section we specify candidate strategies by component
and parameter settings. In many cases, we construct novel candidate strategies by vary-
ing components or parameter settings from existing agents or promising candidates. For
instance, two candidate strategies may be identical except for the amounts of initial com-
ponents requested at the beginning of a simulation. The choice of a compact parameter set
is important for empirical game-theoretic analysis to be feasible.
The basic design process proceeds as follows:
1. Select stable background context (equilibrium of restricted game),
2. Create novel strategies from stable strategies by varying component or parameter
settings,
3. Simulate deviations from background context.
During the design of DeepMaize we often test multiple features—parameterizations or
component decompositions—in parallel. The strategies testing a given feature are isolated
in a restricted game. Promising candidates are then merged into a larger restricted game
for analysis.
2007 Candidates
DeepMaize 2007 was selected after performing a series of experiments. Each experiment
evaluated a set of candidate strategies on a particular component or parameter setting. The
candidate strategy descriptions are given in Table 5.10, following which I review the results
of the experiments.
The first experiment determined the effect of the various day-0 procurement parame-
terizations. Over the history of TAC/SCM tournaments, determining how much to order
on the first day of the game has been a critical strategic problem faced by agent designers.
Wellman et al. (2005a) show that it was perhaps the most critical aspect of agent behavior in
the early tournaments. Although the game designers have reduced the strategic importance
of initial procurement through various mechanisms, day-0 procurement remains a key com-
ponent of an agent’s strategy. We created four candidate variants of the DeepMaize 2006
91
Candidate ID Description
C07-8 Major code update from DeepMaize 2006 SF with day-0 parameterization
C07-9 C07-8 update with shorter day-0 durations
C07-10 C07-8 with slightly longer day-0 durations
C07-11 C07-8 with longer day-0 durations
C07-12 C07-8 with new scheduling/valuation policy
C07-33 C07-12 with new prediction models, more aggressive in low demand
C07-34 C07-33 with restricted end-game risk-taking, lower/faster long-term
Table 5.10: TAC/SCM-07 candidate DeepMaize strategies.
semifinals agent, labeled C07-8 through C07-11. The parameter descriptions are given in
Table 5.10; conceptually, the four vary according to day-0 aggressiveness with C07-9 being
the most aggressive (ordering more, earlier). We simulated a restricted game consisting of
the four candidate strategies. The results are given in Table 5.11.





Table 5.11: Stability metrics ($M) for candidates C07-8 through C07-11 in the day-0 pa-
rameter test.
The aggressive candidate, C07-9, has the minimal max regret and is part of the sample
equilibrium returned by a sample run of replicator dynamics. Varying the aggressiveness
in the range tested seems to have only a mild impact on scores (0.6M). Using C07-09 as
a basis, we created candidate strategies with a new scheduling/valuation policy (C07-12);
new prediction models and more aggressive behavior in low demand situations (C07-33);
and with reduced end-game risk-taking behavior and with a lower quantity, faster purchas-
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ing long-term procurement policy (C07-34). These candidates were selected after a series
of experiments, each varying an isolated aspect of behavior.







Table 5.12: Final 2007 candidate comparison using stability metrics ($M).
We simulated a large 7-strategy restricted-game with the strategies listed in Table 5.12.
Starting from a uniform distribution, the Nash equilibrium returned by replicator dynamics
had large support (98%) in C07-34 and small support (1%) in strategies PH06 and TT06,
respectively. The C07-34 candidate also had the lowest max regret with $2.24M. We chose
candidate C07-34 as the DeepMaize 2007 finals strategy. The full 2007 development tree







Figure 5.7: Development tree for DeepMaize 07 candidate strategies.
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Agent Finals Semifinals Quarter-Finals Seeding
PhantAgent 8.67 10.38 [2] 15.70 [B] 13.30
TacTex 6.31 5.75 [2] 13.61 [C] 12.65
DeepMaize 5.45 9.759 [1] 21.10 [A] 17.76
Maxon 1.79 5.631 [1] 10.46 [C] 13.15
Tinhorn 1.34 6.94 [1] 19.36 [A] 10.24
CMieux 1.24 2.66 [2] 11.70 [C] 7.072
Table 5.13: TAC/SCM-07 finalists, with average scores ($M) from seeding through final
rounds (semifinal and quarter-final groups in brackets).
The agents that competed in the 2007 TAC/SCM finals are listed in Table 5.13. During
the semifinals, we noticed increasingly aggressive early-game long-term procurement by
PhantAgent. Early-game long-term procurement is a related to day-0 procurement, but has
distinguishing characteristics. In the initial phase of orders (day-0 procurement), agents
submit RFQs for early to mid-range arrival dates. These orders are often expensive as
suppliers rush to fulfill them with limited capacity; however, the profits made on the PCs
assembled from these early arrivals can be large because an agent may have a short-term
(near) monopoly on corresponding PCs. Conversely, in the early portion of a game the
prices of components ordered further into the future (long-term) are generally low relative
to the prices at which they can be fulfilled later in the game. Agents can exploit this by
submitting orders early on for components that should arrive much later in the game. This
is risky, as agents may order more components than they actually need if demand for PCs
is lower than expected. At the time, we did not have enough computational resources to
fully investigate the implications, which turned out to have dire consequences. Both Phant-
Agent and TacTex increased their aggressiveness in the finals. Largely due to this change
in behavior, they finished first and second, respectively.
After the tournament, versions of three of these agents were released to the agent repos-
itory: TacTex (Ts and Tf), PhantAgent (Ph), and DeepMaize (DM). Two versions of TacTex
were released, corresponding to versions that played in the final round and semifinal round.
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Table 5.14 gives the results of a 9-strategy restricted-game analysis of the DeepMaize,
PhantAgent, and TacTex 2007 tournament agents, as well as, top-performing agents from
prior years. A sample equilibrium determined through replicator dynamics has support that
consists of DM07 F, PH07, and TT07 F—the three highest-scoring agents of the 2007 tour-
nament finals. The three DeepMaize strategies have the lowest max-regret in the analysis.
In particular, the DeepMaize 20007 finals strategy has a very low max-regret value, imply-
ing that players can at most expect to lose $2.63M compared to the best strategy for any
tested situation.
Agent NE Regret Max Regret
DM07 S [C07-9] 0.32 3.40
DM07 F [C07-34] 0 2.63
PH07 0 48.84
TT07 S 2.90 16.95
TT07 F 0 10.89




Table 5.14: Final 2007 tournament strategy comparison using regret metrics ($M), with
accompanying agents from prior years.
2008 Candidates
The early-game long-term procurement strategy introduced by PhantAgent in the 2007
tournament exposed an interesting and valuable component of strategic behavior in
TAC/SCM. Moreover, this aspect of their behavior was observable and easily replicated.
Many of the teams participating in the 2007 tournament noticed the aggressive behavior and
began experimenting with variations of PhantAgent’s early-game long-term producement
95
strategy in their agents for 2008.
While not completely isolating the effect of early-game long-term procurement strat-
egy, Figure 5.8 shows the finals scores for DeepMaize, TacTex, and the range of the other
finalists over consecutive tournament years since 2006. In 2007, PhantAgent beat both
TacTex and DeepMaize. Additionally in 2007, there was a general increase in scores re-
ceived by all of the finals agents (highlighted by the gray box), largely due to the aggressive
early-game behavior of PhantAgent and TacTex. While having a few aggressive agents in
the tournament seemed to increase scores (especially for the aggressive agents), there is a
point at which adding aggressive agents is detrimental to all agents—as shown by the de-
cline of “other” agents’ scores in 2008 and 2009. This evidence suggests that early-game

















Figure 5.8: TAC/SCM tournament finals scores
As with 2007, DeepMaize 2008 was selected after performing a series of experiments.
The 2008 candidate experiments evaluated various predictors, early-game long-term pro-
curement strategies, and (PC) bid improvement algorithms. The full feature configurations
of the candidate strategies (C08-{0,· · · ,29}) are given in Table 5.15.
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Predictions Controller
Customer Dataset Component Horizon Treatment Bid Improvement EG Procurement
ID SCM05 SCM[06-07] AIO INTRP-Bug INTERP EQ SA GA 07 PH 07+
0 X X X X
1 X X X X
2 X X X X
3-5 X X X X
6 X X X X
7 X X X X
8 X X X X
9 X X X X
10 X X X X X
11 X X X X
13 X X X X
14 X X X X
15 X X X X
17-27 X X X X
28-29 X X X X
Table 5.15: DeepMaize 08 tested feature matrix.
The first experiment determined the effect of the new component and customer predic-
tors. DeepMaize uses both online and offline learning for its predictors. The datasets used
for offline learning are extracted from game logs created by tournament and experimental
play. We used the 2007 DeepMaize finals agent and created new datasets from the 2006 and
2007 tournaments, as well as introduced a new type of component price predictor. C08-1
differed from C08-0 on the component price predictor and C08-2 differed from C08-0 on
the customer prediction dataset. The new component price predictor used by C08-1 con-
tained a bug. We simulated a restricted game consisting of the three candidate strategies.
The game has multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria, however the mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium returned from replicator dynamics (initially uniform over strategies) has sup-
port that consisting of C08-0 and C08-2 only. The max-regret calculation (see Table 5.16)
shows C08-0 to have a much lower regret (approximately half) that of C08-1 and C08-2.
Based upon this results, we created candidate C08-3 as a variation of the C08-0 and C08-2
candidates, with a different dataset used to train the component price predictors. Starting
with candidate C08-5, we used a variation of C08-3 that uses multiple component price
predictors for different respective prediction horizons; it is similar in flavor to the predictor
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used by C08-1, except with better prediction accuracy.




Table 5.16: Initial 2008 component and customer prediction candidate comparison using
stability metrics ($M).
The next experiment varied the early-game long-term component procurement policy
of the candidates. Candidate C08-5 uses the DM07 F procurement policy, candidate C08-6
uses the PH07 procurement policy, and candidate C08-7 uses an enhanced version of the
DM07 F policy. We included candidate C08-0 as a baseline in a 4-strategy restricted-game
analysis of the early-game long-term component candidates. The results of the analysis
are striking (see Table 5.17). Using the PH07 early-game long-term procurement policy,
C08-6 is the sole survivor of iterated elimination of dominated strategies, hence the sole
rationalizable strategy in the restricted game. It is particularly interesting because of the
simplicity of the policy and the large effect it imposes ($2M in this restricted game alone),
even after the game designers’ efforts to reduce a similar effect early in the competition’s
history (see Wellman et al., 2005a).





Table 5.17: Comparison of 2008 candidate long-term procurement policies using stability
metrics ($M).
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After the early-game long-term procurement experiments, we introduced candidates
C08-8 through C08-16. Candidates C08-8 and C08-9 modified the bid improvement policy
of DeepMaize using a simulated annealing and genetic-algorithm based method, respec-
tively. The candidates met with limited success and are not improving deviations to the
C08-06 equilibrium. Experiments involving candidates C08-{10,14,15} once again fo-
cused on prediction methods, this time complemented with the PH07 procurement policy.
Candidate C08-14 is an extension of C08-6 that included a bug fix in the component price
predictor. Candidates C08-10 and C08-15 add an additional customer dataset and use the
component price predictor of C08-2, respectively. Candidate C08-10 is not a positive de-
viation from C08-06, while C08-14 and C08-15 has small (less than 1%) and large (40%)
equilibrium support in their respective 2-strategy reduce-games involving C08-6. Even
though a bug was found in the interpolation method, both C08-6 and C08-15 outperformed
C08-14 in strategic analysis. Reasons for this are unclear, though some evidence suggests
that the long-horizon prediction models actually performed worse than short-horizon pre-
diction models on long horizon predictions. This may be due to incorrect REPTree depth
or lack of attribute selection (thus likely overfitting) on the long-horizon models. This
tendency could account for both why the INTRP-bug method and the AIO method outper-
formed the INTERP method, especially since INTRP-bug grants stronger weights to the
shorter horizon model when interpolating. Candidates C08-6 and C08-15 are qualitatively
similar in our 4-strategy restricted-game analysis and we chose to create variants of C08-6
for further development simply because we believed that we were more likely to improve
the component predictions with the framework defined in C08-6.
After C08-6 was selected, we decided to explore the PH07 early-game long-term pro-
curement strategy in greater detail, as the previous experiments suggested early-game
procurement is the feature that has the largest effect on an agent’s performance. Table 5.18
gives the settings used to define the candidates early-game procurement strategy. In 2-
strategy restricted-game analysis, C08-6 dominates the C08-19 strategy, however C08-20
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fares better against C08-6. All-C08-6 and all-C08-20 profiles are pure-strategy Nash equi-
libria (hence primitive formations); however, the max regret of C08-20 is 27% of the max
regret of C08-6 and C08-20 has a higher payoff in its respective primitive formation. From
the 2-strategy analysis, we added in the PH07 and TT07F strategies. Once again, C08-20
has a max regret that is 19% of the max regret of C08-6 and the only primitive formations
contain C08-06 and C08-20, respectively. Replicator dynamics returns a mixed strategy
with strong support (98.6%) from C08-20 and weak support (1.4%) from C08-6. At this
point, C08-20 became the focal point of our analysis.
Mid-term Mid-term Long-term
Candidate Orders Quantity/Day Quantity/Day
C08-6 N/A 25
C08-19 X 50 50
C08-20 X 35 30
C08-21 X 35 37
C08-23 X 30 25
C08-24 X 40 30
C08-25 X 30 40
Table 5.18: Candidate strategy early-game procurement settings
Candidates C08-{21,22,23,24,25} all slightly perturb the C08-20 mid-term and long-
term quantities. We used a 2-strategy analysis to assess the candidates. In all cases, C08-20
had support in the observed equilibrium (calculated through replicator dynamics) of at
least 97%. In addition, C08-20 had a smaller max regret than each opposing strategy
in the respective 2-strategy restricted game. As a sanity check, we tested the 5-strategy
restricted-game of {C08-20, C08-24, C08-25, PH07, TT07F}. Both PH07 and TT07F are
pruned through iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Further still, the only primitive
formation consists of C08-20 alone.
The final candidate, C08-28, is a variant of the C08-20 strategy that uses capacity-
based component price predictions. Given the impending tournament finals, we had time
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Table 5.19: Large 2008 candidate comparison using stability metrics ($M).
for one last large test. We tested a 7-strategy restricted game consisting of {C08-6, C08-20,
C08-24, C08-25, PH07, TT07F}. Again, TT07F is removed through iterated elimination
of dominated strategies. All of the candidate strategies have support in the equilibrium
returned by a sample run of replicator dynamics; however, the max regret of the candi-
dates differs substantially, as shown in Table 5.19. Our final decision before the last round
of the tournament was between C08-20 and C08-28. Both seemed strategically strong,
however C08-20 had been thoroughly tested and its log files heavily scrutinized, whereas
C08-28 was a relatively late-breaking strategy. In the end, we decided to use C08-20 as
the DeepMaize 2008 finals agent. The primitive formation analysis was developed after
the tournament. In this case, had the analysis been available it would have strengthened
our conviction to play C08-20. The primitive formation analysis yields a single primitive
formation that solely contains C08-20. The full development tree is shown in Figure 5.9.
The agents that competed in the 2008 TAC/SCM finals are listed in Table 5.20. Three of
the six finals teams had agents in the 2007 TAC/SCM finals. DeepMaize had a strong per-
formance, finishing first in 14 of the 18 games and never placing lower than second in any
game. The winning average score $5.318M, beat the next best score by $3.085M. Based
on our previous analysis of long-term procurement, I expect that the difference in average
scores is largely due to equilibrium settings of our early-game long-term procurement pa-
rameters. The equilibrium analysis exposed an NE regret of $1–2M for deviating from the











C08-14 C08-15 C08-19 C08-20
C08-21 C08-22 C08-23 C08-24 C08-25 C08-28
Figure 5.9: Full development tree for DeepMaize 08 with the chosen agent (C08-20) path
highlighted. A feature matrix describing each candidate is given in Table 5.15.
Agent Finals Semifinals Quarter-Finals Seeding
DeepMaize 5.32 25.04 [A] 22.35 [A] 25.40
TacTex 2.23 8.072 [B] 16.50 [B] 24.83
CMieux -0.84 4.912 [B] 17.23 [A] 19.82
CrocodileAgent -5.38 4.490 [B] 16.04 [B] 16.49
Botticelli -5.44 17.87 [A] 13.12 [A] 9.54
Merlion -11.51 16.89 [A] 6.245 [A] 15.44
Table 5.20: TAC/SCM-08 finalists, with average scores ($M) from seeding through final




An unaltered version of DeepMaize 08 played and won the 2009 TAC/SCM tourna-
ment. However, the range of scores was smaller and the second highest-scoring agent
(TacTex) lost to DeepMaize by only $0.34M on average. From conversations with the
TacTex team, the 2009 agent differed only in a single parameter setting from the 2008
agent—the setting made TacTex less aggressive in long-term procurement and sales. This
provides indirect evidence that the profile of agents in the TAC/SCM tournament finals
is approaching equilibrium; however, a full empirical analysis (including all of the finals
agents) is required to test that claim.
5.5 Discussion
The case study of the TAC/SCM market scenario illustrates the usefulness of the methods
from previous chapters. First, through the use of the agent repository, I am able to com-
pare successive years of agent strategies and provide evidence that agents are progressing.
Agent progress is an important measure of the success and vitality of research competitions
like TAC. Moreover, using the deviation and equilibrium analysis from Chapter 3, I deter-
mined low-regret strategies that had been previously regarded as weak by the tournament
standings.
Second, I describe the development approach taken by the DeepMaize team spanning
several competitions. This approach uses empirical game-theoretic analysis to evaluate and
tune parameters in an agent. Through this analysis, I find several important aspects of agent
behavior in TAC/SCM. In particular, I find that early-game procurement behavior remains
one of the most critical aspects of agent design. In large part, this development approach
led to championship finishes in the 2008 and 2009 tournaments.
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Chapter 6
Searching for Approximate Equilibria
Given a simulation budget, which profiles should we simulate and how many observations
should we take? A profile selection policy specifies a sequence of profiles to observe.
Given an objective by which we can compare policies, determining the optimal policy is
the profile selection problem. The methods I describe in this chapter for selecting pro-
files are motivated by the pivotal role stable profiles play in game-theoretic analysis and
mechanism design. For these methods, the objective is to identify stable profiles.
With this in mind, I transform the profile selection problem into a profile search prob-
lem by letting each action in search correspond to a profile simulation and defining the
goal of search as identifying an (approximate) equilibrium profile or set of profiles. The
justification for framing the selection problem as a search problem is manifest in two ob-
servations. First, simulating is costly. For instance, simulation is the dominant cost in the
TAC/SCM analysis of Chapter 5, taking nearly seven processor hours per data point. Sec-
ond, simulating the entire game incurs an estimation cost in proportion to the size of the
profile space, which is exponential in the number of players and the number of strategies
available per player. If an (approximate) equilibrium can be identified without simulating
the entire space, this can result in a substantial computational savings.
At least implicitly, when we select an approach to analyzing a strategic scenario, we
have some set of objectives in mind. These objectives guide our choice of the model
that is used for analysis as well as the methods we use in constructing the model. In this
chapter, I consider two modeling objectives. The first objective is to identify a minimum-
104
regret (pure-strategy) profile and the second is to obtain an accurate belief-distribution of
minimum-regret (pure-strategy) profiles. This chapter focuses on pure-strategy profiles,
whereas the policies in Chapter 7 consider mixed-strategy profiles. Which objective is ap-
propriate in what situation? If, for example, the goal is simply to select a profile that, in
expectation, is a low regret profile, then the first objective is appropriate. To illustrate the
usefulness of the second objective, consider the NE regret of Section 3.1. The regret calcu-
lation uses a Nash equilibrium as a background context. The expected gain from deviation
will vary according to which profile is chosen as the background context. Thus, we may
want to evaluate a new strategy against a set of profiles that are believed to be low regret
(approximate equilibria) and weight each score according to our belief that the respective
profile is the minimum-regret profile. In such a situation, the intrinsic value to the modeler
is having a robust estimate for regret. While both objectives are valid in some respective
domain, the first objective has a quantitative metric that is easy to express. It is simply the
expected regret of the profile selected at the end of the search process. It is this measure by
which we compare prospective search algorithms.
I consider two distinct models of observation that influence the choice of a search pro-
cess:
• revealed-payoff model – each observation determines the true payoff for a designated
pure-strategy profile.
• noisy-payoff model – an observation draws a stochastic sample of the payoff for a
designated pure-strategy profile
Algorithms for the revealed-payoff model are discussed in Section 6.2, and algorithms
for the noisy-payoff model are discussed in Section 6.4. Common to both observational
models, the outcome of a joint strategy is estimated by repeatedly simulating (sampling)
the game. Previous research in the noisy-payoff model has explored directed sampling of
profiles, by using value of information estimates (Walsh et al., 2003) or interleaving sam-
pling and equilibrium calculations (Reeves et al., 2005). Both techniques require at least a
small number of samples to be generated for every profile in the full joint strategy space.
105
Since it may be possible to establish that a particular profile is an equilibrium or near-
equilibrium without considering all profiles, a search approach can potentially relax this
requirement. This was part of the motivation for Sureka and Wurman (2005) proposing an
algorithm based on tabu best-response search, an algorithm that searches for pure-strategy
Nash equilibria within the profile space.
This latter algorithm is applicable in a revealed-payoff domain, where each search step
determines the exact payoff for a designated pure-strategy profile. In contrast, the directed
sampling methods described above assume a noisy-payoff model, where the basic search
step corresponds to drawing a sample from an underlying distribution of payoffs.
I describe algorithms for both observational models, and compare them to the previ-
ous approaches from the literature. For the revealed-payoff model, the developed approach
is based on a minimum-regret-first search. Additionally, I introduce a repeated sampling
algorithm, termed information-gain search, applicable to the noisy-payoff model.
6.1 Notation
The algorithms used in this chapter assume a form of the empirical game model where
NΓ = NS, SΓ = SS, and φ and µ are identity transformations on the profile and utility,
respectively. It is assumed that u can be fit (parameters estimated) from the observation
set Θ. Once uΓ is fit, the empirical game E is fully specified. The notation Θ.sk is used
to indicate k more observations of profile s and E .sk is the empirical game fit from those
observations. Under the revealed-payoff model, each observation in Θ gives the value of
the payoff function for some profile. Under noisy payoffs, each observation in Θ gives a
noisy sample of the true payoff for some profile.
The search algorithms and analysis focus on pure profiles, where strategies are selected
deterministically. Many but not all of the methods described can be extended in a straight-
forward manner to admit mixed strategies, where players choose actions probabilistically.
106
6.2 Search Methods for Revealed Payoffs
The revealed-payoff model involves games in which the simulator returns the true payoff
(exact value of the estimated parameter) when queried with a particular profile. There are
two search algorithms for this model studied previously in the literature: one based on
TABU best response (or simply, TABU) by Sureka and Wurman (2005), and another ap-
plying regret bounds in a minimum-regret-first search (MRFS), employed by Vorobeychik
et al. (2006).
TABU best response (Sureka and Wurman, 2005)
The TABU best-response algorithm begins by selecting an arbitrary profile as active. Sub-
sequently, each iteration involves
(a) selecting a “deviant” player i,
(b) determining a best response, s∗i , for i from the current active profile s,
(c) selecting the profile s′ = (s∗i , s−i) as the next active profile,
(d) add an element to tabu list (L)—si in the attribute based memory version, or s in the
explicit memory version of the algorithm.
When the attribute based memory version of the algorithm is used, the player i best-
response strategy is selected from the remaining strategies not in the tabu list. When the
explicit memory version of the algorithm is used, the player i best-response strategy is se-
lected from the strategies not yielding profiles in the tabu list. The process terminates once
the algorithm selects a PSNE as its active profile.
The original experiments by Sureka and Wurman evaluate performance based on the
number of search steps required to find a PSNE. Since the experimenters know the base
game and therefore its equilibria, they can simply terminate search when one of the known
PSNE becomes the active profile.
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In practice, when searching an unknown game, the algorithm cannot generally deter-
mine that an equilibrium profile is actually such when it first becomes active.1 Thus, I
also consider performance measures that require generated solutions to be confirmed—the
profile and all of its deviations have been observed. I modify TABU to seek confirma-
tion rather than move always to best response in order to address this requirement. In the
modified version, instead of immediately placing the active profile on the tabu list L and
branching to the best response, we do so only if the best response strictly increases the
player’s payoff; otherwise we keep the active profile unchanged. With this modification,
we can confirm an active profile upon iterating through all the players. However, it now
becomes possible in the explicit memory version of the algorithm (the version used in the
experiments below) that we visit a profile for which all neighbors are in the tabu list. In this
case we allow the player to deviate to the best response if that best response gives a higher
payoff than the current profile. Pseudo-code for the tabu best-response algorithm used in
the experiments is presented in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Tabu-Best-Response-Search
T ← ∅
Select initial profile at random
while termination criteria not satisfied do
i← next player
if Di(s) ⊆ T then
s← player i’s best response to s
else if s has an improving deviation in Di(s) \ T then
Push s onto T
s← player i’s best response to s not in T
1Moreover, in general we cannot assume that a PSNE even exists for the base game. We can relax the
criterion to allow approximate equilibria, though we typically do not know a priori the regret of the best
pure-strategy approximate solution.
108
Minimum regret first search
The idea of priority-first search is to expand a search tree by exploring the fringe node that
is best according to some priority measure. In this setting, the objective is to find a profile
minimizing the maximal gain from deviation. Therefore, I adopt as our priority measure a
lower bound, ε̂(s), on the possible gain to deviation from profile s, which is just the greatest
gain among deviations from s that have been evaluated. The pseudo-code below describes
this minimum-regret-first search (MRFS) procedure.
Algorithm 6 Minimum-Regret-First-Search
Select initial profile at random
while Queue is not empty do
Select lowest ε̂(s) profile s from queue
if s is confirmed then




Calculate ε̂(s̄) from observations and insert s̄ into queue
Update ε̂(ŝ) for ŝ ∈ D(s̄) in the queue
The subroutine Select-Deviation(s) returns some deviation from s which has yet to
be sampled. In the subroutine, we try to predict which unevaluated deviation from s is
likely to give the largest gain from deviation. While the efficacy of the deviation selection
heuristic depends on the game class, the following has worked well in a variety of cases.
The heuristic tracks deviations by player and target strategy, and selects the unevaluated
deviation from the current profile that has most frequently produced an improvement in the
search history thus far.
6.3 Evaluating Search Methods for Revealed Payoffs
The experiments in this section employ games of various classes generated by GAMUT
(Nudelman et al., 2005). When applicable, I select game instances similar in size to those
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used by Sureka and Wurman (2005). Initially I experiment with a game class used in their
prior study to establish a baseline for algorithm comparison. I then proceed to investigate
a game class whose structure is known to be exploited by a best-response dynamic, so that
we may compare the algorithms in an environment expected to be favorable to TABU.
Uniform random games
The first class of games has payoffs that are uniformly and independently distributed in
the range [-100,100]. The game class is denoted URG(|I|, |Si|), where |I| is the number
of players and |Si| is the strategy set size of each player. I compare MRFS and TABU on
two sizes of games: the smaller URG(5,5) and the larger URG(5,10). To construct the data
sets for comparing the algorithms, I generated 20 games in each class and checked which
instances possess a PSNE. I ran each algorithm 100 times for each instance, with randomly
selected starting profiles on each run.
The first comparison measures the number of evaluation steps (expressed in terms of
percentage of profile space) required to confirm an equilibrium. For this measure, I neces-
sarily limit attention to those games possessing a PSNE. The results of this comparison are
shown in Table 6.1.
URG(5,5) URG(5,10)
Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%)
MRFS 53.42 52.12 37.10 31.41
TABU 52.25 49.28 41.79 34.75
p value 0.18 3.5e-05
Table 6.1: Percentage of profile space explored to confirm a PSNE, among URGs with at
least one PSNE.
The analysis of URG(5,5) included 12 games which contained at least one PSNE. Seeds
0, 1, 3, 4, 8, and 15 contained one PSNE; seeds 5, 13, 16, 17, and 18 contained two; and
seed 20 contained three. The performance of MRFS and TABU varied drastically accord-
ing to the individual game. For instance, in seeds 4, 8, and 15, TABU rarely succeeded
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in confirming the solution.2 Similarly in seed 3, MRFS on average requires nearly all the
search space to be evaluated. It should be noted that although the equilibrium was not con-
firmed until near the last iteration, many near-equilibrium profiles were confirmed much
earlier.














































Figure 6.1: Mean lowest confirmed regret (ε) for URG(5,5) on the left and URG(5,10) on
the right.
The analysis of URG(5,10) also included 12 games which contained at least one PSNE.
Algorithm performance differences are statistically significant in the large game. In these
larger games, the average performance of MRFS and TABU improves from approximately
50% of the space searched to the mid-30% range.
Figure 6.1 shows the minimum confirmed ε as a function of the space explored, which
is our second performance measure. In many practical settings, it may be that near-
equilibrium profiles are just as useful as PSNE. Therefore in those cases we consider the
second measure more appropriate. Notice that MRFS confirms low ε profiles much earlier
than TABU, which is the desired result.
2Since TABU is not guaranteed to confirm an existing solution, a timeout was placed on the number of
iterations equal to the size of the strategy space. If TABU exceeded the timeout, it was credited for finding
the solution in the greatest possible number of steps required by MRFS.
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Congestion games
The second comparison I present is an experiment using congestion games (Rosenthal,
1973). In the congestion game generated by GAMUT (Nudelman et al., 2005), each player
chooses a subset from the set of all facilities. Each player then receives a payoff that is
the sum of payoff functions for each facility in the chosen subset. Each payoff function
depends only on the number of other players who have chosen the facility. Congestion
games exhibit two key properties for our purposes: they possess PSNE, and best-response
learning processes converge to this equilibrium (Monderer and Shapley, 1996). This latter
property suggests that the TABU best-response search algorithm should be effective.
I compare MRFS and TABU on four-player, four-facility congestion games. This class
of games has 65,536 distinct profiles where each of the four players chooses a subset of the
four facilities. Exploiting player symmetry reduces the size of the games to 3,876 distinct
profiles, though in our experiments the algorithms do not exploit this symmetry. Exploiting
symmetry would, of course, have only improved performance for the fixed game size. The
results of the congestion game comparison are shown in Table 6.2. Twenty games were
generated for experimentation using GAMUT. As expected, these games were extremely
easy for TABU, which needed to search only a tenth of one percent of the profile space
on average to confirm a PSNE. They were quite easy for MRFS as well, although this
algorithm required 0.15 of one percent. The differences are statistically significant, but
practically negligible given the miniscule amount of search required.
MRFS Tabu
Mean (%) 0.15 0.10
Median (%) 0.15 0.10
p value < 2.2e-16
Table 6.2: Mean percentage of profile space explored to confirm a PSNE in the four-player,
four-facility congestion game class.
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6.4 Search Methods for Noisy Payoffs
When payoff realizations are noisy, it stands to reason that the MRFS and TABU best-
response algorithms will be inadequate, since these do not consider how to allocate samples
across evaluated profiles. Nevertheless, we can apply them to the problem in a modified
form, interpreting an evaluation step as a decision to draw k payoff samples for the tar-
get profile. Clearly, as k increases, so does reliability of the answers. On the other hand,
increasing k reduces the number of profiles that can be explored with a given number of
samples. An analyst can, perhaps, guess a reasonable value for k for a particular problem,
using higher k when more noise is present. Such a solution is unsatisfactory for two rea-
sons. First, it seems a waste to sample each profile an equal number of times, since some
profiles are revealed to be unlikely solution candidates after only a few samples. Second,
we would like to develop an algorithm that can automatically adjust sampling allocation
appropriately for a given problem, rather than involve the analyst in the process.
I am aware of two previous approaches to the problem of sample allocation in games
with noisy payoffs, one by Walsh et al. (2003) and another by Reeves et al. (2005). Walsh
et al. introduced a search algorithm founded on the principles of metareasoning (Russell
and Wefald, 1991), using an approximate regret function to determine the value of choos-
ing a specific profile to sample. Reeves et al. proposed a method of search by which
profiles are selected to be sampled according to the estimated probability mass placed on
the specific profile in a sample equilibrium. I introduce another approach that is based on
information gain as measured by the Kullback-Leibler divergence criterion (Kullback and
Leibler, 1951).
EVI and ECVI (Walsh, Parkes, and Das)
First, I discuss the approach to guided search in noisy games introduced by Walsh et al.
(2003). I use the symbol s to denote a profile in S as well as the action of sampling that
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profile and the symbol ST to represent all sequences of sampling actions of length T . Let
ϕ be some decision model that maps an empirical game E to a profile s ∈ S, denoted by
ϕ(E). Let ψ be the error model and ψ(s|E) be the error for selecting a profile s in the game
E . Walsh et al. define the expected value of information (EVI) from sampling a particular
profile s under the current information state E to be
EVI(s|E) = EE.s|E [ ψ(ϕ(E)|E .s)− ψ(ϕ(E .s)|E .s) ] . (6.1)
Walsh et al. propose two algorithms. The first of these is EVI as defined in Equation 6.1, in
which ϕ(E) selects an arbitrary, possibly mixed-strategy, Nash equilibrium in the empirical




max(0, uEi (ŝ)− uEi (s)).
Finally, they develop a particular model of future information which uses distributional
estimates for the payoffs ui(s).
Walsh et al. use Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the expectation of ψ(ϕ(E .s)|E .s).
For each sample of s, an additional set of Monte Carlo simulations estimate the decision
process ϕ(E .s). Walsh et al. found that this EVI approach is computationally infeasible for
large games, which motivated their development of a second algorithm termed expected
confirmational value of information (ECVI). Whereas in EVI sampling s has positive value
in expectation only if it is expected to change (refute) the current equilibrium choice, ECVI
gives more value to s if it is likely to confirm the current equilibrium ϕ(E). Specifically,
the authors calculate ECVI as
ECVI(s|E) = EE.s|E [ ψ(ϕ(E)|E)− ψ(ϕ(E)|E .s) ] .
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To help understand the implications of using ECVI, consider an alternate method for cal-
culating the expected error of ψ(ϕ(E .s)|E .s). Instead of generating Monte Carlo samples
for ψ(·) and ϕ(·) independently, we use each additional sample for the error and decision
function’s empirical game E .s. Because a Nash equilibrium will always exist in our finite
E .s, we know that one will be selected by the decision process ϕ(E .s). We know from the
definition of the error function that for each Monte Carlo sample, ψ(ϕ(E .s)|E .s) will be
zero. Therefore, the EVI equation simplifies to
EVI(s|E) = EE.s|E [ ψ(ϕ(E)|E .s)] . (6.2)
Notice that in ECVI, the left term in the expectation is a constant independent of s. Both
EVI and ECVI seek to maximize the value of their respective information measures. EVI
chooses the s that maximizes the expectation in Equation 6.2, whereas ECVI chooses the s
that minimizes it.
Intuitively, the left and right terms in the expectation of Equation 6.1 provide an implicit
balance between exploitation and exploration, respectively. The exploration component
vanishes in Equation 6.2. Notice that EVI chooses a profile s that is the most likely, in ex-
pectation, to refute the current candidate solution. This is precisely what MRFS attempts in
the revealed-payoff domain by selecting unobserved deviations from the current candidate
solution. Thus, Equation 6.2 also provides a qualitative link between EVI and MRFS.
Information gain approach
Approaches such as EVI and ECVI focus on improving a particular (perhaps arbitrary)
Nash equilibrium estimate (in our setting, a pure strategy equilibrium). The information
gain approach focuses on improving an estimate that is based on any model that yields a
distribution over profiles given an empirical game. Such profile distributions arise, for ex-
ample, as belief distributions of play (Vorobeychik and Wellman, 2006), which are beliefs
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constructed by an outside observer (e.g., mechanism designer) about the relative likelihood
of different profiles arising as a result of actual strategic interaction that is modeled by
the game. Belief distributions of play may model players as selecting an arbitrary Nash
equilibrium, or may involve more complex beliefs—for example, a probability distribution
which assigns higher probability to profiles with lower regret will likely assign positive
(albeit often small) probability to every profile in a finite game (Duong et al., 2008). We
are interested in a particular such belief model that assigns a relative likelihood to profiles
based on their respective probabilities of having the smallest regret.
The information gain algorithm is, in principle, straightforward. We begin by presum-
ing that our sampling action will take k samples. With each profile s ∈ S we compute
(or approximate) information gain from sampling this profile k times. We then select the
profile that promises the greatest information gain. The core of the approach to comput-
ing information gain, based on Kullback-Leibler divergence, is very general in that it can
use any prior distribution on profiles obtained based on the current empirical game, ps(E).
Thus, I first develop it for an arbitrary distribution, and then specialize to one of particular
interest in this work.
First, I define the entropy of a profile s,H(s; E):
H(s; E) = −ps(E) log2 ps(E)− (1− ps(E)) log2(1− ps(E)).
The standard definition of cross entropy of s, denoted here byH(s; E , Ê), is then
H(s; E , Ê) = −ps(E) log2 ps(Ê)− (1− ps(E)) log2(1− ps(Ê)).
Based on these, I define the information gain for a profile s from taking k additional sam-
ples of ŝ, denoted G(s; E , E .ŝk), to be
G(s; E , E .ŝk) = H(s; E , E .ŝk)−H(s; E).
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We determine the profile to sample by comparing the aggregate information gain over all
profiles from taking k additional samples of a profile. However, additional samples of
profile ŝ update the posterior distribution of a profile s, ps(E .ŝ), only if ŝ ∈ D(s). There-
fore, the aggregate information gain from sampling a profile ŝ a total of k times, denoted
G(E , E .ŝk), is computed as
G(E , E .ŝk) =
∑
s∈D(ŝ)
G(s; E , E .ŝk).
The information gain so defined is then used as a part of our INFO-GAIN-SEARCH se-
lection algorithm:
Algorithm 7 INFO-GAIN-SEARCH(E(∅), k, T )
Select initial profile at random s
E ← k samples of s
while Termination criteria not satisfied do
s← arg maxŝ EE.ŝk|E
î
G(E , E .ŝk)
ó
E ← E ∪ k samples of s
return arg maxŝ pŝ(E)
In developing the assessment of likely strategic outcomes based on the evidence encom-
passed by the empirical game, I posit that players are most likely to play a profile with the
lowest regret. Since we restrict our search space to pure strategy profiles, such profiles need
not constitute Nash equilibria, although often they will (particularly in very large games),
and even more often the smallest regret will be indeed quite low to justify our belief. Thus,
I define the information gain with respect to the distribution ps(E) that assigns probabilities
to profiles s in proportion to their likelihood of having the smallest regret. I now develop
these distributions formally, beginning with the definition of the highest payoff a player i
can obtain by deviating from s to another strategic option.
Definition 25 (Maximum deviation payoff). For a given player i and profile s, the maxi-
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The distribution of gi(s), denoted by Fgi(s)(d), is the n
th order statistic (maximum) over





The distribution of player regret, r, denoted by Fδi(s)(r) can be obtained by conditioning




Fgi(s)(u+ r) dFui(s)(u). (6.3)
We estimate the integral in (6.3) using a Monte Carlo method with importance sampling





Now, as the final piece, we can define the actual distribution of minimum regret, that is,
we can define, for each profile s ∈ S, the probability that s has minimum regret given the









To estimate the value of the integral in (6.4) using Monte Carlo simulation, we have
to generate M realizations of the random variable. Each of these M realizations requires
computing or estimating the integral in (6.3) a total number of |S| − 1 times. The latter,
as I already mentioned, is also estimated using Monte Carlo methods by generating N
realizations of its respective random variable. Thus, each iteration requiresO(|S|NM) op-
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erations, for at total running time ofO(|S|NM T
k
). Furthermore, we may have to use a very
large M to get a reasonable approximation. Consequently, running time of our algorithm
quickly becomes impractically long. To keep it somewhat in check, I instead approximate




where ε(1)S\s is the lowest regret over all profiles except s calculated using the expected mean
payoffs given the empirical game E . The approximation in Equation 6.5 requires O(|S|N)
calculations in each iteration, for a total running time of O(|S|N T
k
).
6.5 Evaluation of Search Methods for Noisy Payoffs
Unlike the evaluation of search algorithms for games with revealed payoffs, which used
randomly generated games of various classes, I evaluate the approaches for noisy games
in a more representative setting—the TAC/SCM game described in Chapter 5. The sce-
nario is modeled as a symmetric normal form game with five heuristic strategies,3 for a
total of 35 strategy profiles. The payoffs in the game are estimates based on the analysis
of Section 5.3. I use the sample mean payoffs to construct a base game that has structure
similar to the empirical TAC/SCM model. Therefore, it is with respect to the approximated
TAC/SCM model that we measure error. This technique, in our application, creates three
player-pairs. Each of these pairs is constrained to play the same strategy and the payoff
to the pair is the average of the payoffs of each member in the base game. In this study, I
add zero-mean Gaussian noise on top of the already sampled base-game mean payoffs to
mimic the simulation process.
I present the results of two experiments. The first experiment uses Gaussian noise with
3The heuristic strategies are a subset of the agents who participated in the TAC/SCM 2006 tournament
and released binary versions of their agent software.
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standard deviation of 3.75 million, which is roughly the order of magnitude of the noise
found in TAC/SCM simulations. The second experiment has a larger standard deviation of
10 million. For each of these experiments, we tested four different algorithms. For each
experiment and algorithm, I generated 100 runs and average the score over runs. The score
is the true regret ε of the returned profile in the base game as a function of the number of
samples.




































Figure 6.2: Mean regret (ε) in the SCM↓3 2006 game of the profile returned by the algo-
rithms after a given number of samples when small variance (left) and large variance (right)
Gaussian noise is added to the payoffs.
The first algorithm tested was the MRFS extension to noisy games, labeled MRFS-30
in Figure 6.2. MRFS-30 samples each profile 30 times and uses the resultant mean as if it
were the actual payoff in a revealed payoff game.
Second, I tested the IGS and ECVI algorithms. These are repeated sampling algo-
rithms and normally require some initial samples of every profile in the game. Therefore,
I prefaced the repeated sampling portion of the search with an MRFS search, where three
samples are taken per profile. Each iteration of IGS and ECVI algorithms took five samples
of each profile per iteration. These algorithms were labeled IGS-MRFS-3 and ECVI-
MRFS-3, respectively.
Finally, I tested the IGS algorithm with a zero-mean Gaussian prior payoff distribu-
tion over profiles. In the small-variance game, the standard deviation of the Gaussian prior
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was taken to be five million, whereas in the large-variance game it was 20 million. This
algorithm was labeled IGS-WITH-PRIOR.
Figure 6.2 shows the results of the analysis. In the small variance game, we see that
MRFS-30 does not perform as well as the other algorithms for most of the sample sizes.
Using MRFS-3 to gather initial samples seemed to help substantially for the first 200 sam-
ples, after which IGS-WITH-PRIOR caught up with the performance of IGS-MRFS-3.
Note that MRFS-3 uses up the first 105 samples. Finally, I note that IGS-MRFS-3 offers a
performance improvement over ECVI-MRFS-3.
In the large-variance game we note the surprising result that all of the algorithms outper-
formed ECVI-MRFS-3, particularly when more samples were taken. MRFS-30 displays
a particularly strong performance in this game class, essentially on par with IGS-MRFS-3
and IGS-WITH-PRIOR.
6.6 Discussion
I have investigated the problem of searching for approximate equilibria in games where
determining the payoff for particular profiles is costly. For each observation model, I ex-
perimentally evaluated the known approaches from prior literature—all, as far as I am
aware—along with new algorithms and variants, on a range of game instances and game
classes.
For the revealed-payoff model, I compared MRFS and TABU on classes of games with
or without helpful structure. In all cases, I found that the methods require approximately
the same number of search steps on average to confirm a PSNE. MRFS significantly out-
performs TABU, however, in terms of its ability to confirm better approximate equilibria
earlier, for games that require significant search. Another important attribute of the MRFS
algorithm is that it will confirm all available profiles eventually, whereas TABU may not.
This is important not only in the case where no PSNE exists, but also when we wish to
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analyze low-regret profiles when designing a best response.
For the noisy-payoff model, I introduced a new algorithm based on information gain,
called IGS, and found that it outperforms the ECVI repeated sampling algorithm, the
current benchmark in the literature. Unlike ECVI, which was an attempt to construct a
computationally feasible version of expected value of information, the IGS family of al-
gorithms does not directly resolve to improve the mean estimate of player regret. Instead,
the IGS algorithm focuses on improving some distribution over profiles. For example,
this distribution could be a distribution of play, a likelihood of PSNE, or the probability
that a profile minimizes regret. Optimizing the distribution rather than a point estimate
can improve calculations involving the distribution and other heretofore unknown quan-
tities. Consequently, an EVI-based algorithm may not completely capture the decision
theoretic-problem underlying the game analysis task.
In addition, IGS does not succumb to a problem that plagues ECVI. That is, ECVI has
a tendency to sample safe profiles, or precisely, profiles that are not likely to change the
current decision in expectation. Thus, ECVI can easily get stuck in local optima and never
recover.
Although MRFS was developed and justified under the revealed-payoff model, I have
shown that even under noisy payoffs, using MRFS to select initial samples can improve
performance early on in the search process. Moreover, I have shown that in some cases
MRFS can perform as well as IGS when sampling noisy games.
One significant drawback to MRFS is the constant number of samples per iteration.
Given the relative strength MRFS has displayed on the tested classes of games, an in-
teresting future path of study is a dynamic variant of MRFS which takes into account the
significance of the deviation comparisons to determine how many times to sample a profile.
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Chapter 7
Searching for Approximate Formations
In this chapter, I consider a special case of the profile selection problem: policies that spec-
ify a sequence of restricted games to evaluate. I define such policies as restricted-game
selection policies. Because evaluating a restricted game involves evaluating all of its con-
stituent profiles, a restricted-game selection policy implicitly specifies a profile selection
policy. Given an objective measure of quality, determining an optimal restricted-game se-
lection policy is the restricted-game selection problem, which is also termed the strategy
exploration problem in the existing literature.
In existing literature, policies are measured by the regret of a profile selected after the
execution of the policy—the same as in Chapter 6. However, because the policies produce
restricted games that are completely observed, we can determine the regret of the resul-
tant restricted game—the largest regret, induced by strategies not in the restricted game,
of any profile in the restricted game. In effect, policies are measured according to their
ability to minimize the minimum regret with respect to the base game (minimize the regret
of a minimum-regret profile) and minimize the maximum regret of all the profiles in the re-
stricted game with respect to the strategies not contained in the restricted game (minimize
the formation regret of the restricted set of strategies).
I propose a novel policy that seeks to identify (approximate) formations—restricted
games that are minimal according to the second measure. This formation-based policy
performs as well as or better than the existing policies on all measures in the experiments.
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7.1 Strategy Exploration Problem
Schvartzman and Wellman (2009a) were the first to address the strategy exploration prob-
lem. The authors observed that, in practice and existing literature, empirical game-theoretic
analysis often involves dynamic formulation of a game model: we evaluate a priori salient
strategies—for instance, winners in a TAC tournament—then, based on intermediate analy-
sis, we evaluate additional candidates. This approach is consistent with the profile selection
policies of Chapter 6, except that the intermediate analysis makes use of fully-observed re-
stricted games. For instance, the empirical analysis of TAC/SCM in Chapter 5 that led to
the design of DeepMaize, involved repeated evaluation of small restricted games. In large
part, this is because restricted games allow for easy mixed-profile analysis, especially when
the support consists of only a few strategies. Profile selection policies such as EVI and
IGS also allow for analysis and identification of mixed-profiles, however these algorithms
require a small number of observations for all profiles, which is often infeasible due to
computational constraints. Thus, Schvartzman and Wellman investigate policies that focus
on restricted-game evaluation, where the objective is to identify a minimum-regret profile.
I consider an additional objective: identify an approximate formation.
A policy determines a sequence of restricted games ΓS↓X(0) , . . . ,ΓS↓X(k) to be evalu-
ated, where X(0) ⊂ · · · ⊂ X(k) ⊆ S. Each restricted game ΓS↓X(j+1) is formed by making
additional strategies available to players in ΓS↓X(j) . I consider policies for the revealed-
payoff model (Section 6.2), in which each observation determines the true payoff for a
designated pure-strategy profile. In this case, evaluating a restricted game means observing
the payoffs for each pure-strategy profile in X(j).
Schvartzman and Wellman (2009a) proposed four basic policies, where the policies
add a single strategy to X during each step. The policies are described using symmetric
games—therefore S and X refer to strategy sets rather than sets of profiles—however, they
can be easily extended to non-symmetric games. The first policy, random (RND), picks one
of the remaining strategies in S \X with equal probability. The remaining policies choose
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a strategy from the improving deviations. Strategy s′i ∈ Si is an improving deviation for
player i with respect to profile σ, if i would benefit by playing s′i rather than its designated
strategy in σ: ui(s′i, σ−i) > ui(σ). Let Di(σ) be the set of improving deviations with re-
spect to σ for player i and D(σ) = ∪i∈NDi(σ)—because of symmetry Di(σ) = Dj(σ) for
all i, j ∈ N . The following deviation policies are described by Schvartzman and Wellman:
• Improving deviations only (DEV): Find a Nash equilibrium, σ, of the current re-
stricted game, and choose a strategy uniformly from D(σ) \X .
• Best response (BR): Find a Nash equilibrium, σ, of the current restricted game, and
choose a strategy uniformly from B(σ) \X .
• Softmax (ST): Find a Nash equilibrium σ of the current restricted game. Choose
strategy s′i from D(σ) \ X with probability given by the softmax formula ap-




The authors evaluate the k-step strategy exploration policies by measuring the regret with
respect to Γ of a sample Nash equilibrium of ΓS↓X(k) . They find that improving deviation
policies perform better than unrestricted selection policies—such as RND.
With the exception of RND, the policies proposed by Schvartzman and Wellman re-
quire knowledge of the payoffs for single-player deviations from profiles in X(j) to the
remaining strategies.1 In other words, the utility functions for each player i is defined over
Si × X(j)−i for the j th step in the exploration. I define a new concept that encapsulates this
model of a game, called an augmented restricted game.
Definition 26 (Augmented Restricted Game). Let Γ>S↓X be an augmented restricted game
with respect to the base game Γ, where players in Γ>S↓X are restricted to playing profiles in
X ⊆ S, however the utility function for each player i is a mapping ui : Si ×X−i → R.
From Section 4.3, we can calculate the base-game regret of any profile in ΓS↓X by
calculating its restricted-game regret, if X is a formation. In addition, our estimate can
be understating the base-game regret by no more than ε, if X is an ε-formation. Contrast
1In the worst case, this may require all single-player deviations to each of the remaining strategies. Ex-
ceptions to this requirement may occur, for instance, if the policy has access to an oracle that selects the best
response out of the remaining strategies.
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this with calculations that can be performed with augmented restricted games: given the
augmented restricted game Γ>S↓X , we can calculate the base-game regret for any profile in
ΓS↓X , regardless of X’s status as a formation; furthermore, given Γ>S↓X , we can calculate
the regret of X (see Definition 23) without any additional profile observations. Therefore,
we now state the strategy exploration problem as determining a sequence of augmented
restricted games Γ>
S↓X(0) , . . . ,Γ
>
S↓X(k) to be simulated, where X
(0) ⊂ · · · ⊂ X(k) ⊆ S.
Schvartzman and Wellman propose that we evaluate a policy according to the regret of a
profile (Nash equilibrium) produced at each iteration. I propose an additional metric, where
we evaluate a policy according to the regret of the restricted strategy set (the joint strategy
set of the restricted game) produced at each iteration. These metrics correspond to two
different modeling objectives: minimize the minimum regret and minimize the maximum
regret.
Evaluating the two metrics introduces interesting computational problems. To minimize
the maximum regret, I modify the FIND-FORMATION algorithm (see Algorithm 4 of Sec-
tion 4.6), such that the setX—the restricted strategy set that results from the policy—is the
bound rather than the size of the resultant restricted game. Finding a (mixed) profile with
minimum regret is also an interesting new problem. Schvartzman and Wellman selected a
profile using replicator dynamics on the restricted game. In many cases replicator dynam-
ics finds a Nash equilibrium, however equilibria in the restricted game are not necessarily
minimum-regret profiles—when constrained to mixtures over X—in the base game. In the
following section, I describe an algorithm for finding minimum-regret profiles when we are
constrained to mixtures over X.
7.2 Minimum-Regret Constrained Profiles
Consider the augmented reduced game, Γ>S↓X , that results from some policy. We may
wish to determine a minimum-regret profile of Γ, using our limited knowledge of the pay-
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offs in Γ>S↓X—for instance, identifying a minimum-regret profile allows us to measure the
minimum profit-regret of a policy (the first evaluation metric). This minimum-regret pro-
file, σ, is constrained by the domain of the utility functions, such that σ ∈ ∆X , where
∆X = ×i∈N∆(Xi). A minimum-regret profile of Γ is a Nash equilibrium, therefore we
may be tempted to select a Nash equilibrium of ΓS↓X . However, a minimum-regret con-
strained profile is not an equilibrium of the restricted game in general. We can, however,





where ε(·) is with respect to Γ. This is a constrained optimization problem with a nonlinear,
non-differentiable objective function and both inequality and equality constraints. Because
the regret function is non-differentiable, standard optimization techniques that calculate
the gradient of the Lagrangian do not apply. Various direct search algorithms have been
proposed to solve optimization problems where a gradient is not available or efficiently cal-
culable. Powell (1998) and Kolda et al. (2003) provide a good review of these algorithms.
In practice, one of the most popular algorithms is the amoeba method, introduced by Nelder
and Mead (1965), that iteratively refines a simplex in the search space until convergence or
some fail condition is reached. In a similar setting, Walsh et al. (2002) used the amoeba
method to calculate Nash equilibria of an empirical game representing a continuous double
auction scenario.
When applying the amoeba method to the MRCP optimization problem, we have to
reconcile the fact that the optimization problem is constrained and the amoeba method is
an unconstrained optimization technique. One way to account for this is to optimize over a
different objective function, where the new function equals ε(σ), if σ ∈ ∆Γ
>
S↓X , and infin-
ity, otherwise. The problem with this approach is that the amoeba algorithm searches over
R|X| and the feasible region of the space has zero measure with respect to R|X|.
To handle the constraints, we have a few general approaches: apply a penalty function,
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transform the variables, or restrict the amoeba method’s vertex generation steps to feasible
regions. Penalty functions are problem dependent and care must be taken not to introduce
new local minima with their application. We can transform variables by introducing x(si)
where σ(si) = x2(si) for every si ∈ Xi; however, this relieves the inequality constraints,
but not the equality constraint.
What about maintaining feasibility? If an iteration starts with a simplex where each
vertex is within the feasible region, then we can modify the amoeba method such that we
always end the iteration with a feasible simplex. To do this, we modify the reflect and
expand steps of the original amoeba method to generate only feasible vertices. We use a
binary search to select the maximum feasible reflection (α) and expansion (γ) scaling pa-
rameters, respectively, if the unmodified reflected or expanded vertex is infeasible. Using
this approach, all the vertices of the simplex are feasible at the end of each iteration.
I now make an additional observation. Minimum regret profiles may not have full
support. In fact, minimum regret profiles will often have small support, a feature that is
exploited by equilibrium finding algorithms like those introduced by Porter et al. (2008). If
the minimum regret profile does not have full support, then the inequality constraints on σ
are active at the minimum.
Figure 7.1 shows a sample run of the modified amoeba method on a three-strategy re-
stricted TAC/Travel game, overlaid on the regret contour. The method starts by generating
feasible vertices uniformly over the probability simplex consisting of the three strategies.
The simplex quickly reduces support from strategy 19. However, the second time the sim-
plex meets the strategy 19 boundary, it collapses into a simplex with almost zero measure.
Once this occurs, the amoeba algorithm does recover. Fortuitously, the amoeba algorithm
converges near the local minimum in this example, however this will not be the case in
general.
One way to deal with this problem is to search over small supports. Notice that for



















Figure 7.1: The sample run of the amoeba method on TAC/Travel.
gret profile in Γ>S↓X , we can search over subsets of X . All else being equal, we are more
likely to converge to the minimum when it is an interior point of ∆(X̂), than a boundary
point of ∆(X). Algorithm 8 gives a recursive algorithm for solving the MRCP optimiza-




for X̂ ⊂ X where X̂ has a single strategy removed from X do
Σ← Σ ∪ FIND-MRCP(Γ>
S↓X̂)




Notice that we repeatedly compute the MRCP for small restricted strategy sets. Using
memoization we can dramatically improve performance. Moreover, strategy exploration
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policies iteratively add strategies to the existing strategy set. Therefore, we can also retain
the computed values for later calls to FIND-MRCP.
7.3 Formation Policies
In this section, I propose a novel formation-based policy that is closely related to the
improving-deviation policies investigated by Schvartzman and Wellman (2009a). Consider
the best response (BR) policy: at the kth iteration, pick a Nash equilibrium of ΓS↓X(k);
choose a best-response strategy from among the remaining strategies; and use that strat-
egy to construct X(k+1). The basic idea behind BR is successively refuting the current
minimum-regret profile. This is a common theme among profile-search algorithms of
Chapter 6 like MRFS, EVI, and IGS.
The following strategy-exploration policy is the natural extension of this idea to
formations—refuting the best ε-formation. At each step, the algorithm determines a
minimum-ε formation that is a subset of current set of restricted strategies, X . The
minimum-ε-maximum-τ (MEMT) strategy-exploration policy chooses a strategy that max-
imizes the gain (τ ) to deviating from a minimum-ε formation. Thus, MEMT selects a
strategy that refutes the current minimum-regret formation, choosing the strategy that max-
imizes τ as a heuristic. If τ is non-positive, then X contains a formation and, thus, the
formation-regret is zero. We can view MEMT as a heuristic policy designed to quickly
identify formations, by minimizing formation regret. In doing so, the algorithm may also
minimize the regret of a minimum-regret profile. The complete procedure is given in Algo-
rithm 9. The algorithm works in two stages: the first stage selects a minimum-ε formation
(Chapter 4) and the second stage selects the τ -maximizing strategy for the minimum-ε
formation.
The minimum-ε formation, denoted by Xmin, may have a τ -maximizing strategy, de-
noted by si, that is already in X . In this case, we place Xmin in a tabu list, denoted by
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T . Subsequent calls to FIND-FORMATION will return the minimum-ε formation that is
not in T or null, if all formations are in T . This process continues until a τ -maximizing
strategy is found that is not in X .
Algorithm 9 MEMT(Γ>S↓X)
T ← ∅
Xmin ← FIND-FORMATION(Γ>S↓X , |X|, T )Ùsi ← NULL
while Ùsi is NULL and Xmin is not NULL do
si ← FIND-TAU(Γ>S↓X , Xmin)
if si 6∈ X thenÙsi ← si
else
T ← T ∪ {Xmin}
Xmin ← FIND-FORMATION(Γ>S↓X , |X|, T )
if Ùsi is NULL thenÙsi ← FIND-TAU(Γ>S↓X , X)
return Ùsi
Consider the symmetric game given in Table 7.1. How would MEMT and BR select
strategies for exploration in this game? Assume that, at the current step, we have ex-
plored strategies a and b. Thus, X = {a, b}. The BR policy selects a best response to
the minimum-regret constrained profile in X . If γ is small (γ < 1/4), then c is the best
response to the minimum-regret constrained profile, where each player plays b with prob-
ability 1−2γ
2
. Therefore c is selected by BR. Notice that there is a single Nash equilibrium
in the base game, where players play a with probability 0.5 and d with probability 0.5.
Therefore, BR requires an additional step before a base-game Nash equilibrium is found.
The MEMT policy chooses a strategy that maximizes the regret of a minimum-regret
ε-formation—the ε-formation is a subset of X . The regret (see Definition 23) of {a, b} is
1+γ, the regret of {a} is 1−γ/2, and the regret of {b} is 1+γ. Thus, the minimum-regret
ε-formation is {a}, and the τ -maximizing strategy is d. Therefore, d is selected by MEMT,
forming a restricted game with strategy set {a, b, d}. Notice that {a, d} is a formation,
therefore any Nash equilibrium found in the restricted game with strategy set {a, d} is a
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Nash equilibrium in the base game.
a b c d
a (0, 0) (γ, 1− γ) (0, 1− γ) (1− γ/2, 1− γ/2)
b (1− γ, γ) (0, 0) (0, 1 + γ) (0, 1− γ/2)
c (1− γ, 0) (1 + γ, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1− γ/2)
d (1− γ/2, 1− γ/2) (1− γ/2, 0) (1− γ/2, 0) (0, 0)
Table 7.1: Example two-player, four-action symmetric game.
7.4 Experiments
I evaluate MEMT on two market games employed by Schvartzman and Wellman for testing
their strategy exploration policies. The first is a four-player empirical game simulating a
continuous double auction (CDA) scenario (Schvartzman and Wellman, 2009b). The CDA
game is symmetric with 13 strategies. The second is based on the Trading Agent Compe-
tition Travel (TAC/Travel) game (Wellman et al., 2007). Schvartzman and Wellman use a
symmetric two-player hierarchical reduction of a 35-strategy empirical TAC/Travel game
for testing.
I consider two evaluation metrics: expected minimum profile regret and expected min-
imum formation regret. The expected minimum profile regret of an augmented restricted
game is simply the regret of a selected profile—the same as that proposed by Schvartz-
man and Wellman (2009a). Schvartzman and Wellman select a Nash equilibrium of the
restricted game, whereas I select an MRCP. By construction, MRCPs reveal the mini-
mum profile regret of a restricted game, however in the experiments the difference in regret
between the MRCPs and NEs is negligible. I proceed with the minimum profile-regret


























Figure 7.2: The expected minimum profile-regret in the empirical CDA game.
Minimum profit-regret analysis
Using the same experimental setup as Schvartzman and Wellman (2009a), I analyze the
MEMT policy by tracing the sequence of augmented restricted games generated by MEMT,
starting from each of the 13 strategies of the CDA game. At each step k, I measure the ex-
pected regret of an MRCP of Γ>
S↓X(k) . I use a regret tolerance of 10
−3 when analyzing the
traces. If a profile with base-game regret below this level is found, the trace terminates. Fig-
ure 7.2 shows the expected minimum profile-regret of MEMT and those policies given by
Schvartzman and Wellman, averaged over the 13 traces, on a logarithmic scale for regret.
MEMT requires six steps to reach the tolerance threshold in the worst case, but reaches the
threshold in 3.84 steps on average. This differs substantially from the improving-deviation
policies, where it takes eight steps to reach the 10−3 level in the worst case.
Continuing with the same experimental process, I analyze the policies starting from
each of the 35 strategies of the TAC/Travel game. Figure 7.3 shows the expected minimum
profile-regret averaged over the 35 traces, on a logarithmic scale for regret. In contrast to
the CDA experiment, here MEMT and BR display similar quality. The BR and MEMT
policies require seven and eight steps, respectively, to reach the tolerance threshold in the



























Figure 7.3: The expected minimum profile-regret in the empirical TAC/Travel game.
Minimum formation-regret analysis
I evaluate MEMT and BR, the only other deterministic policy, on the formation-regret mea-
sure for the CDA and TAC/Travel games. As in Section 7.4, I use a regret tolerance of 10−3
when analyzing the traces. The BR policy is representative of the improving-deviation
policies, whereas MEMT is a policy specifically designed to minimize expected formation
regret. Like the profile-regret analysis of the CDA game, I find that MEMT and BR re-
quired six and eight steps, respectively, to reach the tolerance threshold in the worst case,
but reach the threshold in 3.84 and 4.30 steps on average. One explanation for this quick
convergence is the existence of a 2-strategy primitive formation. This is the smallest forma-
tion that exists in the game and, therefore, the lower bound on the optimal number of steps
to termination. If either support of the smallest primitive formation is the starting strategy,
both policies terminate in two steps. Of the 13 starting strategies, ten terminate in four
steps or fewer for MEMT and nine for BR, respectively. In cases where the best-response
strategy supports the minimal profile-regret and the minimal formation-regret, both policies
behave similarly. This occurred frequently in the CDA game, potentially due to its small
primitive-formation.























Figure 7.4: The expected minimum formation-regret in the empirical TAC/Travel game.
In fact, the smallest primitive formation has 27 strategies. Figure 7.4 shows the expected
minimum formation regret averaged over the 35 traces up to a maximum of 16 steps. The
dotted line shows the formation regret of the optimal policy—the sequence that minimizes
formation regret. The regret of MEMT nearly converges in mean to the regret of the op-
timal policy after 15 steps, whereas BR is slower to converge with an expected regret of
approximately 1.8 times that of MEMT after the same number of steps.
7.5 Discussion
I present an algorithm for a modified version of the strategy exploration problem defined by
Schvartzman and Wellman (2009a). In the modified problem, policies generate a sequence
of augmented restricted games. The augmented restricted games allow for exact calcula-
tion of profile and formation regret with respect to a base game. In the original strategy
exploration problem, Schvartzman and Wellman identified pathological cases where the
minimum profile regret increases as additional strategies are explored. With augmented re-
stricted games, this pathology cannot occur because the profile that minimizes base-game
regret is selected by the policies, rather than the one that minimizes regret with respect to
the restricted game.
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I find evidence that formation-finding policies like MEMT perform well on the pro-
file regret measure when small primitive formations exist and are comparable to the best
improving-deviation policies when they do not. I also find MEMT is superior according
to the formation-regret measure on both game instances. In the large game analysis, the
mean expected regret of MEMT converges to the optimal policy much faster than BR—a
representative from the improving-deviation family of policies.
Finally, while MEMT is a strategy exploration policy, it can easily be modified for
more general profile selection problems—problems with fewer constraints on evaluation.
For instance, at each step we can define a candidate restricted game and select a strategy to
refute that game as a formation. This policy uses a MEMT-like selection criterion, however
MEMT—being a strategy exploration policy—evaluates the restricted game consisting of
all previously selected strategies. This is probably inefficient; allowing the policy to evalu-
ate arbitrary restricted games saves us from evaluating unnecessary profiles. This is similar




Generalization Risk in Empirical Games
Experimental analysis of agent strategies in multiagent systems presents a tradeoff between
granularity and statistical confidence. Collecting a large amount of data about each strat-
egy profile improves confidence, but restricts the range of strategies and profiles that can be
explored. In Chapter 2, I review Monte Carlo methods for efficiently estimating the param-
eters of an empirical game model, where we specify the form of the model—for instance,
the set of parameters—being estimated. In this chapter, I investigate how we arrive at that
form.
I propose a flexible approach, where we construct multiple game-theoretic models for
the same underlying scenario (observation dataset). From these candidates, we select a
model to represent the scenario. The prospect of incorrectly selecting an empirical model
is termed generalization risk, and the generalization risk framework I describe provides a
general criterion for empirical modeling choices—such as adoption of factored strategies
or other structured representations of a game model. I propose a principled method of man-
aging generalization risk to derive the optimal game-theoretic model for the observed data
in a restricted class of models. Application to a large dataset generated from a trading agent
scenario confirms the method’s efficacy.
8.1 Sources of Risk in Empirical Games Models
I consider two sources of risk when modeling empirical games. The first source arises from
our choice of the heuristic strategy set, which can be constrained in size by limitations in
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our computational resources. If the heuristic strategy set is a proper subset of the strategy
space, then there is a chance that a useful strategy is omitted. For instance, in TAC/SCM we
are limited to analyzing a handful of strategies even though the space of possible strategies
is infinite. This risk is endemic in modeling MAS scenarios and can be mitigated only
partially by expanding our computational budget.
A second source of risk arises from the analysis of the available observations. Once the
simulator and strategy sets are defined, then observations can be collected and an empirical
game model estimated from the observation data. The empirical game model provides an
estimate for the utility of playing a profile within its profile space. In the previous chap-
ters, the strategy space of the empirical game is assumed identical to that of underlying
simulation. I relax this constraint, allowing models where the strategy sets or even players
do not correspond precisely to the base notions defined by the simulator. For instance, an
empirical game model may treat two strategies that are distinct for the simulator as inter-
changeable in its own strategy space. This coarsens the model the empirical game uses
to predict payoffs, reducing the model’s complexity compared to the finer-grained strategy
space of the simulator.
Entertaining multiple candidate models of varying complexity provides useful flexibil-
ity. A more complex model may capture observations better than a simpler one, however
it may also be more susceptible to fitting spurious information in the observations. I term
this the generalization risk associated with an empirical game model. In the game-theoretic
context, the consequence of incorrect generalization could be that profiles that appear stable
are actually unstable, or vice versa. Thus, I develop a framework that allows us to com-
pare candidate models and make an appropriate selection based on the model’s predictive
power. To illustrate the flexibility of this approach, I investigate equivalent strategy models,
a class of empirical game models that takes an existing strategy space and transforms it by
introducing equivalence classes amongst strategies.
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8.2 Quantifying Generalization Risk
In this section, I quantify the generalization risk of estimating (fitting) the parameters of
the embedded utility function, uΓ, to an observation set Θ generated by simulation. Be-
cause we may be able to fit multiple models, we require some criterion for selecting among
them. In particular, we would like to be able to evaluate and compare the goodness of fit
for different models so that we may identify which is most useful for analysis.
A standard measure of loss for a statistical model is the mean of squared errors with
respect to the data. In this context, I define the loss function L of a candidate empirical
game model by










where θ.s and θ.π are the joint strategy and payoffs comprising the observation θ. We
endeavor to find an empirical game model that minimizes the expected loss E[L (E|Θ)],
where Θ is the random observation set generated from a simulator. Note that because we
do not know the true distribution of Θ, we must estimate the expected loss using an ex-
isting observation set. In the experiments, I use cross-validation on the observation set to
construct this estimate. I outline the k-fold cross-validation procedure in Section 8.3.
8.3 Cross-Validating Empirical Game Models
In order to compare the generalization risk of differing empirical game models, we con-
struct an estimate for the expected loss EL . I calculate this estimate using a cross-
validation technique known as k-fold cross-validation (Stone, 1974).
Define E(h,Θ) to be the empirical game model within model class h that minimizes
loss with respect to a set of observations: E(h,Θ) = arg minE∈h L (E|Θ). I separate the
observation set Θ into k distinct partitions as follows. Let Θŝ = {θ ∈ Θ |s(θ) = ŝ}, that is,
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all of the observations of profile ŝ. For each s ∈ S, I randomly partition Θs into k equally
sized groups Θs1, . . . ,Θ
s
k. For a given set Θi = ∪s∈SΘsi , we define Θ−i = Θ \ Θi. Let
L̂ (h|Θ) denote the estimated expected loss given some model class h, defined as follows





I refer to L̂ (h) without the Θ parameter when the context is clear.
8.4 Partially Ordered Game Models
In Section 8.2, I use the empirical utility model, ũE , to evaluate the loss of a candidate
empirical game model. Here, I introduce a partial order over game model classes. Let h be
a set of empirical game models for a given S. I call h a model class for S. For instance,
we can define a model class by fixing NS, SS, NΓ, SΓ, φ, and µ while letting uΓ vary. Let
H be a set of models classes under consideration for a simulator.
Definition 27 (Model expressiveness). For h, ĥ ∈ H, h expresses ĥ if for every Ê ∈ ĥ there
exists an E ∈ h such that ∀s ∈ S ũE(s) = ũÊ(s).
I use ĥ  h to denote that h expresses ĥ and ĥ ≺ h to denote that h is more expressive than
ĥ, that is, h expresses ĥ but ĥ does not express h. The pair (H,) is a partially ordered set.
Consider two model classes, h and ĥ, where ĥ  h. We can decompose the expected
loss of each class into bias squared and variance components (for an example, see Geman
et al., 1992). Because h is more expressive, we expect the bias of h to be smaller than
that of ĥ. However, we expect the variance of h to be larger than that of ĥ. Therefore,
the tradeoff between the bias and variance components of each class determines the overall
expected loss. The heuristic search algorithms defined in Section 8.6 choose model classes
to evaluate based on this implicit tradeoff.
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8.5 Equivalent Strategy Models
In order to motivate the introduction of equivalent strategy models, we return to the ex-
ample game in Table 1.1 of Chapter 1. In mean utility, strategies (a,A) and (a,B) are
equivalent, as well as, strategies (b,A) and (b,B). Therefore, we can reduce the size of
our empirical model by considering two strategies instead of four—thus 4 profiles instead
of 16. In a factorial design methodology, all possible profiles can be evaluated, and if
conducted naively, a great deal of effort will be spent analyzing equivalent strategies.
In the example, the pairs of strategies have exactly the same mean utilities. However,
strategies in complex scenarios—such as in TAC/SCM—may be defined by a very large
parameter space in which the effects (on utility) of modifying the parameters are slight
or imperceptible. Additionally, modelers may not know a priori if there are equivalent
strategies. Not identifying these equivalent strategies increases the generalization risk—the
variance term increases with no corresponding decrease in the bias term—when compared
to a model class that equates those strategies. I introduce a game model that uses the
concept of equivalent strategies to form a reduced game.
Definition 28 (Equivalent Strategy Model). An equivalent strategy empirical game model
ESG = 〈S, (∼i), (ui)〉 constitutes a model for an empirical game where, for each player
i,∼i is an equivalence relation on SSi that forms equivalence classes {[sSi ]|sSi ∈ SSi ]} and
ui : ×j∈N(Sj/ ∼j) → R for each player i such that
• φ(sS) = ([sSj ])j∈NS
• µ(u( φ(s) ) ) = u( φ(s) ).
The embedded game is given by 〈NS, (Si/ ∼i), (ui)〉, where (Si/ ∼i) is the set of equiva-
lence classes on the strategy set Si—also called the quotient set.
The equivalent strategy model forms equivalence class [si] from each relation∼i where
player i may select any element of the equivalence class with the same result. Thus all
elements in [si] are equivalent. In other words, whenever a strategy si is observed in a
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simulation profile s, we replace it with the representative strategy [si]. Given some ob-
servation set Θ, we can estimate ui(φ(sS)) by the sample mean of the observed payoff
set {πi|(π, s) ∈ Θ and φ(s) = φ(sS)}. Let ∼ be equal to (∼i)i∈N . We can impose the
following expressiveness partial order:
∼̂  ∼⇔ ∀i ∈ N ∀[si] ∈ (Si/ ∼i) ∃[ŝi] ∈ (Si/∼̂i) [si] ⊆ [ŝi].
In other words, every equivalence class under ∼ is a subset of an equivalence class under
∼̂. By dropping the player parameterization of the equivalence relation in Definition 28,





Table 8.1: Simple duplicate game.
Consider another example, the two-player game specified in Table 8.1. The column
player has a single action, C, and the row player has three actions: A, B, and B̂. Suppose
that a simulator modeling this scenario adds zero-mean, unit-variance Gaussian noise to the
row player’s score. Discounting noise, the strategies B and B̂ are equivalent. When α is
small A, B, and B̂ are approximately the same. We have five basic ESM partitions: A, B,
B̂; A, {B, B̂}; {A,B}, B̂; {A, B̂}, B; and {A,B, B̂}. Clearly, we would like to discover
that B and B̂ are equivalent. Additionally, for some settings of α, we would like A, B, and
B̂ to be considered equivalent, if doing so minimizes loss. Consider ESMs fit from a single
observation of each profile in the Table 8.1. Because we know the noise distribution, we
can compute EL analytically. Each payoff observation is a χ-distributed random variable.
The expected loss for each partitioning is given in Table 8.2.
Given the expected loss, the optimal model for the game should consider A, B, and
B̂ equivalent strategies when α is small relative to the noise variance, and only B and B̂
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Partition α = 1 α = 2
A,B, B̂ 3 3
A, {B, B̂} 2 2
{A,B}, B̂ 5/2 4
{A, B̂}, B 5/2 4
{A,B, B̂} 4/3 11/3
Table 8.2: The expected loss, EL , for various partitions and settings of α for the game in
Table 8.1.
equivalent otherwise. Note that in all cases, B and B̂ are equivalent in the selected empir-
ical game model, as desired, and when α varies we have a strict decision criterion which
allows us to decide what magnitude of payoff differences should distinguish strategies. Of
course, in practice we do not have access to the true model—only observations—and must
estimate the expected loss.
8.6 Model Selection
In this section, I define a procedure for selecting a model class, h, from a hypothesis space,
H. This algorithm is similar to the FIND-FORMATION algorithm of Chapter 4. SELECT-
MODEL (Algorithm 10) uses two basic subroutines and a priority queue with a maximum
size of M to determine the model class with least expected loss. A setting of M = 1
gives a best-first search. The two enqueue routines, ENQUEUE-FIRST and ENQUEUE-
NEXT, each present novel model classes to the priority queue. I discuss two generic
implementations of the SELECT-MODEL algorithm: INCREASING-SELECT-MODEL
and DECREASING-SELECT-MODEL.
In the INCREASING-SELECT-MODEL variant, we start with the least expressive
model classes and introduce model classes in order of increasing expressivity. The
ENQUEUE-FIRST routine (randomly) enqueues one of the minimal elements of H. The
ENQUEUE-NEXT routine enqueues the set {h′ ∈ H|h′  h and 6 ∃h′′ ∈ H h′′  h′  h},
which is the set of least expressive model classes that are more expressive than h.
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Algorithm 10 SELECT-MODEL(H, Θ, ENQUEUE-FIRST, ENQUEUE-NEXT, M )
best← null
queue← Empty priority queue with maximum size M ordered by L̂
ENQUEUE-FIRST(queue,H)
while queue is not empty and termination conditions are not met do
h← top(queue)




Similarly, in the DECREASING-SELECT-MODEL variant, we start with the most ex-
pressive model classes and introduce model classes in order of decreasing expressivity. The
ENQUEUE-FIRST routine (randomly) enqueues one of the maximal elements of H. The
ENQUEUE-NEXT routine enqueues the set {h′ ∈ H|h′ ≺ h and 6 ∃h′′ ∈ H h′′ ≺ h′ ≺ h},
which is the set of most expressive model classes that are less expressive than h.
I conclude this section by discussing the DECREASING-ESM-SELECTION algo-
rithm to select an ESM given a set of observations. The algorithm is a variant of the
DECREASING-SELECT-MODEL algorithm.1 The scenario under consideration is sym-
metric, therefore the player indexing on the strategy equivalence relation ∼ is dropped. I
let H be the set of model classes induced from all possible equivalence relations on the
simulation strategy space. Therefore, (H,) is a lattice. The ENQUEUE-FIRST routine
enqueues the maximum element of the lattice, which is simply the model class where each
equivalence class contains only a single strategy. There is a bijection between model classes
and equivalence relations for ESMs. For a model class h, let ∼ be the equivalence relation
that corresponds to h. The ENQUEUE-NEXT routine enqueues a set of model classes,
such that each model class is formed by merging a single pair of equivalence classes in ∼.
Finally, the algorithm terminates if the expected loss of the best class seen thus far is less
than the expected loss of any class in the queue.
1We chose this variant under the assumption that most strategies in the scenario should not be considered
equivalent. It turns out that this assumption is incorrect, however the algorithm works well regardless.
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8.7 Equivalent Strategy Model Experiments
In the following experiments, I consider game models over observations taken from the
TAC Supply Chain Management scenario. I experimentally evaluate the DECREASING-
ESM-SELECTION algorithm on two TAC/SCM data sets. In Chapter 5, I describe the
construction of the 2008 candidate data set, as well as the methods used to evaluate each
strategy. After initial analysis, five variants of DeepMaize 2008 remained as candidates for
the final screening of strategies. These five strategies combined with top strategies from
the 2007 tournament analysis comprise the strategy set used to select the DeepMaize 2008




DM6 DeepMaize 2008 variant 6
DM20 DeepMaize 2008 variant 20
DM24 DeepMaize 2008 variant 24
DM25 DeepMaize 2008 variant 25
DM28 DeepMaize 2008 variant 28
Table 8.3: Strategies used in the TAC/SCM data set.
Each simulation of a specific profile requires 7 processor hours on a cluster of com-
puters (1 hour running simultaneously on 7 different processors). A full six-player, seven-
strategy symmetric game has 924 distinct strategy profiles. We use 30 samples per profile
for statistical analysis of the deviations and regret. This requires, at minimum, 194,040
processor hours to complete. On a typical day prior to the tournament, there were 700 pro-
cessor hours available. Our candidate analysis usually begins in April and lasts through the
end of June. The full six-player analysis requires approximately three times the available
amount of processing power—assuming a zero failure rate. However, using a three-player
hierarchical reduction (Wellman et al., 2005b), we can reduce the number of distinct pro-
files to 84, a feasible size for analysis.
In Section 5.4, I describe the development path for the DeepMaize 2008 agent, which
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consists of a set of candidate strategies. I repeat capsule descriptions of each candidate
strategy here. The designation DM6 corresponds to DeepMaize 2008 candidate version 6.
DM6 is a slight modification of the strategy used by the DeepMaize 2007 agent. DM6 re-
placed the 2007 procurement strategy by mimicking PH’s long-term procurement strategy.
DM20 is a departure from DM6 that changed the procurement policy of the agent in the
early portion of the game. DM24 and DM25 varied the mid-game procurement levels from
that of DM6 and DM20. DM28 uses a modified component-price prediction algorithm,
but is otherwise identical to DM20. The DM28 component-price prediction algorithm de-
creased the prediction error of the DM20 predictor by about 1% RMS error (Pardoe and
Stone, 2008). While a 1% improvement is appreciable, it was not known whether the im-
provement would be expressed behaviorally in the relative score of the agent. Using these
candidate strategies and a background set of agents that had strong support in the equilib-
rium analysis of Chapter 5, our team needed to make a decision about which candidate to
play in the 2008 tournament.
The first experiment attempts to empirically validate the ESM selection algorithm for
a reduced set of strategies, where one of the strategies is a known duplicate of an existing
strategy. Because the two strategies are identical, the ESM selected by the algorithm should
place the original and the duplicate in the same equivalence class. A reduced observation
set is constructed from the observations of profiles supported by strategies PH, TT, and
DM20. To introduce a duplicate strategy, I created a new strategy label: DM20C. For all
observations involving strategy DM20, I changed the label to DM20C with probability 0.5.
I ran the DECREASING-ESM-SELECTION algorithm on the resultant observations, We
expect the algorithm to identify DM20 and DM20C as equivalent. Table 8.4 verifies that
the algorithm does indeed equate the two strategies. The table illustrates the algorithm as
it progresses through various iterations. For each ESM model, I report the expected loss
in millions. The single star highlights the best model in each round and the double star
highlights the final model selected.
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Round Best Strategy Space RMSE
0 PH, TT, DM20, DM20C 3.64
{PH, TT}, DM20C, DM20 12.93
{PH, DM20}, TT, DM20C 11.27
{PH, DM20C}, TT, DM20 10.68
PH, DM20C, {TT, DM20} 4.30
PH, {TT, DM20C}, DM20 4.24
? PH, {DM20, DM20C}, TT 3.57
1 PH, {DM20, DM20C}, TT 3.57
TT, {PH, DM20, DM20C} 14.74
{DM20, DM20C}, {PH, TT} 12.92
PH, {DM20, DM20C, TT} 4.73
FINAL ?? PH, {DM20, DM20C}, TT 3.57
Table 8.4: Model selection on the TAC/SCM duplicate data set.
In the second experiment, I consider the full strategy set from Table 8.3. Because
the ESM selected by the DECREASING-ESM-SELECTION algorithm depends on the
randomized observation-set partition used by k-fold validation, different ESMs may be re-
turned on different runs of the algorithm. Over thirty runs, five distinct ESMs were selected
by the algorithm. Table 8.5 gives the frequency of these ESMs. The modal ESM contained
the strategy equivalence classes: PH, TT, DM28, and {DM6, DM20, DM24, DM25}.
Equivalent Strategy Game Freq
PH, TT, {DM6, DM20, DM24, DM25}, DM28 17
PH, TT, {DM20, DM28}, {DM6, DM24, DM25} 7
PH, TT, DM6, {DM20, DM24, DM25}, DM28 5
PH, TT, DM28, {DM20, DM24}, {DM6, DM25} 1
Table 8.5: ESM frequency table for TAC/SCM data set.
Figure 8.1 displays the modal ESM with the four distinct regions separated by the gray
barrier. Three regions contain exactly one strategy, respectively. The fourth central region
contains the four base strategies which the ESM identifies as equivalent: DM6, DM20,
DM24, and DM25. The solid black lines interconnecting the four strategies represent the
relative strengths of the pairwise equivalences as determined by their frequency in Ta-
ble 8.5. For instance, strategies DM24 and DM25 appeared as equivalent in 29 of the 30
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selected ESMs and the relationship is drawn with a thick line. Comparatively, strategies
DM6 and DM20 appeared as equivalent in 17 of the 30 selected ESMs and the relationship
is drawn with a slim line. The second most frequent ESM equated strategies DM20 and







Figure 8.1: Modal ESP for TAC/SCM data set.
For the following experiments, I denote the equivalence class {DM6, DM20, DM24,
and DM25} by DM*. I treat the modal ESM as the true ESM of the TAC/SCM simu-
lation. We would like to know how restricting observations to a subset of the strategies
affects analysis on the full strategy set. For instance, in designing and analyzing the strate-
gies for a tournament, it often infeasible to sample the entire space of 20 or so candidate
strategies, even using the hierarchical reduction technique. Often design and analysis pro-
ceed iteratively, adding strategies to a set of small background strategies—similar to the
strategy exploration methods of Chapter 7. Bad (irrelevant) strategies are pruned, while
those in support of a sample Nash equilibrium or formation (see Chapter 4) are retained.
New candidate strategies are added and the analysis process starts a new iteration. There
is no guarantee that strategies previously pruned would not be in the support of the new
equilibrium.
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We would like to know if in a restricted strategy space, the ESM returned by the algo-
rithm is consistent—in terms of the equivalence relation—with the ESM returned by the
algorithm given observations from the entire strategy set (the full strategy space). There are
two types of errors that may occur: a false positive (Type I) and a false negative (Type II).
A Type I error occurs when strategies that should not be equivalent in the full strategy space
are selected as equivalent in the restricted space. Type II errors occur when strategies that
should be equivalent in the full strategy space are selected as distinct in the restricted space.
For instance, if strategies DM6 and DM28 are in the same equivalence class, the restricted
strategy ESM would contain a Type I error. If instead strategies DM24 and DM25 are in
different equivalence classes, the restricted strategy ESM would contain a Type II error.
Size
Type I Error Rate Type II
PH DM28 DM* Error Rate
3



















Table 8.6: Type I and II error rates on TAC/SCM data for different strategy set sizes.
I design an experiment to explore the Type I and Type II error rates of the DECREASING-
ESM-SELECTION in the TAC/SCM domain. For all of the strategies listed in Table 8.3,
we create restricted strategy spaces of sizes 3–6. For each restricted strategy space of size





cases. For each of these observation sets,
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I run the DECREASING-ESM-SELECTION algorithm. I report the rate of each type of
error in Table 8.6, using the modal ESM in Figure 8.1 as the standard for comparison. Note
that since the equivalence classes for TT, PH, and DM28 are singletons, there can be no
Type II errors for those classes. Because DM* is composed of multiple underlying strate-
gies, we can observe Type II errors when more than one of the constituent strategies is in
the restricted strategy set. This occurs with varying rates across the restricted strategy set
sizes. For instance, in the restricted size 3 group, of the 22 simulations in which a Type II
error could occur, only one contained such a false negative. There were no instances in any
of the restricted simulations where TT or PH were incorrectly equated with any of the other
strategies. In contrast, DM28 was incorrectly equated with at least one of the DM* strate-
gies 21%, 30%, 20%, and 33% of the time for sizes 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively. The values
seem relatively large, however consider that even when analyzing all seven strategies, 23%
of the time DM20 and DM28 were in the same equivalence class.
8.8 Discussion
I propose a framework for comparing empirical game model classes and a family of model
algorithms that heuristically select the optimal class from set of candidate classes. For illus-
tration, I introduce a hierarchy of model classes called equivalent strategy models. ESMs
can model scenarios where duplicate (equivalent or near equivalent) strategies may exist in
the simulation space.
I experimentally evaluate DECREASING-ESM-SELECTION, a specialization of the
general SELECT-MODEL algorithm for ESMs, on a data set of TAC/SCM observations.
Using the algorithm, I select an ESM for TAC/SCM, given the 2008 tournament candidate
strategies for our agent. The first test experimentally confirmed that the DECREASING-
ESM-SELECTION algorithm identifies identical, relabeled strategies as equivalent. The
second test discovered an equivalence relation involving four out of the five DeepMaize
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candidate strategies. Additionally, the error-rate tests confirm the equivalence classes are
consistent across restricted games in the TAC/SCM data.
If ESMs are consistent across restricted games, this property can be exploited by strat-
egy exploration methods. We can analyze small restricted-games for strategy equivalences.
If some equivalences are found, they are likely to hold in the base game, thereby reducing
the need to test multiple strategies in the same equivalence class. Identifying equivalences
can yield a substantial reduction in the required number of observations to fully analyze the
scenario. Leading into the 2008 competition, DM20 was identified as a promising strategy.
DM28 was a relatively late-breaking addition to the candidate set. Most of the available cy-
cles nearing the start of the tournament were devoted to comparing the difference between
DM20 and DM28, which had similar support in a sample Nash equilibrium for the em-
pirical game. DM20 was chosen over DM28 since it had been tested thoroughly, whereas
DM28, being a relative last-minute update, had undergone only minimal testing outside
of pairwise comparisons. Had the results of the DECREASING-ESM-SELECTION al-





The emergence of Internet advertising, specifically ad auctions, as a significant commercial
success over the past decade (Fain and Pedersen, 2006) has led to increasing interest among
academic researchers, manifest in a growing literature and a popular regular workshop on
the topic. Both the commercial importance and academic interest were major motivations
for introducing a new TAC game in this area. Given that bidding in keyword auctions
(employing essentially the same mechanism we incorporate in the game) is a widespread
current activity, the prospects for real-world implementation of ideas developed in the re-
search competition are more direct than previous TAC games.
This chapter contains an overview of this new TAC Ad Auctions game (TAC/AA), in-
troducing its key features and design rationale. TAC/AA debuted in summer 2009, with the
final tournament commencing in conjunction with the TADA-09 workshop. Using tour-
nament and offline simulation data, I perform a strategic analysis of the scenario and find
improvements to the standard auction mechanism.
9.1 Simulating Ad Auctions
Despite considerable academic interest in ad auctions, many interesting algorithmic, bid-
ding, and mechanism-design problems remain open (Muthukrishnan, 2008). Designing a
realistic simulator (Feldman and Muthukrishnan, 2008) is a central component in many
of these problems. For instance, Yahoo! researchers (Acharya et al., 2007) developed the
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Cassini simulator to evaluate alternative sponsored search mechanisms. The system sim-
ulates low-level query and click behavior, publisher ranking and budget enforcement, and
other aspects of the sponsored search environment. Cassini allows a rich simulation of user
interaction, however the authors report some of its limitations in terms of the advertiser
strategy space. For instance, advertisers were not allowed to adaptively change their bids
in response to new market conditions. Perhaps most importantly, the Cassini system is not
publicly accessible to the research community at large.
Another early predecessor to TAC/AA was the Pay Per Click Bidding Agent Compe-
tition,1 designed and organized by Brendan Kitts as part of the ACM EC-06 Sponsored
Search Workshop. Participants in this competition managed a live Microsoft AdCenter
campaign for a given set of keywords over a 24-hour period. Running the competition
with real money and real users over actual sponsored-search interfaces provides a max-
imal level of realism. In this design, however, I follow the precedent of previous TAC
games in developing a simulated environment, where participants interact via a specified
interface with a game server running the auctions and generating simulated market events
(in this case, search user behavior). This approach provides advantages of repeatability
and transparency, which are particularly important for supporting the research goals of this
enterprise.
9.2 Sponsored Search
Ad auctions are used by Internet publishers to allocate and price advertising channels. In-
ternet advertising provides a substantial source of revenue for online publishers, amounting
to billions of dollars annually. Sponsored search is a popular form of targeted advertising,
in which query-specific advertisements are placed alongside organic search-engine results
(see Figure 9.1). The placement (position) of ads for a given query, along with the cor-
1http://www.biddingagentcompetition.com
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responding cost (to the advertiser) per click (CPC), are determined through an auction
process. Under cost-per-click pricing, both publisher and advertisers bear some of the risk
associated with uncertain user behavior. The use of automated auctions addresses the com-
binatorial problem of quoting an appropriate price (CPC) for each display slot for each
distinct query. Advertisers bid for the family of keywords of interest, and competition





Figure 9.1: Typical search engine results page (SERP).
Given the salience of ad auction mechanisms, a growing number of researchers have
started to investigate the mechanism design problem faced by search publishers, as well as
the strategic problems faced by advertisers. Common to many of the early approaches are
stylistic restrictions on the scenario or the full strategic space. Most of the foundational
models for sponsored search analysis construct a static game of complete information for
a single keyword auction (Aggarwal et al., 2006; Börgers et al., 2007; Edelman et al.,
2007; Varian, 2007). This type of analysis has provided a solid conceptual base for re-
searchers to build upon. Significant results include equilibrium characterizations and the
discovery that the auctions currently in use by publishers are not truthful. From the static
models, extensions have considered dynamic variations that often include some aspect of
simulation (Cary et al., 2007; Lahaie and Pennock, 2007; Vorobeychik and Reeves, 2008).
TAC/AA continues in this vein by building a richer model space, while retaining many of
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the useful empirical qualities found in previous TAC scenarios.
9.3 Designing an Ad Auction Game
In TAC/AA, we design a simulation framework that attempts to include many of the
interesting strategic aspects of sponsored search auctions, while being repeatable and com-
putationally amenable to empirical analysis. In this framework there are three types of
agents: users, advertisers, and publishers. We discuss the behavior of each in turn below,
as well as the underlying market that drives the behavior of the user and advertiser agents.
Some important elements of managing an ad campaign are not considered, such as ex-
ploration of a large keyword space for high-profitability keywords, or optimizing landing
page content to improve the advertiser’s quality score. These issues are sacrificed not for
lack of interest or value, but rather because we lack useful models to represent them. In
the process of developing TAC/AA, we identified three interesting modeling problems, not
currently resolved in the sponsored search literature, central to the design of our simulation
environment:
• What drives query generation?
• How do advertisers derive value?
• Why might keyword auctions be interdependent?
The process that generates queries is a fundamental component of ad auctions. In ad-
dition to defining the query space, we include query bursts: large shifts in the number of
queries, which advertisers observe in real markets. Uncertainty in the volume of queries is
an important consideration for both the publishers and advertisers.
TAC/AA introduces an underlying retail market scenario. This market scenario de-
fines the value of retail purchases to the advertisers. Unlike many of the earlier models,
the advertiser value-per-click is not constant. This formulation imposes a keyword-value
interdependency based on the query and conversion processes of user behavior. In most
other models, interdependency is achieved by exogenous budgets. In reality, the ob-
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served budgets—for instance, the daily budgets submitted by advertisers to major search
engines—are not hard constraints for the advertisers. For instance, the management of a
self-financing firm may impose spend limits on its advertising department to control risk.
These constraints are exogenous from the advertising department’s perspective, but not
from the firm’s perspective—in TAC/AA, players are modeled as firms. Thus, spend limits
are part of an advertiser’s strategy, not an exogenous constraint on it.
A full description of the TAC/AA scenario is provided in the specification document
(Jordan et al., 2009). Here, we discuss some of the key modeling choices used in TAC/AA,
providing design rationales and comparing to related literature where applicable.
Defining the Market
In the TAC/AA scenario, users search for and potentially purchase components of a home
entertainment system. There is a setM of manufacturers in this market, each of whom pro-
duce a set of component types C. The manufacturers and components found in TAC/AA are
shown in Table 9.1. The set of products P is simplyM× C, therefore there are nine dis-
tinct products p = (m, c) that are uniquely identified by manufacturer m and component
c. Advertisers represent retailers who deal in these products. Each user has an underlying
preference for one of the nine products. The advertisers use the ad auctions to attract user
attention to their offerings, in an attempt to generate sales.
M C









Table 9.1: Manufacturers and components in the retail market.
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Advertisers each have a distribution process that constrains their ability to deliver prod-
ucts to purchasing users in a timely manner. A user’s decision to purchase is influenced by
how constrained the advertiser is in making its deliveries. This induces a non-linearity in
the value of a click to the advertiser.
Publisher Behavior
Publishers provide the mechanism through which advertisers interact in sponsored search
auctions. This includes defining the slots over which advertisers bid, the mechanism that
ranks and prices the displayed ads given the bids, and reserve prices that constrain the bids
of displayed ads. The value of the slots to the advertisers and the publisher is largely de-
termined by user behavior. This in turn requires advertisers and publishers to construct
a model of user behavior in order to optimize their respective objectives. Each of these
components of publisher behavior and the associated existing research are discussed sub-
sequently.
Slot positions
When a user queries a publisher, the publisher returns a set of ads. In typical sponsored
search auctions, the ads are returned in some significant order (see Figure 9.2). The posi-
tion of the ad connotes some relative value. This relative value is inferred from the disparity
in click-through rates across positions. For example, ads positioned towards the top of the
results page usually have higher click-through rates, all else considered. Some search en-
gines divide slots into two regions. One region is considered promoted or premium and
is somehow distinguished from the other ad slots. In TAC/AA, we incorporate a similar
notion with two types of slots: regular and promoted. Ads in promoted slots receive an
odds bonus in click-though rate.
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TAC / AA  -  SERP
GP Promoted
Regular
Figure 9.2: TAC/AA search engine results page (SERP).
Ranking ads
In general, each ad auction matches ads with available slots. This type of generality is
appealing and general matching mechanisms have been applied to sponsored search by
Aggarwal et al. (2009). However, given the natural ordering of slots, mechanisms that
fundamentally incorporate this order are often used in practice as well as research.
Two ranking mechanisms have been prominent in the analysis of sponsored search:
• Rank by Bid: advertisers are ordered according to their bid bq for a given query.
• Rank by Revenue: advertisers are ordered according to the product of their click-
through rate and bid, eqbq, for a given query.
Lahaie and Pennock (2007) introduce a family of ranking algorithms that can interpo-
late between rank-by-bid and rank-by-revenue. The family is parameterized by a squashing
parameter χ. Advertisers are ranked according to (eq)χbq, which we term an advertiser’s
score. Notice that a setting of χ = 0 is equivalent to rank-by-bid and a setting of χ = 1
is equivalent to rank-by-revenue. The ranking method in TAC/AA uses the Lahaie and
Pennock parameterization. The squashing parameter is announced at the beginning of the
simulation, so that advertisers can condition their strategy on it.
158
Pricing clicks
In sponsored search, a slot is assigned a cost per click (CPC) that is determined by an auc-
tion. When a user clicks on the ad in the slot, the advertiser is charged the CPC amount.
Edelman et al. (2007) describe the two basic pricing mechanisms used in sponsored search
auctions.
• Generalized first-price (GFP): the CPC for a slot is set to the price bid by the
winner of that slot.
• Generalized second-price (GSP): the CPC for a slot is set to the minimum price the
winner of that slot needed to pay to keep the slot.
Let b(i) be the bid of the winner of the ith position and e(i) be the click-through-rate of







The auctions introduced by Overture in 1997 used GFP. Edelman et al. report one of the
effects of GFP to be volatile prices. Under GFP, advertisers inevitably want to change their
bid given the current setting of other-agent bids, which produces a price instability actually
observed in such auctions. In practice, most publishers now use GSP, and TAC/AA adopts
this pricing rule as well. With GSP, advertisers have less cause to frequently adjust prices,
because they are already paying the minimum price for the slot given the other advertisers’
bids.
Setting reserve prices
The publisher in TAC/AA employs a generalized second-price pricing model with reserve
scores. To be allocated a slot, an advertiser’s score must meet a certain threshold ρ, called
a reserve score. The publisher in TAC/AA uses two reserve scores: ρpro for promoted
slots and ρreg for regular slots. If an advertiser’s score in a (candidate) promoted slot falls
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between ρreg and ρpro, the advertiser is allocated a regular slot.
Let eq,(p) be the baseline click probability of the ad in the pth position, and b(p)q the bid by
the advertiser ranked in that position (we take b(p)q = eq,(p) = 0 if there is no such bid). The
cost-per-click (CPC) for position p of the auction for query q is determined by the effective















where ρ(p) is ρpro if p is a promoted slot and ρreg otherwise. The CPC is given by the




Reserve prices in ad auctions are used for revenue maximization and ad quality control.
Abrams and Schwarz (2008) develop a framework based on the hidden costs advertisers
impose on users.2 Abrams and Schwarz construct an efficient mechanism by modifying the
bids by the hidden costs. Even-Dar et al. (2008) describe a set of VCG payment modifica-
tions that incorporate advertiser-specific minimum bids. One of the payment modifications
offsets bids by the minimum reserve prices. Using the Abrams and Schwarz mechanism,
Even-Dar et al. show that the auction is efficient and truthful. The other efficient and truth-
ful VCG payment adjustment Even-Dar et al. introduce is virtual values. These virtual
values essentially become reserve scores, where an advertiser’s score is the product of its
bid and click-through rate. Unlike the more general Even-Dar et al. model, the reserve
price model of TAC/AA applies a uniform reserve score across advertisers for a given
query. However, the reserve score can be converted into an advertiser-specific reserve price
2In their model, hidden costs are related to the change in future revenue due to a user clicking on an
advertiser’s ad. For instance, dissatisfied users are less likely to click on future ads.
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by adjusting for the advertiser’s individual click-through rate.
Unknown user behavior
The behavior of users is not known a priori to publishers or advertisers. For instance, pub-
lishers may view the number of queries per day as a stochastic variable. The distribution
may be influenced by many latent variables. Dealing with this type of uncertainty is an
important part of a publisher’s mechanism.
Recent research has explored various online algorithms for allocating ad slots to ad-
vertisers given a random sequence of queries. This problem has been considered with
advertiser budgets (Mehta et al., 2007; Mahdian et al., 2007; Muthukrishnan et al., 2007;
Goel and Mehta, 2008) and without (Mahdian and Saberi, 2006; Abrams and Gosh, 2007).
In addition to online algorithms, publishers may try to design optimal mechanisms that
use various parameterizations of user behavior. In real markets, these parameters must be
learned. This learning process affects the dynamics of the auctions, which in turn affects
revenue and efficiency (Wortman et al., 2007). Learning parameters is an especially im-
portant part of the publisher mechanism when the query space is large and data is sparse.
In TAC/AA this is not the case; the query space is relatively small and users generate a
large number of queries for each query each time period. For this reason and simplicity’s
sake, we just assume the publisher in TAC/AA knows advertiser-specific click probabil-
ities, thus eliminating the need to learn click-through rates. We further assume that the
ranking mechanism is fixed, so that learning more detailed user behavior is not relevant to
publisher behavior. It is, of course, quite relevant to advertiser behavior.
User Search Behavior
Aggarwal et al. (2008) suggest a framework for analyzing sponsored search auctions in
which the search user takes a central role. The authors describe the need for a rich prob-
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abilistic model of user behavior, specifically once the ads are presented to the user. This
corresponds to the click and conversion behavior presented in the sections that follow. We
go even further and suggest that the entirety of user behavior should form the basis for
analysis. This includes the definition of the query space over which that users generate
queries and the frequency at which they do.
Query behavior
Search queries trigger the ad auctions that are built around them and, thus, understanding
and modeling the user query process is of fundamental importance. Much of the early re-
search in ad auctions looked at an instance of a single ad auction or a sequence of auctions
all associated with a single query class. This abstracts away the interrelation among queries
and the implications this has for bidding.
For instance, advertisers often use keywords that match multiple queries. Advertisers
must reason about their values for each type of query that a single keyword matches. More-
over, the relative frequencies of queries changes dynamically over time, thus the value of
the keyword changes with the distribution. This implies that query dynamics is an impor-
tant consideration as well, when designing an ad auction simulation.
TAC/AA uses a state-based user model to generate this dynamic behavior (see Fig-
ure 9.3). Users progress through various states in order to satisfy their underlying product
preferences. The user’s state determines the type of query the user generates (see Guo
et al., 2009, for related work). At any given time, the population of users is divided into
three broad classes: non-searching (NS ), searching, and transacted (T ). This is similar in
nature to the query classifications of Jansen et al. (2008). Non-searching users are currently
inactive, generating no queries. The searching users are further divided into informational
(IS ) and shopping searchers. The informational searchers seek to gather information about
their desired product but not to purchase. The shoppers navigate available ads and possibly
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transact. Shopping users are further divided by levels of search sophistication3 (focus): low
focus (level 0), intermediate (level 1), and high focus (level 2). The transacted users have







Figure 9.3: User state transition model. Each state also has an implicit self-loop (not
shown).
A query consists of a collection of words. In our model, we consider only the six words
corresponding to manufacturers and components in the home entertainment market. Each
query contains at most two of these words: the user’s desired manufacturer and compo-
nent. For instance, a user with preference (Lioneer, TV) may generate a query mentioning
Lioneer, TV, both Lioneer and TV, or neither. An F0 level query mentions neither a com-
ponent nor manufacturer. An F1 level query mentions one or the other, but not both. an
F2 level query mentions both component and manufacturer. In total, there are 16 distinct
queries: 1 F0 query, 6 F1 queries, and 9 F2 queries. A user with a given product preference
will generate one of four queries: two possible F1 queries, and one possibility each at F0
and F2.
Each user in a searching state generates a single query per day. An F0, F1, or F2 user
3We can also think of these levels as reflecting their degree of knowledge about their own preference.
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submits a query pertaining to its level of focus. An informational user selects among the
three query types uniformly at random. If an F1 query is selected, the informational user
selects between the manufacturer and component with equal probability.
Each user sub-population is modeled as a Markov chain. Most transition probabili-
ties are stationary, with the following exceptions. To model bursts of search behavior, we
provide stochastic spikes in the NS → IS transition. The transition probabilities from fo-
cused search states to state T are also non-stationary, governed by the click and conversion
behavior of the user.
Click behavior
Many models have been proposed for user click behavior. The functional forms of the mod-
els vary, nevertheless each model gives the probability that an ad at a given position will
be clicked. Examples of early models include the Edelman et al. (2007) model an Börgers
et al. (2007) model. Edelman et al. (2007) assume each position has an ad-independent
click probability—thus, they do not consider the effect of an ad on the probability. In con-
trast, Börgers et al. (2007) allow for an independent probability for each advertiser-position
pair.
Even the Börgers et al. model is not completely general. For instance, it may be that the
click probability is dependent on the other advertisers and the position of the other advertis-
ers that are allocated slots. Most existing research (implicitly) adopts one of the following
models for click probability:
• Separability: For each query, the click probability is the product of a position and
advertiser effect (Aggarwal et al., 2006; Edelman et al., 2007; Börgers et al., 2007;
Varian, 2007);
• Cascade (Markovian): For each query, each ad has a click probability given that
the ad is viewed, as well as a continuation probability that the user will view the
subsequent slot (Aggarwal et al., 2008; Kempe and Mahdian, 2008).
The decomposition given by the separability model yields a convenient form for the
optimization problem the publisher solves, however this model does not appear to be the
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best predictor of click probabilities. For organic (non-sponsored) links, Craswell et al.
(2008) find the cascade model to be the best predictor of click probabilities and argue for
applicability of their results to sponsored links. The dependency of click probability on
the other advertisers is termed an externality effect. Gunawardana and Meek (2008) ana-
lyzed these effects and found a significant contextual effect. In general, Gunawardana and
Meek’s results suggest that significant externality effects exist and that the assumptions of
the separability model do not hold in practice.
As an alternative to the cascade model, Das et al. (2008) propose an extension of the
separability model in which the user may convert from at most one of the advertisers. Like
the cascade model, this introduces a dependence on the advertisers in the higher slots.
The click model we employ in TAC/AA is a hybrid of the cascade model and the model
proposed by Das et al., and also incorporates the underlying product preferences of indi-
vidual search users. Users in our model proceed as in the cascade model, but stop clicking
on subsequent ads when a purchase is made.
In practice, one important focus of search engine marketing (SEM) is selecting the ad
copy or the text that is displayed in the ad. This process usually involves creating a series
of ads and then testing the click-through rates of those ads, known as split testing. The
TAC/AA click model does not incorporate text directly, however it does include a rudimen-
tary form of ad selection. Ads take one of two forms: targeted and generic. Targeted ads
emphasize a specific product, whereas generic ads do not. Ghose and Yang (2008) dis-
cuss the effects of brand and product keywords on click probability. The TAC/AA model
incorporates similar effects, but in terms of ad targeting. Compared to the generic ad,
users with preference matching the target of a targeted ad click with higher probability, and
non-matching users are less likely to click.
Specifically, the click behavior of searching users is modeled by the following parame-
ters:
• an advertiser effect eaq for each combination of advertiser a and query class q,
• a targeting effect TE which modifies the probability of clicking targeted ads depend-
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ing on whether the user’s preferences match the ad target,
• a promotion bonus modifying the click probability for promoted slots, and
• a continuation probability γq for query class q.
Given an impression page, also called a search engine results page (SERP), for query
q, the user proceeds to sequentially view ads, starting from the first position. For a generic
ad viewed from advertiser a, the baseline probability that the user clicks is given by eaq .
This probability can be modified by two factors. First, the targeting factor, ftarget, applies




1 + TE if targeted ad, matches
1 if generic ad
1/(1 + TE ) if targeted ad, does not match.
Second, the promotion factor fpro applies a promotion slot bonus PSB if the ad position
is a promoted slot. Promoted slots are placed in a premium location on the page (see Slot
positions), and therefore enjoy an enhanced click rate. For a regular slot, fpro = 1, and for
a promoted slot, fpro = 1 + PSB .
The overall click probability starts with the baseline and gets adjusted based on these
factors.






If the ad is not clicked, or clicked but no purchase is made, the user proceeds to the next
ad with continuation probability γq.
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Conversion behavior
The purchase or conversion behavior of users can arise from various processes (Chen and
He, 2006; Athey and Ellison, 2007; Cary et al., 2008; Kominers, 2008). For example, there
may be some cost associated with search for the users and the advertisers may have differ-
entiated products and prices. In any case, these models induce some probability that the
user will convert.
In TAC/AA, we describe this conversion probability in terms of inventories and back-
order delays. This story is meant merely to be suggestive, just one causal explanation for
the ultimate effect, which is to impose a diminishing marginal value on clicks. Our conver-
sion model is composed of three factors. One factor is attributed to the state or type of the
user. The other two factors are associated with the state of the advertiser and its product
specialty, respectively.
Once an ad has been clicked-through, the shopping users convert at different rates ac-
cording to their focus levels. The probability is a function of several parameters. The
baseline conversion probability is given by πl, for l ∈ {F0,F1,F2}. Higher focus level
queries convert at higher rates: πF2 > πF1 > πF0.
The second factor captures an effect of constrained distribution capacity. The story is
that if the advertisers sell too much product in a short period, their inventories run short and
they have to put items on backorder. As a result, shoppers are less inclined to purchase, and
conversions suffer. All product sales contribute to the distribution constraint, thus rendering
the queries interdependent. Let cd be the total number of conversions over all products on
day d, and W the aggregation window for distribution capacity. The distribution constraint








where Ccap is the critical distribution capacity, beyond which conversion rates decrease.
In our scenario, advertisers are assigned one of three discrete capacity levels: cap ∈
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{HIGH,MED,LOW}.
Finally, we consider the effect of component specialization. For users with prefer-
ence for a component matching the advertiser’s specialization, the odds of converting are
increased by a component specialization bonus (CSB ), using the formula for odds adjust-
ment (9.1). If the user matches component specialty, fspecialization = 1 + CSB , otherwise
fspecialization = 1. In sum, the overall expression for conversion probability becomes
Pr(conversion) = η(πlId, fspecialization).
Advertiser Strategy Space
Advertisers in sponsored-search auctions face a complex problem in optimizing their ad
campaigns. They contend with dynamic user behavior, uncertainty in publisher policies,
and the effects of other competing advertisers. Advertisers control the content of the ads,
which ads to display, the bids they place for the ads, and spend limits that bound the cost
they can incur. There are also other aspects of campaign management that are important.
For instance, optimizing the landing page—the page users are directed to when the click
on an ad—can dramatically affect conversion rates.4
All of these features define the advertiser strategy space, however only a subset of these
features are included in TAC/AA. Part of the motivation for excluding some features (in ad-
dition to simply limiting scope), such as landing page optimization, is that we expect them
to be approximately strategically independent and can be studied in a decision-theoretic
context apart from other strategic considerations. Features that we believe are strategically
dependent include setting bids, choosing ads, and setting spend limits. We discuss each of
these in turn over the remainder of the section.




Advertisers may specify bids for each of the query classes—there are 16 distinct query
classes in TAC/AA. This differs with bidding languages that are actually employed by
search engines where advertisers bid on keywords. Even-Dar et al. (2009) identify the
bidding language used by TAC/AA as a query language and those used by the search en-
gines as a keyword language.5 In the case of a keyword language, advertisers are forced
to implicitly reason about their values over a set of queries. Thus, the selection of key-
words becomes a major component of the advertiser’s strategy. Various natural language
processing and machine learning models have been proposed that attempt to generate or
select profitable keywords (Rusmevichientong and Williamson, 2006; Bartz et al., 2006;
Abhishek, 2007; Chen et al., 2008). We adopt a query language over the restricted domain
of TAC/AA queries for two reasons: query languages are more expressive and the query
space in TAC/AA is small.
Choosing ads
In actual sponsored search auctions, advertisers generate the ads that are displayed. The
content of the ad relative to the user query can have a dramatic effect on the click-through
rate of the ad. Advertisers, or SEM firms managing campaigns on their behalf, typically
develop ad content in an iterative manner. First, a set of candidate ads is created and sub-
mitted to the publisher for display. Then, some method of testing is used to prune ads that
perform poorly. Based on the surviving ads, the advertisers generate additional candidate
ads for testing and the process recurs.
The ad content in TAC/AA is specified by the inclusion, or lack thereof, of a specific
product. An ad that specifies a product is called targeted, whereas an ad that does not is
called generic. This restricts the set of possible ads and eliminates the content creation
5Equivalently, one can view the TAC/AA query language as fixing a coarse partition over a large set of
implicit keyword expressions.
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aspect of the advertisers’ strategies. However, the exploration and exploitation problem of
selecting which ad to display for a given query remains.
Setting spend limits
Currently, most publishers allow advertisers to specify an advertising budget by which
an advertiser can limit the advertising cost or spend for some period of time. Once the
advertiser exceeds the limit, the constrained ads will no longer be shown.
Much of the published work on advertiser bidding strategies in dynamic, multi-keyword
sponsored search auctions focuses on optimizing return while being constrained by an
exogenously specified budget (Kitts and Leblanc, 2004; Zhou and Lukose, 2007; Muthukr-
ishnan et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2008; Zhou and Naroditskiy, 2008). We believe that in
most situations the “budgets” submitted by advertisers to publishers are actually soft con-
straints on spending. These daily spend limits can be used by the advertisers for a variety
of purposes—for instance, to protect against a large influx of unprofitable clicks, to guard
against the advertisers’ uncertainty about the value of those clicks, cash-flow management,
or controlling distributed purchasing in a large organization.
Simulating an Advertising Campaign
The TAC/AA game simulates the daily campaigns of eight advertisers over a horizon of 60
simulated days. A high level depiction of the game interaction is show in Figure 9.4. The
game flow can be described by considering the game initialization phase and the daily tasks
performed by the agents after initialization.
At the beginning of a game instance, the instance-varying user, advertiser, and publisher
parameter settings are drawn from their associated distributions. All users are initialized
to the non-searching state, and the server simulates virtual days of user activity without
advertising, to spread the population across various states. The virtual day initialization is
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Figure 9.4: Cycle of activities for day d of a TAC/AA game instance.
an attempt to reduce the impact of cold start anomalies. Advertisers learn their product
and manufacturer specialization as well as their distribution capacity parameter (they are
not told the specialties and capacities of competitors). Finally, the publisher determines the
squashing parameter χ and reserve scores, of which the squashing parameter is revealed to
the advertisers.
At the beginning of each day d, the daily reports summarizing day d − 1 activity are
delivered to the advertisers. The publisher executes an ad auction for each query class to
determine the ad rankings and click prices. Users then issue queries, receive results, con-
sider clicking on ads and purchasing products. The publisher monitors spend limits and
reruns ad auctions as necessary. After all searching users have acted, the server updates
the population based on the results of the queries, ads, and purchases. Finally, the advertis-
ers submit their bid and ad selection updates to the publisher, for the auctions determining
placement on day d+ 1.
At the conclusion of a game, log files are produced that trace the interaction of the
agents during the simulation. We provide a log file parser that allows for further post-game
analysis of the traces.
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9.4 The 2009 Tournament
The TAC/AA specification and server implementation were announced in late 2008, and
the first tournament was held in Summer 2009. The 2009 TAC/AA competition had two
stages: qualifying and final tournament. During the qualifying stage agents participated in
a round-robin style tournament. Agents passed the qualifying stage by meeting a minimal
standard for agent competence. The TAC/AA final tournament was held during the Trad-
ing Agent Design and Analysis (TADA) workshop as well as the main IJCAI conference




CrocodileAgent University of Zagreb
DNAgents University of Washington, Tacoma and Ghent University
EPFLAgent Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
McCon Concordia and McGill Universities
Merlion Singapore Management University
Mertacor Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
MetroClick City University of New York and Microsoft
QuakTAC University of Pennsylvania
Schlemazl Brown University
TacTex U Texas at Austin
UMTac09 University of Macau
UWTAgent University of Washington, Tacoma
WayneAd Wayne State University
Table 9.2: Team agents and affiliations for the 2009 TAC/AA tournament.
The final tournament consisted of two rounds: semifinals and finals. During each round
approximately half of the agents were eliminated, while the remaining agents continued on
to the next round. In total, fifteen teams participated in the competition with eight moving
on to the finals round. The semifinal round consisted of a total of 88 games, while the final
round consisted of 80. Teams in the semifinal round played in either 44 or 48 games, while
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all agents in the finals played in each of the 80 games. Table 9.3 gives the scores for each
agent in semifinal and final rounds.
Agent Finals Semifinals Agent Semifinals
TacTex 79.89 70.69 Mertacor 62.53
AstonTAC 76.28 66.45 UWTAgent 62.32
Schlemazl 75.41 68.93 Merlion 61.27
QuakTAC 74.46 64.14 Bishop 59.31
DNAgents 71.78 68.28 McCon 41.73
EPFLAgent 71.69 68.22 CrocodileAgent 34.55
MetroClick 70.63 63.04 WayneAd 19.19
UMTac09 66.93 65.57
Table 9.3: TAC/AA-09 tournament participants, with average scores ($K) from semifinal
through final rounds.
Each round of the tournament consisted of a set of blocks of four games. Within each
block, each agent had two games where its Ccap value was MED, one game with a value of
LOW, and one game with a value of HIGH. The Ccap variable is an influential environmen-
tal factor that significantly affects an agent’s respective score, therefore the blocks enforced
a fair distribution of playing time with each value (see the common random variables and
antithetic variables methods of Section 2.1).
9.5 Tournament Analysis
Our understanding of the strategies employed by the participants in the 2009 tournament
is limited to observations (simulation traces) from tournament play and the offline analysis
of the following section. I perform a black-box analysis of the agents in order to gain an
understanding of the elementary components of their strategies. I investigate the distribu-
tion of advertising cost (spend) over query classes for each of the agents. With respect to a
set of basic features, the distribution of advertising spend is the most significant observable
behavior distinguishing agents in the 2009 tournament.
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Constructing the dataset
As with TAC/SCM, agents may experience network delays or other problems that cause
an agent to exhibit non-standard behavior by no fault of their own. A game is scratched
in TAC/SCM if, for any agent, there are six or more days (out of 220) in which the server
did not receive a message from that agent (as indicated by the game log). The games are
shorter in TAC/AA (60 days) and so we adopt a tighter bound. Two or more days without
a message triggers a scratch. Of the 168 games in the final rounds, 20 games meet this
criterion.
Reducing the variance in profits
I employ the Monte Carlo techniques of Chapter 2 to reduce variance in the scores observed
in TAC/AA simulations. In TAC/SCM, we observed a significant correlation between the
average level of demand and the profits agents received (see Section 5.3). The derived
payoff measure, DAP, adjusted each agent’s profit by the same amount. This uniform
adjustment occurs because the demand is assumed to affect each agent similarly and the
average demand is observed by all agents. Unlike TAC/SCM, there are significant control
variables in TAC/AA that are specific to a given agent in a simulation, such as the criti-
cal distribution capacity Ccap . This introduces an agent-specific dependence in the control
variates’ score adjustment that is not observed in TAC/SCM. Therefore, the adjustment
may change the rank (order of scores) of agents within a simulation.
I use data from the 2009 TAC/AA Final Tournament to calculate the control variates.
Of the 168 games in the final tournament, I scratch eight from the semifinal round. Twelve
games from the final round matched the scratch criterion. In each case, it was TacTex that
caused the scratch, however TacTex’s scores were not adversely effected. Thus, I include
those games in the test dataset. I consider the set of candidate control variables given in
Table 9.4. For each simulation, I calculate the value of the control variables for each of the
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eight agents. I use the semifinals dataset to fit the regression models and the finals dataset
to test. This generates a total of 640 training samples and 640 test samples that I use to
calibrate the control variates.
Symbol Description Mean
χ Squashing parameter 0.8
ρreg Regular reserve score 0.035
ρpro Promoted reserve score 0.2175
Ccap Advertiser critical distribution capacity 400
N ps Number of advertisers with product specialty 7/9
Nms Number of advertisers with manufacturer specialty 7/3
N cs Number of advertisers with component specialty 7/3
e Mean advertiser effect 0.4
eps Product specialty advertiser effect 0.45
ems Mean manufacturer specialty advertiser effect 0.425
ecs Mean component specialty advertiser effect 0.425
γps Product specialty continuation probability 0.55
γms Mean manufacturer specialty continuation probability 0.525
γcs Mean component specialty continuation probability 0.525
Table 9.4: TAC/AA-09 candidate control variables with their respective mean values.
Chapter 2 describes the luck-only method of control variates for multiagent simula-
tions. I propose four regression types for the luck-only method, of which I consider two
here: strategy-independent and strategy-dependent. In the strategy-independent method,
we regress the payoffs against the control variables without a strategy indicator. In the
strategy-dependent method, we regress the payoffs against the control variables with a
strategy indicator as an addition factor in the regression. The intuition behind the strategy-
dependent method is that, in general, agents are likely to score differently on average due
to some inherent difference in strategic quality. If we do not account for this, the regression
will use correlations in the control variables to “explain” the variance in scores. In some
cases, the agents condition their strategy on these variables. This makes the regression
heavily dependent on the mixture of the agents played and how those agents condition on
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the control variables. By adding an agent indicator in the regression we reduce, but do not
eliminate, this effect.
I regress both methods’ models on the semifinals test set, then evaluate each model by
calculating the standard error of each finalist’s score. Many of the variables in Table 9.4
are not significant. I employ backwards elimination to determine a reduced set of con-
trol variables for the strategy-independent and strategy-dependent methods. In backwards
elimination, we iteratively remove the variable with the largest p-value above 0.05 until
all variables are significant. After variable selection, the strategy-independent method has
an average standard error of $631.87, while the second method has an mean standard er-
ror of $581.71. Adding the agent identity decreased standard error by approximately 8%.
Without the adjustments of either model, the mean standard error is $1,129.34. I chose the
strategy-dependent model for our control variates, which decreases standard error by 48%.
Table 9.4 gives the coefficients and means selected as the control variates model for the
2009 server. I give the adjusted profit, denoted π†, for agent i in game x on the 2009 server
as
π†(x, i) = π(x, i)−
∑
q
αq(Cq(x, i)− µq). (9.2)
Control Mean Coefficient Low High
Variable (µq) (Cq) (2.5%) (97.5%)
Ccap 400 0.100 0.092 0.109
N ps 7/9 −1.22 −2.04 −0.39
Nms 7/3 −1.10 −1.57 −0.62
eps 0.425 36.80 16.11 57.48
γms 0.525 15.95 2.26 29.64
γcs 0.525 17.02 1.85 32.19
Table 9.5: TAC/AA-09 control variates with 95% confidence intervals around the coeffi-
cients (in thousands of units).
Table 9.6 compares the raw and adjusted average profit of each finalist. The differences
between the two profit measures are relatively small. This is largely attributable to the
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block-style tournament structure, where effects of the critical distribution capacity on an
individual agent’s score are marginalized.
Profit Adj. Profit
Agent Mean Std Err Mean Std Err
TacTex 79.89 1.25 80.02 0.66
AstonTAC 76.28 1.12 76.52 0.54
Schlemazl 75.41 1.23 75.22 0.87
QuakTAC 74.46 1.05 74.44 0.52
DNAgents 71.78 1.12 72.17 0.53
EPFLAgent 71.69 1.17 72.11 0.54
MetroClick 70.63 0.98 70.83 0.51
UMTac09 66.93 1.10 67.10 0.47
Table 9.6: TAC/AA-09 tournament finalists with raw and adjusted average profit ($K).
While the order of average profits and thus the overall ranking remains unchanged, the
rank within an individual games changed significantly. For instance, TacTex received the
highest profit (1st place) in 23 of the 80 finals games, however it received the highest ad-
justed profit in 36 of the 80 finals games. Similarly, UMTac09 received the lowest profit
(8th place) in 18 of the 80 finals games, however it received the lowest adjusted profit in 39
of the 80 finals games.
Managing a Portfolio of Ads
One major component of running an advertising campaign is determining what bid to sub-
mit for each ad in a portfolio of ads. The bids determine the position of the ads, which
in turn determines the clicks received by the ads. In TAC/AA, the value of a click differs
for different query classes, due to the focus and specialization effects. On the other hand,
the inventory effect imposes a decreasing marginal conversion rate that is common to all
query classes. When agents operate beyond Ccap , their conversion probability decreases




















































































Figure 9.5: Average bid, position, clicks, and conversions for each agent in the 2009
TAC/AA finals.
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Figure 9.5 shows the average bid, position, number of clicks received, and number of
conversions received per game for each agent in the finals. Advertisers influence the dis-
tribution over query classes in which they receive clicks by varying bids, ads, and spend
limits. This distribution, and the profit associated with each of the clicks, determines the
value of the portfolio. Figure 9.6 shows the distribution of clicks over query types for each


































































































































































































































































































Figure 9.6: Query type distribution of clicks for each agent in 2009 TAC/AA finals.
Six of the eight agents receive clicks from all three query types. The remaining
two, AstonTAC and UMTac09, do not receive any clicks from F0 queries. EPFLAgent,
MetroClick, Schlemazl, and TacTex have a relatively large percentage of clicks from each
of the query types. While not exclusively limited to F1 and F2 queries, QuakTAC has very
few F0 clicks in comparison. On the other hand, DNAgents has a large percentage of F0
clicks, especially after considering that there is a single query class that pertains to the F0
type, while there are 15 that do not.
From the results of the control variates analysis, we know that the parameters cor-
responding to the manufacturer specialty queries strongly influenced the results of the
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competition. For the remainder of the section, I investigate how agents condition their
observable behavior on these parameters. At the beginning of a simulation each agent is
assigned a manufacturer specialty (MS). For each agent, let the queries whose manufac-
turer information matches the MS be MS queries and let the bids that correspond to those
queries be MS bids. To understand the agents’ bids with respect to the manufacturer spe-
cialty, I consider each agent’s average MS bids over the course of a simulation. Using the
sample distributions of MS bids for each pair of agents, I calculate the p-value that the
mean is the same using a two-sample Student’s t-Test. I use the negative logarithm of the
p-values as a dissimilarity measure. Figure 9.7 gives a hierarchical clustering of the agents
with the dissimilarity measure. Notice that two highest level clusters split the agents ba-
sically according to rank in the tournament, with the exception of MetroClick. The mean
MS bids of DNAAgents, EPFLAgent, and UMTac09 all differ significantly from the bids
od the remaining five agents. On the other hand, the average MS bids of MetroClick, the























































Figure 9.7: Hierarchical cluster of agents’ MS bids in the 2009 TAC/AA finals, where
− log(p) is the dissimilarity between two clusters.
I repeat this type of clustering analysis for the average position, number of clicks, and
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advertising cost of each agent with respect to its respective MS queries. The hierarchi-
cal clustering remain qualitatively the same as in Figure 9.7, with the top four agents and
MetroClick being separated at the highest level from the remaining three. However, if we






















































Figure 9.8: Hierarchical cluster of agents’ MS revenue in the 2009 TAC/AA finals, where
− log(p) is the dissimilarity between two clusters.
The high-level cluster separates the three most profitable agents from the bottom five.
If, for example, we consider the differences in campaign strategy for Schlemazl and
MetroClick on MS queries, we see that bids, positions, clicks, and cost are all similar.
Therefore the difference of the two agents, at least on MS queries, lies in the revenue. On
average, the focus and specialty effects are the same for both agents, therefore it is the
inventory effect where the difference is pronounced.
All else being equal, conversions from an agent’s manufacturer specialty are the most
valuable (50% more than non-MS conversions). Therefore, for a fixed query type and in-
ventory effect, the average value per click is higher for MS queries than non-MS. The other
specialty effect, the component specialty, increases the odds of a conversion by 50%, how-
ever there is no positive probability, πlId, such that component specialty bonus increases
the conversion rate such that the resulting click value is greater than the click value of the
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MS bonus. Therefore, all else being equal, agents should prefer MS clicks over non-MS
clicks for the same cost per click.
If we calculate the average fraction of MS clicks each agent receives and cluster using
dissimilarity of that fraction, we see two main clusters separating the top three and bottom
five agents—similar Figure 9.8. Plotting the adjusted profits against the percentage of MS
clicks reveals an even stronger relationship, shown in Figure 9.9. The circles represent data
from the top three agents, while the squares represent data from the bottom five agents. The
thick black line gives the prediction of a linear model fit to the data. The linear coefficient
of the model is significant at a level beyond 0.001, with an adjusted R2 of 40%.





















Figure 9.9: Adjusted profits versus the percentage of MS clicks.
The analysis of agents’ click distributions reveals a strong relationship between the
fraction of clicks associated with MS queries and the adjusted profits. However, the top
performing agent (TacTex) had only the third-highest percentage of MS clicks, so other
strategic factors play an important role. Consider, for example, the average relative capacity











This statistic gives the fraction of the critical distribution capacity is used by the agent each
day. Regressing the fraction of MS clicks and the average relative capacity against adjusted
profits yields a statistically significant linear coefficient for each variable, however adding
the relative capacity only improves the adjusted R2 of the model by 2%. Thus, while sta-
tistically significant, the relative level at which agents keep their recent capacity does not
seem to explain the differences in agents’ scores. If the difference in relative capacity does
not explain the scores, then perhaps how the agents restrict the non-MS clicks plays a role.
One way to restrict clicks on non-MS queries is simply not to be included in the search
results corresponding to those queries. For each agent, 12 of the 16 query classes are
non-MS classes. For the five least profitable finals’ agents, their respective ads appear, on
average, in at least 9 of the 12 non-MS query class auctions per day. Of the three most prof-
itable agents, AstonTAC and Schlemazl appear, on average, in at most 4 of the 12 non-MS
query class auctions per day.
Another possibility is to apply a binding spend limit on the non-MS queries. All of
the three most profitable agents seems to take this approach. When an ad is shown in an
auction, each of the top three agents have an average daily binding spent limit on at least
seven of the 12 non-MS auctions.
Finally, I return to analyzing the unadjusted profits as a function of capacity and five
variables describing agent behavior. Of the five behavior variables, three relate to non-MS
behavior, one to MS behavior, and one to the capacity behavior. Table 9.7 lists the variables
as well as the cumulative adjusted R2 after adding each variable to a linear model. The four
MS and non-MS variables describe the behavior of agents in terms of how clicks were dis-
tributed, while the other two variables express the general degree to which the inventory
effect was active. For instance, knowing Ccap allows us to explain 60% of the variance,
while knowing Ccap and the fraction of MS clicks allows us to explain 80%. The coeffi-
cient of each variable is significant beyond the 2× 10−16 level. In total, given the values of




Fraction MS clicks 0.80
Average non-MS position 0.85
Average non-MS binding spend limits 0.86
Average used capacity 0.95
Average standard deviation of non-MS spend limits 0.97
Table 9.7: Capacity and significant behavioral variables for predicting advertiser profit.
9.6 Post-Tournament Analysis
After the 2009 tournament, teams were requested to submit their agents to the TAC agent
repository. Six of the eight finalists complied, as well as, three of the semifinalists who did
not advance to the finals. The players’ roles in the simulator are ex ante equivalent. With
the six strategies, the symmetric eight-player game has a total of 1,287 distinct profiles. I
model both the eight-player game and a four-player reduction (Wellman et al., 2005b). As
with the TAC/SCM analysis, in the four-player reduction (AA↓4) strategies are assigned
to pairs of players rather than individual players, and the payoff to a strategy in a profile
is defined as the average payoff to the two players playing this strategy in the original
eight-player game.
To date, I have collected results from over 45,000 simulation runs. Each simulation
reserves nine CPUs for a period of fifteen minutes—about a third of the computational re-
quirements of a TAC/SCM simulation; one for each agent and one for the TAC/SCM server.
As with TAC/SCM, agents can adapt only within a game instance. We scratch simulations
where an agent did not communicate with the server for two or more simulation days.
Four-player reduction
For AA↓4, I simulated all 126 profiles, with a minimum of 30 samples per profile. In the
resulting empirical game, only TacTex and Schlemazl survive IEDS. There is a mixed-
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strategy Nash equilibrium where each player chooses TacTex with probability 0.932 and
Schlemazl with probability 0.068. Using this equilibrium, I compute the NE regret of each
strategy that is listed in Table 9.8, along with its respective max regret. This ranking differs
from the tournament ranking in that AstonTAC is ranked lower and EPFLAgent is ranked
higher than their respective ranking in the tournament. We can also see that TacTex has a
small max regret, implying that it is nearly a dominant strategy in AA↓4.







Table 9.8: TAC/AA-09 tournament AA↓4 strategy comparison.
Eight-player empirical game
For the eight-player analysis, I simulated all 495 profiles over five of the six finalist
strategies, withholding MetroClick. In this empirical game, there is mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium where each player chooses TacTex with probability 0.90 and AstonTAC with
probability 0.10. I tested only deviations from the equilibrium profile to MetroClick, thus
reducing the number of required profiles from 1,287 to 503. Using this equilibrium, the
NE regret of each strategy is listed in Table 9.9. The ranking under the eight-player model
is closer to the tournament ranking than the AA↓4 ranking, however EPFLAgent is still
ranked higher than its respective ranking in the tournament.
Given the eight-player analysis, we can contrast equilibria in this model with the equi-









Table 9.9: TAC/AA-09 tournament full strategy comparison.
game, then we can employ the reduction in auction design analysis. Unfortunately, the
equilibrium profile in AA↓4 has a regret of $2.6K in the eight-player game, which is large
enough to prefer the eight-player analysis. Interestingly, the eight-player equilibrium mix-
ture has a regret of $0.5K in AA↓4. Like the tournament analysis of Section 9.5, we find
that TacTex, AstonTAC, and Schlemazl are stable strategies. We use these strategies as the
basis for optimizing the ad auctions as described in the next section.
9.7 Empirical Auction Design
In this section, I experiment with various ad-auction mechanisms in an attempt to deter-
mine a mechanism—a set of allocation and pricing rules—that yields optimal revenue for
the publisher. This analysis is consists of two stages: predicting the distribution of play
and calculating the revenue under that distribution. Because players condition their strate-
gies on the mechanism, we have to predict the distribution of play for each mechanism.
I employ a game-theoretic approach, whereby I use a sample Nash equilibrium of the in-
duced empirical game as a prediction of agent play. Then, I estimate the publisher revenue
of the mechanism by calculating the weighted sample mean under the sample equilib-
rium distribution. In general, this approach—optimizing a mechanism through empirical
game-theoretic analysis—is termed empirical mechanism design. Empirical mechanism
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design was first used by Vorobeychik et al. (2006) to analyze day-zero procurement in
TAC/SCM and later generalized by Vorobeychik (2008). Like empirical game-theoretic
analysis, empirical mechanism design allows us to analyze high-fidelity models. However,
there are caveats to the inferences that can be drawn. Principally, the evidence is empirical
and the strategy space is limited to a few heuristic strategies. Additionally, I am experi-
menting with strategies that are designed for one mechanism and using those to determine
the revenue under another mechanism.
I solve each mechanism through an eight-player empirical analysis similar to that of
Section 9.6. In the worst case, this requires that each of the 1,287 profiles are evaluated.
However, based on the analysis from the previous section, I conjecture that the support of
a sample Nash equilibrium will contain, at most, TacTex, AstonTAC, and Schlemazl—the
top three agents from the tournament. I find that this conjecture is correct. In fact, among
all of the tested mechanisms, no sample equilibrium has support that consists of more
than two of those strategies. Therefore, we only need to evaluate 9 profiles to determine
the equilibrium and 32 profiles to validate it—roughly 3% of profiles in the eight-player,
six-strategy game.
In each of the mechanisms, I use generalized second-price (GSP) as the pricing model.
I investigate two major components of an ad-auction mechanism: reserve scores and slot
scheduling algorithms. For reserve scores, I explore the space of static reserves that are uni-
form across all auctions. For slot scheduling, I explore algorithms that adjust advertisers’
bids in order to spread consumption of spend limits over a simulated day.
I compare auctions according the their expected publisher revenue, advertiser profit,
and total surplus. I maximize the publisher revenue and observe the profits for the ad-
vertisers during the optimization. The baseline for comparison is the standard 2009 finals
mechanism. Table 9.10 gives the publisher revenue, advertiser profits, and total surplus for
the profile of agents used in the tournament finals (each of the eight strategies is assigned
to a single player) and the eight-player equilibrium profile specified in Section 9.6.
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Profile Publisher Revenue Advertiser Profit Total Surplus
Finals 167.31 587.07 754.38
Equilibrium 83.09 688.96 772.05
Table 9.10: TAC/AA baseline comparison [$K].
In equilibrium, the publisher revenue is a small fraction (11%) of the total surplus. This
is primarily due to TacTex, which has large support (93.2%) in the equilibrium profile. Tac-
Tex tends to keep its bids low and focuses on the MS queries. It also appears that TacTex
is implicitly exploiting low reserve scores.
Static reserve prices
Edelman and Schwarz (2007) characterize the optimal auction for the one-shot sponsored
search environment proposed by Edelman et al. (2007). They find that in this setting the




where F (v) is the distribution of IID bidder valuations. The authors use a simulation frame-
work to evaluate the effects of setting reserves. They found that the reserve price matters
most when the market is shallow (few advertisers are bidding). In some cases, the optimal
reserve price increases publisher revenue more than adding an additional advertiser. This
result by Edelman and Schwarz for multi-unit (sponsored search) auctions is in contrast
to the findings of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) for single-unit auctions: no setting of the
reserve price exceeds the revenue gained through an additional advertiser.
I investigate the effect of reserve scores on publisher revenue in the TAC/AA scenario.
TAC/AA is a dynamic, multi-auction generalization of the scenario Edelman and Schwarz
(2007) investigated. In the 2009 finals, the publisher set reserve scores for all auctions
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at the beginning of the simulation. The regular and promoted reserve scores remained
constant throughout the simulation, respectively. The regular reserve score (ρreg) is drawn
uniformly from [0.02, 0.05], whereas the promoted reserve score (ρpro) is drawn uniformly
from [ρreg, 0.4]. In the first experiment, I constrain ρreg = ρpro = ρ and vary ρ over the
interval [0.0, 1.2]. At each evaluated reserve score, I select an equilibrium of the game and
calculate the publisher revenue and advertiser profits. Figure 9.10 shows equilibrium mix-
ture as a function of reserve score and the publisher revenue, advertiser profits, and total






































Figure 9.10: Equilibrium mixture, publisher revenue, advertiser profits, and total surplus
as a function of reserve score.
The publisher revenue is maximized at a reserve score of 0.60, with a value of approx-
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imately $264K. This is nearly a 400% increase over the publisher surplus without reserve
scores (ρ = 0). Such a large increase is surprising. For instance, Edelman and Schwarz
report an increase of less than 20% in their simulations for eight advertisers; however, their
simulations involve a single auction where the eight advertisers have IID valuations. As we
have seen in earlier sections, competent advertisers in TAC/AA focus a majority of their
spend on MS queries. The expected number of high-value competitors (advertisers whose
MS is identical) is 7
3
. While not directly comparable, Edelman and Schwarz (2007) also
report a large increase in publisher revenue (approximately 200%) for a similar number of
advertisers.
We can also measure the effect of varying numbers of advertisers on publisher revenue.
Instead of modifying the simulator to reduce the number of players, we can simply intro-
duce a special type of advertiser called a zero advertiser. Zero advertisers submit bids of 0
to the publisher, thus never show ads. Using the optimal reserve setting (0.60), we introduce
a varying number of zero advertisers. We compare the publisher revenue for each count of
zero advertisers to the revenue when the reserve is set to zero—determining an equilibrium
in strategies at each point. Figure 9.11 shows the resulting publisher revenue. The addi-
tional revenue garnered from setting reserve scores optimally vastly exceeds the benefit of
an additional advertiser. In fact, the publisher prefers its surplus with three advertisers and
an optimal reserve score to that with eight advertisers and no reserve score.
Slot Scheduling
When advertisers specify spend limits, the publisher must account for these limits when
allocating slots. Advertisers that have consumed their spend limits cannot be charged by
the publisher, therefore the publisher does not show the corresponding ads. Determining
how to allocate (and price) slots when advertisers specify spend limits is the slot scheduling
problem.6
6In practice, this is often called throttling or day parting.
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Figure 9.11: Revenue under the optimal reserve and no reserve as a function of advertisers.
Consider a simplified scenario given in Table 9.11. In this scenario, there are two ad-
vertisers (Alice and Bob) and two query classes (X and Y). For each query, the publisher
has one available slot. Assume every time an ad is displayed the user clicks on the ad, each
advertiser pays its respective bid when it is allocated a slot, and advertisers are allocated
slots until there are no more queries or the advertisers have exhausted their respective spend
limits. How should the publisher allocate slots?
Advertiser X Bid Y Bid Spend Limit
Alice 1 0 ∞
Bob 1 + α 1 + α 1 + α
Table 9.11: Slot allocation example.
The answer to this question depends on the sequence of queries. For instance, consider
a greedy approach where the publisher allocates slots to the highest bidder with an uncon-
sumed spend limit. Using the greedy algorithm, the revenue of the publisher is 2 + α for
the sequence Y X . This is the optimal revenue the publisher can achieve for that sequence.
However, consider the sequence XY . Using the greedy algorithm, the revenue of the pub-
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lisher is 1 + α, whereas the optimal is 2 + α. By letting α go to zero, we can see that,
in the worst case, the revenue of the greedy algorithm achieves at least half of the optimal
revenue—thus has a competitive ratio of 1
2
.
Mehta et al. (2007) introduce an algorithm that has a competitive ratio of 1 − 1/e for
this simplified problem. Let fi be the fraction of advertiser i’s spend limit that has been
consumed and φ(x) = 1 − ex−1. The publisher creates adjusted bids φ(fi)bi for alloca-
tion and pricing—the slot goes to the advertiser with the highest adjusted bid. Mehta et al.
prove that no randomized online algorithm can have a better competitive ratio than 1−1/e.
Lahaie et al. (2007) call this effect “budget smoothing” and, henceforth, I refer to this al-
gorithm as the budget-smoothing algorithm. Mahdian et al. (2007) study a modification
of the budget-smoothing algorithm that exploits accurate estimates of query frequencies,
while maintaining a good worst-case competitive ratio.
I investigate with three different slot allocation algorithms applied to TAC/AA: greedy,
budget smoothing, and budget smoothing with reserves. For the budget-smoothing-with-
reserves algorithm, the publisher creates adjusted bids of the following form:
φ(fi)bie
χ
i + (1− φ(fi))ρ,
where ρ is the reserve score. Thus, instead of tending to zero as fi approaches one, the
with-reserves algorithm tends to the reserve price, ρ/eχi . These adjusted bids replace the
standard bids in the publisher’s allocation and pricing algorithms. The results of the experi-
ment are given in Table 9.12. The greedy algorithm gives substantially better performance,
in terms of publisher surplus, than either of the budget smoothing algorithms. The greedy
and the budget-smoothing-with-reserves algorithms have comparable total surplus, how-
ever the greedy algorithm captures more of the revenue for the publisher with the same
setting of reserve scores. The combination of high reserve scores and tending the adver-
tiser bids towards zero seems to doom the standard budget smoothing algorithm, which
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creates a small surplus for both the publisher and the advertisers.
Publisher Advertiser Total
Algorithm Revenue Profits Surplus
Greedy 263.12 367.02 630.14
Budget smoothing 92.19 266.69 358.88
Budget smoothing with reserves 225.44 401.10 626.54
Table 9.12: TAC/AA-09 slot scheduling algorithm comparison [$K].
9.8 Discussion
Internet advertising, in particular ad auctions, is a challenging domain with many inter-
esting problems. Early research in ad auctions characterized equilibrium strategies in
abstracted forms of the scenario. Using these abstractions and their corresponding equilib-
ria, researchers have improved the various auction mechanisms used today—both in terms
of publisher revenue and total surplus. The TAC/AA scenario is a novel, high-fidelity sim-
ulation of an ad auction market sector. It incorporates many features of the domain that
are difficult to model analytically, but are nonetheless salient in the design of strategies and
mechanisms.
Participants in the 2009 TAC/AA tournament produced 15 viable agent strategies. Of
those, three strategies effectively managed to control advertising spend by focusing on
high-value query auctions—the primary determinant of success in the tournament. These
strategies also fared well in an empirical game-theoretic analysis of the scenario, each in
support of an equilibrium under various market parameterizations: TacTex when the reserve
score is low, AstonTAC for mid-range reserve scores, and Schlemazl when the reserve is
high.
Using these strategies, the auction design experiments demonstrated that reserve scores
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are a critical component of ad auction design. Even with as few three advertisers par-
ticipating in the market, the optimal reserve score accounts for more revenue than eight
advertisers with no reserve in TAC/AA. I show that a common slot scheduling algorithm—





This thesis expands the set of methods and techniques available to modelers when ana-
lyzing complex strategic scenarios—in particular, empirical game-theoretic methods and
techniques. Below, I summarize my contributions to empirical game theory and the appli-
cation of these methods and techniques to the analysis of market games.
10.1 Empirical Game-Theoretic Systems
Empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) encompasses the processes by which we con-
struct and analyze an empirical game model from a set of observations. An empirical
game-theoretic system unifies the control and analysis of a simulated scenario with the
components being operated on—such as a simulator, a set of strategies, and a set of mech-
anisms. The components of the system (white boxes with black text) and the interactions
between the components (arrows) are illustrated in Figure 10.1. The black arrows rep-
resent inputs that select a single element from a set, whereas the gray arrows represent
atomic inputs—passing all the data from a component. For instance, the set of strategies—
an atomic input—implicitly defines the set of profiles. Selecting a profile to simulate from
the set of profiles (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7), however, is a selection input. Given a profile
and a mechanism, a simulator generates an observation. Given observations and a set of
candidate game models, the system selects a single game model (Chapter 8), then fits the
model to the observed data (Chapter 2). The system analyzes the resulting empirical game
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Figure 10.1: Empirical game-theoretic system with relating chapters. Chapters are given
by black boxes with white text; selection inputs are given by black arrows; and atomic
inputs are given by gray arrows.
Estimating model parameters
In Chapter 2, I propose three classes of control variate methods for reducing variance in
multiagent simulations. Using these techniques, I demonstrate a significant variance reduc-
tion in the TAC/SCM and TAC/AA data sets of Chapters 5 and 9, respectively.
Evaluating strategies
Chapter 3 introduces a novel regret-based methodology for evaluating strategies in an em-
pirical game model. NE regret measures the regret of a strategy with respect to a Nash
Equilibrium. Using NE regret, modelers may construct NE-response rankings over strate-
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gies. For instance, NE-response rankings may be used to align the incentives of the entrants
in research competitions with the goals of the competition designers, where the competition
designers desire stable strategies. The methods introduced in Chapter 3 form the basis for
strategic analysis in case studies of supply chain management (Chapter 5) and ad auctions
(Chapter 9).
Identifying relevant strategies
Many computational problems in game theory, such as finding Nash equilibria, are hard
to solve. This limitation forces analysts to limit attention to restricted subsets of the en-
tire strategy space—focusing on strategies that are relevant to analysis. Often this means
strategies that support equilibria, or, more generally, strategies that are best responses. In
Chapter 4, I investigate formations: strategy sets that are closed under a (correlated) best-
response correspondence. I develop algorithms for n-player games that identify formations
by modifying an existing family of algorithms for two-player games. I extend these algo-
rithms to apply in cases where the utility function is partially specified, or there is a bound
on the size of the restricted profile space. The formation-finding algorithms I introduce
outperform existing algorithms from the literature on various classes of games.
Selecting profiles to simulate
For the profile selection problem, we sequentially determine profiles to simulation in order
to achieve some goal—for instance, finding a Nash equilibrium. Simulation is costly (often
the dominant cost of analysis), therefore we may be limited in the number of simulations
we can run. One basic approach is to simulate profiles uniformly until our simulation bud-
get is exhausted. However, if the goal of analysis is to determine a Nash equilibrium, not
all profiles are relevant. Of course, we do not know the set of relevant profiles a priori.
However, during the course of simulation we may determine profiles that are relevant.
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I introduce novel policies, as well as extend existing policies, for sequentially determin-
ing profiles to simulate, when constrained by a budget for simulation. I consider two for-
mulations of the profile selection problem: the revealed-payoff model and the noisy-payoff
model. In Chapter 6, I investigate policies that search for low-regret profiles (approxi-
mate equilibria). For the revealed-payoff model, I compare minimum-regret-first search
algorithm (MRFS) to the tabu best-response algorithm (TABU). TABU is the only existing
algorithms from the literature that has formally been analyzed. MRFS was informally used
in analysis of TAC/SCM. I find that MRFS is superior to TABU in many games of inter-
est. For the noisy-payoff model, I propose the information-gain search algorithm (IGS).
This algorithm outperforms the existing expected-confirmational-value-of-information al-
gorithm from the literature (ECVI). The MRFS and IGS algorithms for the revealed-payoff
and noisy-payoff models of observation, respectively, significantly reduce the number of
observations required to identify an approximate equilibrium when compared to the other
algorithms from the literature.
Schvartzman and Wellman (2009a) describe a special case of the profile selection prob-
lem, called the strategy exploration problem. Unlike profile selection policies such as
MRFS and IGS, strategy exploration policies sequentially determine restricted games (sets
of profiles) to evaluate. In Chapter 7, I propose a novel formation-based policy, MEMT,
for the revealed-payoff model. In an experimental study, MEMT performed as well as or
better than to the best existing policies in each case.
Selecting an empirical game model
In empirical game-theoretic systems, the empirical game that models the strategic aspects
of the scenario is constructed from empirical observation. This presents a tradeoff between
granularity and statistical confidence. For instance, collecting a large amount of data about
each profile improves confidence, but restricts the range of profiles that can be explored.
I introduce a flexible approach, where we may construct multiple game-theoretic models
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from the same set of observations. The models may vary in their expressiveness—ability
to represent a given utility function. I propose a family of algorithms in Chapter 8 that
select an empirical game model from a set of candidates. The algorithms use the concept
of generalization risk—treating each empirical game model as a predictor of payoffs—to
compare model classes. The model selection algorithms are sufficiently general such that
many compact game representations can be reasoned over—for instance, factored games
and graphical games. I demonstrate the efficacy of this approach by analyzing equivalent
strategy models on the TAC/SCM scenario.
10.2 Market Games
I employ the developed empirical game-theoretic techniques in two case studies of market
scenarios. In the first market scenario, I analyze the supply chain management strategies
through the perspective of a strategy designer. In the second, I create a simulated ad-auction
market and optimize the auction mechanism using strategies provided by external research
teams.
Supply chain management
Through a case study of the TAC/SCM market scenario (Chapter 5), I find evidence of
agent progress over subsequent tournaments, an important measure of the success for the
competition. In addition, I describe the regret-based development approach taken by the
DeepMaize team. I find that early-game procurement—the policy for selecting quantities
and order dates for purchases in the early part of the game—is a significant factor in the
regret (stability) of a strategy. When set optimally with respect to the tested policies, each
player choosing DeepMaize 2008 is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and the strategy set
consisting of only DeepMaize is the sole primitive formation.
In part, the analysis of the DeepMaize 2008 candidate strategies isolated the effect of
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early-game procurement policies. We could have, for instance, selected a policy that was a
best response to the 2007 finals agents. However, this policy would have likely been too ag-
gressive. The evidence from the 2008 tournament scores suggests that many teams selected
policies that were too aggressive for their respective agent. Instead we chose an equilib-
rium policy, based on empirical game-theoretic analysis. Thus, at least anecdotally, I find
evidence that this empirical game-theoretic approach to parameter selection contributed to
championship finishes in the 2008 and 2009 tournaments.
Ad auctions
I present a case study of ad auctions in Chapter 9. With my co-developers, I design a sce-
nario (TAC/AA) capturing key strategic issues in the Internet ad-auction domain for the
first time. TAC/AA debuted in summer 2009, with fifteen research groups participating. I
isolate strategic behavior that separates the top three agents from the remaining agents. Us-
ing these agents as a heuristic strategy set, I perform a strategic analysis of the scenario and
find that the top three agents from the tournament are the three most strategically stable.
Finally, I investigate various auction mechanisms. In particular, I vary the reserve score
and determine a Nash equilibrium over tournament strategies for each setting. In each case,
the set of profiles evaluated is a fraction (roughly 3%) of the total space. By exploiting
small supports, I was able to finely sample the reserve score. I demonstrate that, from the
publisher’s perspective, the reserve score is a principal determinant of publisher revenue in
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